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[reactos.git] / dll / win32 / crypt32 / chain.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
3 *
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
8 *
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
13 *
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
17 *
18 */
19 #include <stdarg.h>
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
21 #include "windef.h"
22 #include "winbase.h"
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
25 #include "wincrypt.h"
26 #include "wininet.h"
27 #include "wine/debug.h"
28 #include "wine/unicode.h"
29 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30
31 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
32 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
33
34 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35
36 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
37 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
38 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
39 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
40 */
41 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
42 {
43 LONG ref;
44 HCERTSTORE hRoot;
45 HCERTSTORE hWorld;
46 DWORD dwFlags;
47 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
48 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
49 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
50 } CertificateChainEngine;
51
52 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
53 DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
54 {
55 DWORD i;
56
57 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
58 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
59 }
60
61 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
62 {
63 DWORD i;
64
65 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
66 CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
67 }
68
69 static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
70
71 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
72 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
73 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
74 {
75 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
76 BYTE hash[20];
77 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
78
79 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
80 {
81 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
82
83 matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
84 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
85 }
86 return matching;
87 }
88
89 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
90 {
91 BOOL ret = TRUE;
92
93 if (store)
94 {
95 HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
96 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
97
98 do {
99 cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
100 if (cert)
101 {
102 if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
103 ret = FALSE;
104 else
105 CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
106 }
107 } while (ret && cert);
108 if (cert)
109 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
110 CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
111 }
112 return ret;
113 }
114
115 HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root, DWORD system_store, const CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG *config)
116 {
117 CertificateChainEngine *engine;
118 HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
119
120 static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
121 static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
122 static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
123
124 if(!root) {
125 if(config->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG) && config->hExclusiveRoot)
126 root = CertDuplicateStore(config->hExclusiveRoot);
127 else if (config->hRestrictedRoot)
128 root = CertDuplicateStore(config->hRestrictedRoot);
129 else
130 root = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, rootW);
131 if(!root)
132 return NULL;
133 }
134
135 engine = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
136 if(!engine) {
137 CertCloseStore(root, 0);
138 return NULL;
139 }
140
141 engine->ref = 1;
142 engine->hRoot = root;
143 engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0, CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
144 worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
145 worldStores[1] = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, caW);
146 worldStores[2] = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, myW);
147 worldStores[3] = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, trustW);
148
149 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld, sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
150 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld, config->cAdditionalStore, config->rghAdditionalStore);
151 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
152
153 engine->dwFlags = config->dwFlags;
154 engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = config->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
155 engine->MaximumCachedCertificates = config->MaximumCachedCertificates;
156 if(config->CycleDetectionModulus)
157 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = config->CycleDetectionModulus;
158 else
159 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
160
161 return engine;
162 }
163
164 static CertificateChainEngine *default_cu_engine, *default_lm_engine;
165
166 static CertificateChainEngine *get_chain_engine(HCERTCHAINENGINE handle, BOOL allow_default)
167 {
168 const CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { sizeof(config) };
169
170 if(handle == HCCE_CURRENT_USER) {
171 if(!allow_default)
172 return NULL;
173
174 if(!default_cu_engine) {
175 handle = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(NULL, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER, &config);
176 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer((void**)&default_cu_engine, handle, NULL);
177 if(default_cu_engine != handle)
178 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(handle);
179 }
180
181 return default_cu_engine;
182 }
183
184 if(handle == HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE) {
185 if(!allow_default)
186 return NULL;
187
188 if(!default_lm_engine) {
189 handle = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(NULL, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE, &config);
190 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer((void**)&default_lm_engine, handle, NULL);
191 if(default_lm_engine != handle)
192 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(handle);
193 }
194
195 return default_lm_engine;
196 }
197
198 return (CertificateChainEngine*)handle;
199 }
200
201 static void free_chain_engine(CertificateChainEngine *engine)
202 {
203 if(!engine || InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref))
204 return;
205
206 CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
207 CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
208 CryptMemFree(engine);
209 }
210
211 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT
212 {
213 DWORD cbSize;
214 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedRoot;
215 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedTrust;
216 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedOther;
217 DWORD cAdditionalStore;
218 HCERTSTORE *rghAdditionalStore;
219 DWORD dwFlags;
220 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
221 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
222 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
223 } CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT;
224
225 BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
226 HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
227 {
228 BOOL ret;
229
230 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
231
232 if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT)
233 && pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG))
234 {
235 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
236 return FALSE;
237 }
238 ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
239 if (!ret)
240 {
241 *phChainEngine = NULL;
242 return FALSE;
243 }
244
245 *phChainEngine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(NULL, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER, pConfig);
246 return *phChainEngine != NULL;
247 }
248
249 void WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
250 {
251 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
252 free_chain_engine(get_chain_engine(hChainEngine, FALSE));
253 }
254
255 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
256 {
257 free_chain_engine(default_cu_engine);
258 free_chain_engine(default_lm_engine);
259 }
260
261 typedef struct _CertificateChain
262 {
263 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
264 HCERTSTORE world;
265 LONG ref;
266 } CertificateChain;
267
268 BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD *type)
269 {
270 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
271 DWORD size;
272 BOOL ret;
273
274 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
275 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
276 {
277 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
278
279 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
280 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
281 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
282 &info, &size);
283 if (ret)
284 {
285 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
286 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
287 {
288 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
289 DWORD i;
290
291 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
292 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
293 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
294 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
295 directoryName =
296 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
297 if (directoryName)
298 {
299 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
300 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
301 && CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
302 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
303 if (type) *type = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
304 }
305 else
306 {
307 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
308 ret = FALSE;
309 }
310 }
311 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
312 {
313 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
314 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
315 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
316 {
317 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
318
319 if (buf)
320 {
321 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
322 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
323 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
324 CryptMemFree(buf);
325 if (type) *type = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
326 }
327 else
328 ret = FALSE;
329 }
330 else
331 ret = FALSE;
332 }
333 LocalFree(info);
334 }
335 }
336 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
337 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
338 {
339 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
340
341 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
342 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
343 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
344 &info, &size);
345 if (ret)
346 {
347 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
348 {
349 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
350 &info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) &&
351 CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber,
352 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
353 if (type) *type = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
354 }
355 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
356 {
357 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
358 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
359 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
360 {
361 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
362
363 if (buf)
364 {
365 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
366 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
367 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
368 CryptMemFree(buf);
369 if (type) *type = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
370 }
371 else
372 ret = FALSE;
373 }
374 else
375 ret = FALSE;
376 }
377 else
378 ret = FALSE;
379 LocalFree(info);
380 }
381 }
382 else
383 {
384 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
385 &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer);
386 if (type) *type = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
387 }
388 return ret;
389 }
390
391 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
392 {
393 CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
394 CryptMemFree(element);
395 }
396
397 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
398 {
399 DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
400
401 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
402 for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
403 for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
404 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
405 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
406 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
407 cyclicCertIndex = j;
408 if (cyclicCertIndex)
409 {
410 chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
411 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
412 /* Release remaining certs */
413 for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
414 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
415 /* Truncate chain */
416 chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
417 }
418 }
419
420 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
421 static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
422 {
423 if (chain->cElement)
424 return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
425 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
426 else
427 return FALSE;
428 }
429
430 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
431 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
432 {
433 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
434 chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
435 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
436 * chain.
437 */
438 chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
439 }
440
441 static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
442 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
443 {
444 BOOL ret = FALSE;
445 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
446
447 if (element)
448 {
449 if (!chain->cElement)
450 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
451 else
452 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
453 (chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
454 if (chain->rgpElement)
455 {
456 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
457 memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
458 element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
459 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
460 if (chain->cElement > 1)
461 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
462 = subjectInfoStatus;
463 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
464 if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
465 {
466 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
467 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
468 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
469 */
470 element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
471 }
472 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
473 &element->TrustStatus);
474 ret = TRUE;
475 }
476 else
477 CryptMemFree(element);
478 }
479 return ret;
480 }
481
482 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
483 {
484 DWORD i;
485
486 for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
487 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
488 CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
489 CryptMemFree(chain);
490 }
491
492 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
493 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
494 {
495 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
496 rootElement->pCertContext);
497
498 if (!trustedRoot)
499 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
500 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
501 else
502 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
503 }
504
505 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
506 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
507 {
508 PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
509
510 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
511 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
512 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
513 {
514 TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
515 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
516 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
517 }
518 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
519 }
520
521 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
522 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
523 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
524 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
525 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
526 */
527 static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
528 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
529 {
530 BOOL ret = TRUE;
531 PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
532 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
533
534 constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
535 if (ext)
536 {
537 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
538 DWORD size = 0;
539
540 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
541 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
542 NULL, &info, &size);
543 if (ret)
544 {
545 if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
546 constraints->fCA =
547 info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
548 LocalFree(info);
549 }
550 }
551 else
552 {
553 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
554 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
555 if (ext)
556 {
557 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
558
559 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
560 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
561 0, NULL, constraints, &size);
562 }
563 else
564 constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
565 }
566 return ret;
567 }
568
569 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
570 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
571 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
572 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
573 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
574 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
575 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
576 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
577 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
578 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
579 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
580 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
581 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
582 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
583 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
584 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
585 * the next certificate in the chain.
586 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
587 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
588 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
589 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
590 * occurs.
591 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
592 * chain is valid.
593 */
594 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
595 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
596 DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
597 {
598 BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
599 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
600
601 if (isRoot)
602 implicitCA = TRUE;
603 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
604 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
605 {
606 BYTE hash[20];
607 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
608
609 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
610 hash, &size))
611 {
612 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
613 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
614 engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
615 &blob, NULL);
616
617 if (localCert)
618 {
619 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
620 implicitCA = TRUE;
621 }
622 }
623 }
624 if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
625 &constraints, implicitCA)))
626 {
627 chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
628 if (!constraints.fCA)
629 {
630 TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
631 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
632 }
633 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
634 {
635 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
636 * entire remaining chain.
637 */
638 if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
639 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
640 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
641 {
642 TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
643 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
644 chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
645 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
646 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
647 }
648 }
649 }
650 if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
651 remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
652 {
653 TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
654 remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
655 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
656 *pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
657 }
658 return validBasicConstraints;
659 }
660
661 static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
662 {
663 BOOL match;
664
665 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
666 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
667 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
668 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
669 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
670 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
671 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
672 * and for email addresses,
673 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
674 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
675 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
676 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
677 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
678 */
679 if (constraint[0] == '.')
680 {
681 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
682 if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
683 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
684 constraint);
685 else
686 {
687 /* name is too short, no match */
688 match = FALSE;
689 }
690 }
691 else
692 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
693 return match;
694 }
695
696 static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
697 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
698 {
699 BOOL match = FALSE;
700
701 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
702
703 if (!constraint)
704 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
705 else if (!name)
706 ; /* no match */
707 else
708 {
709 LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
710 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
711 WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
712
713 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
714 * section 4.2.1.10:
715 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
716 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
717 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
718 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
719 *
720 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
721 colon = strchrW(name, ':');
722 if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
723 name = colon + 3;
724 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
725 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
726 * Those are removed next.)
727 */
728 authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
729 if (!authority_end)
730 authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
731 if (!authority_end)
732 authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
733 /* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion
734 * of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion
735 * is found (indicated by '@').
736 */
737 for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' &&
738 *colon != '@'; colon--)
739 ;
740 if (*colon == ':')
741 authority_end = colon;
742 /* Remove any username from the authority */
743 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
744 name = at;
745 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
746 if (*authority_end)
747 {
748 if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) /
749 sizeof(hostname_buf[0]))
750 {
751 memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
752 (authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
753 hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
754 hostname = hostname_buf;
755 }
756 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
757 }
758 else
759 hostname = name;
760 if (hostname)
761 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
762 }
763 return match;
764 }
765
766 static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
767 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
768 {
769 BOOL match = FALSE;
770 LPCWSTR at;
771
772 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
773
774 if (!constraint)
775 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
776 else if (!name)
777 ; /* no match */
778 else if (strchrW(constraint, '@'))
779 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
780 else
781 {
782 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
783 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
784 else
785 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
786 }
787 return match;
788 }
789
790 static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
791 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
792 {
793 BOOL match = FALSE;
794
795 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
796
797 if (!constraint)
798 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
799 else if (!name)
800 ; /* no match */
801 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
802 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
803 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
804 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
805 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
806 * would not."
807 */
808 else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
809 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
810 else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
811 {
812 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
813 constraint);
814 if (match)
815 {
816 BOOL dot = FALSE;
817 LPCWSTR ptr;
818
819 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
820 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
821 * matching portion of the name.
822 */
823 for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
824 !dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
825 if (*ptr == '.')
826 dot = TRUE;
827 match = dot;
828 }
829 }
830 /* else: name is too short, no match */
831
832 return match;
833 }
834
835 static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
836 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
837 {
838 BOOL match = FALSE;
839
840 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
841 name->cbData, name->pbData);
842
843 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
844 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
845 */
846 if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
847 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
848 else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
849 constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
850 {
851 DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
852
853 memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
854 memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
855 memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
856 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
857 * don't need to swap to host order
858 */
859 match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
860 }
861 else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
862 {
863 const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
864 DWORD i;
865
866 subnet = constraint->pbData;
867 mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
868 addr = name->pbData;
869 match = TRUE;
870 for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
871 if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
872 match = FALSE;
873 }
874 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
875
876 return match;
877 }
878
879 static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
880 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
881 {
882 CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
883 DWORD size;
884 BOOL match = FALSE;
885
886 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
887 constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
888 {
889 DWORD i;
890
891 match = TRUE;
892 for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
893 match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
894 CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
895 (CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
896 LocalFree(constraintName);
897 }
898 return match;
899 }
900
901 static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
902 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
903 {
904 BOOL match = FALSE;
905
906 if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
907 {
908 if (present)
909 *present = TRUE;
910 switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
911 {
912 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
913 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
914 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
915 break;
916 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
917 match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
918 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
919 break;
920 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
921 match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
922 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
923 break;
924 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
925 match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
926 &name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
927 break;
928 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
929 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
930 &name->u.DirectoryName);
931 break;
932 default:
933 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
934 constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
935 *trustErrorStatus |=
936 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
937 }
938 }
939 else if (present)
940 *present = FALSE;
941 return match;
942 }
943
944 static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
945 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
946 {
947 DWORD i;
948 BOOL match = FALSE;
949
950 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
951 match = alt_name_matches(name,
952 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
953 return match;
954 }
955
956 static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
957 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
958 BOOL *present)
959 {
960 DWORD i;
961 BOOL match = FALSE;
962
963 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
964 match = alt_name_matches(name,
965 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
966 present);
967 return match;
968 }
969
970 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
971 {
972 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
973
974 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
975 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
976 if (!ext)
977 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
978 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
979 return ext;
980 }
981
982 static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
983 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
984 {
985 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
986 DWORD size;
987
988 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
989 altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
990 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
991 &subjectAltName, &size))
992 {
993 DWORD i;
994
995 for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
996 {
997 BOOL nameFormPresent;
998
999 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
1000 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1001 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
1002 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
1003 * the certificate is acceptable."
1004 */
1005 if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
1006 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
1007 trustErrorStatus))
1008 {
1009 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
1010 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
1011 *trustErrorStatus |=
1012 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1013 }
1014 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
1015 if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
1016 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
1017 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
1018 {
1019 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
1020 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
1021 *trustErrorStatus |=
1022 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1023 }
1024 }
1025 LocalFree(subjectAltName);
1026 }
1027 else
1028 *trustErrorStatus |=
1029 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1030 }
1031
1032 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1033 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1034 {
1035 DWORD i;
1036 BOOL match = FALSE;
1037
1038 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1039 {
1040 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1041 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1042
1043 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1044 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1045 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1046 }
1047 return match;
1048 }
1049
1050 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1051 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
1052 BOOL *present)
1053 {
1054 DWORD i;
1055 BOOL match = FALSE;
1056
1057 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1058 {
1059 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1060 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1061
1062 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1063 {
1064 *present = TRUE;
1065 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1066 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1067 }
1068 }
1069 return match;
1070 }
1071
1072 static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
1073 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1074 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1075 {
1076 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
1077 DWORD size;
1078
1079 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
1080 subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
1081 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1082 {
1083 DWORD i, j;
1084
1085 for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
1086 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
1087 if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
1088 szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
1089 {
1090 BOOL nameFormPresent;
1091
1092 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
1093 * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1094 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
1095 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
1096 * the certificate is acceptable."
1097 */
1098 if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
1099 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1100 trustErrorStatus))
1101 {
1102 TRACE_(chain)(
1103 "email address in subject name is excluded\n");
1104 *trustErrorStatus |=
1105 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1106 }
1107 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
1108 if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
1109 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1110 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
1111 {
1112 TRACE_(chain)(
1113 "email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
1114 *trustErrorStatus |=
1115 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1116 }
1117 }
1118 LocalFree(name);
1119 }
1120 else
1121 *trustErrorStatus |=
1122 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1123 }
1124
1125 static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1126 {
1127 BOOL empty;
1128
1129 if (!name->cbData)
1130 empty = TRUE;
1131 else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
1132 {
1133 /* An empty sequence is also empty */
1134 empty = TRUE;
1135 }
1136 else
1137 empty = FALSE;
1138 return empty;
1139 }
1140
1141 static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1142 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1143 {
1144 BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
1145 DWORD i;
1146
1147 /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
1148 * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
1149 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
1150 * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
1151 * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
1152 * attribute [RFC2985]."
1153 * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
1154 */
1155 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
1156 i++)
1157 if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1158 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1159 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1160 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
1161 i++)
1162 if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1163 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1164 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1165 if (hasEmailConstraint)
1166 compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
1167 trustErrorStatus);
1168 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1169 {
1170 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1171 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1172
1173 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
1174 directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
1175 {
1176 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
1177 *trustErrorStatus |=
1178 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1179 }
1180 }
1181 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1182 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
1183 * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
1184 * acceptable."
1185 * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
1186 */
1187 if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
1188 {
1189 BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
1190
1191 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1192 {
1193 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1194 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1195
1196 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1197 {
1198 hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
1199 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
1200 subjectName);
1201 }
1202 }
1203 if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
1204 {
1205 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
1206 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1207 }
1208 }
1209 }
1210
1211 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
1212 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
1213 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1214 {
1215 CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
1216
1217 if (ext)
1218 compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
1219 trustErrorStatus);
1220 /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
1221 * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1222 * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
1223 * subject alternative names."
1224 */
1225 compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
1226 trustErrorStatus);
1227 }
1228
1229 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1230 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
1231 {
1232 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
1233
1234 CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
1235
1236 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
1237 cert->rgExtension)))
1238 {
1239 DWORD size;
1240
1241 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1242 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1243 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
1244 &size);
1245 }
1246 return info;
1247 }
1248
1249 static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
1250 {
1251 DWORD i;
1252 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1253
1254 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
1255 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1256 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
1257 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
1258 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
1259 */
1260 if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
1261 {
1262 WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
1263 ret = FALSE;
1264 }
1265 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
1266 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1267 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
1268 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
1269 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
1270 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
1271 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
1272 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
1273 * certificate."
1274 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
1275 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
1276 */
1277 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1278 if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1279 info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1280 {
1281 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
1282 ret = FALSE;
1283 }
1284 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1285 if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1286 info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1287 {
1288 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
1289 ret = FALSE;
1290 }
1291 return ret;
1292 }
1293
1294 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1295 {
1296 int i, j;
1297
1298 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
1299 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
1300 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
1301 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
1302 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
1303 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
1304 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
1305 * them.
1306 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
1307 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
1308 * constraints.
1309 */
1310 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1311 {
1312 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1313
1314 if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
1315 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
1316 {
1317 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
1318 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1319 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1320 else
1321 {
1322 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1323 {
1324 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1325
1326 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
1327 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
1328 */
1329 if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1330 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext, NULL))
1331 {
1332 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
1333 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
1334 &errorStatus);
1335 if (errorStatus)
1336 {
1337 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1338 errorStatus;
1339 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1340 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1341 }
1342 else
1343 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1344 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1345 }
1346 }
1347 }
1348 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1349 }
1350 }
1351 }
1352
1353 /* Gets cert's policies info, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1354 static CERT_POLICIES_INFO *CRYPT_GetPolicies(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1355 {
1356 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1357 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies = NULL;
1358
1359 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1360 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1361 if (ext)
1362 {
1363 DWORD size;
1364
1365 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1366 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1367 &policies, &size);
1368 }
1369 return policies;
1370 }
1371
1372 static void CRYPT_CheckPolicies(const CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies, CERT_INFO *cert,
1373 DWORD *errorStatus)
1374 {
1375 DWORD i;
1376
1377 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1378 {
1379 /* For now, the only accepted policy identifier is the anyPolicy
1380 * identifier.
1381 * FIXME: the policy identifiers should be compared against the
1382 * cert's certificate policies extension, subject to the policy
1383 * mappings extension, and the policy constraints extension.
1384 * See RFC 5280, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.11.
1385 */
1386 if (strcmp(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier,
1387 szOID_ANY_CERT_POLICY))
1388 {
1389 FIXME("unsupported policy %s\n",
1390 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier);
1391 *errorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS;
1392 }
1393 }
1394 }
1395
1396 static void CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1397 {
1398 int i, j;
1399
1400 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1401 {
1402 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1403
1404 if ((policies = CRYPT_GetPolicies(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)))
1405 {
1406 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1407 {
1408 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1409
1410 CRYPT_CheckPolicies(policies,
1411 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus);
1412 if (errorStatus)
1413 {
1414 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1415 errorStatus;
1416 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1417 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1418 }
1419 }
1420 LocalFree(policies);
1421 }
1422 }
1423 }
1424
1425 static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1426 {
1427 DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1428 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
1429 LPWSTR str = NULL;
1430
1431 if (len)
1432 {
1433 str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1434 if (str)
1435 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1436 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
1437 }
1438 return str;
1439 }
1440
1441 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
1442 {
1443 LPWSTR str;
1444
1445 switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
1446 {
1447 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
1448 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
1449 debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
1450 break;
1451 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
1452 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
1453 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
1454 break;
1455 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
1456 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
1457 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
1458 break;
1459 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
1460 str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
1461 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
1462 CryptMemFree(str);
1463 break;
1464 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
1465 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
1466 break;
1467 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
1468 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
1469 entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
1470 break;
1471 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
1472 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
1473 debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
1474 break;
1475 default:
1476 TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
1477 }
1478 }
1479
1480 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1481 {
1482 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
1483 DWORD size;
1484
1485 TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
1486 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
1487 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1488 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1489 {
1490 DWORD i;
1491
1492 TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
1493 for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
1494 dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
1495 LocalFree(name);
1496 }
1497 }
1498
1499 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1500 {
1501 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
1502 DWORD size = 0;
1503
1504 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
1505 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
1506 NULL, &info, &size))
1507 {
1508 TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
1509 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1510 info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1511 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
1512 LocalFree(info);
1513 }
1514 }
1515
1516 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1517 {
1518 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
1519 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
1520
1521 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1522 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1523 0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
1524 {
1525 TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
1526 TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
1527 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1528 constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1529 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
1530 }
1531 }
1532
1533 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1534 {
1535 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1536 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1537
1538 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1539 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1540 {
1541 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1542 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1543 if (usage.cbData)
1544 {
1545 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
1546 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
1547 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1548 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1549 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1550 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1551 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1552 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
1553 }
1554 #undef trace_usage_bit
1555 if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
1556 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1557 }
1558 }
1559
1560 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
1561 {
1562 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
1563 TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1564 subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
1565 }
1566
1567 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1568 {
1569 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1570 DWORD size;
1571
1572 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1573 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1574 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
1575 &size))
1576 {
1577 DWORD i;
1578
1579 TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1580 nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
1581 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1582 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
1583 TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1584 nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
1585 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1586 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
1587 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1588 }
1589 }
1590
1591 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1592 {
1593 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1594 DWORD size;
1595
1596 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1597 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1598 &policies, &size))
1599 {
1600 DWORD i, j;
1601
1602 TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
1603 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1604 {
1605 TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1606 debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
1607 TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1608 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
1609 for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
1610 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1611 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
1612 pszPolicyQualifierId));
1613 }
1614 LocalFree(policies);
1615 }
1616 }
1617
1618 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1619 {
1620 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
1621 DWORD size;
1622
1623 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
1624 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1625 &usage, &size))
1626 {
1627 DWORD i;
1628
1629 TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
1630 for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
1631 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
1632 LocalFree(usage);
1633 }
1634 }
1635
1636 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1637 {
1638 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1639 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1640
1641 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1642 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1643 {
1644 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1645 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1646 if (usage.cbData)
1647 {
1648 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1649 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1650 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1651 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1652 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
1653 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
1654 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1655 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1656 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1657 }
1658 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1659 }
1660 }
1661
1662 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1663 {
1664 TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
1665 ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
1666 if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1667 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
1668 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
1669 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
1670 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1671 dump_basic_constraints(ext);
1672 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1673 dump_key_usage(ext);
1674 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1675 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
1676 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
1677 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
1678 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1679 dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
1680 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1681 dump_name_constraints(ext);
1682 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1683 dump_cert_policies(ext);
1684 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1685 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
1686 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
1687 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
1688 }
1689
1690 static LPCSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
1691 {
1692 char date[80];
1693 char dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1694 SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
1695
1696 if (!time) return "(null)";
1697
1698 GetLocaleInfoA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt,
1699 sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0]));
1700 FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
1701 GetDateFormatA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date,
1702 sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0]));
1703 return wine_dbg_sprintf("%s", date);
1704 }
1705
1706 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1707 {
1708 LPWSTR name = NULL;
1709 DWORD len, i;
1710
1711 TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1712 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1713 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
1714 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1715 if (name)
1716 {
1717 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1718 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
1719 TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1720 CryptMemFree(name);
1721 }
1722 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1723 NULL, 0);
1724 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1725 if (name)
1726 {
1727 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1728 name, len);
1729 TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1730 CryptMemFree(name);
1731 }
1732 TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1733 filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore),
1734 filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter));
1735 TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
1736 for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1737 dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
1738 }
1739
1740 static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
1741 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
1742 {
1743 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1744 BOOL ret;
1745 BYTE usageBits = 0;
1746
1747 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1748 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1749 if (ext)
1750 {
1751 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1752 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1753
1754 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
1755 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1756 &usage, &size);
1757 if (!ret)
1758 return FALSE;
1759 else if (usage.cbData > 2)
1760 {
1761 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1762 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1763 */
1764 return FALSE;
1765 }
1766 else
1767 {
1768 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1769 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1770 * key usage bits.
1771 */
1772 usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
1773 }
1774 }
1775 if (isCA)
1776 {
1777 if (!ext)
1778 {
1779 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1780 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1781 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1782 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1783 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1784 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1785 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1786 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1787 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1788 * certs without key usage extensions. Because some CAs, e.g.
1789 * Certum, also do not include key usage extensions in their
1790 * intermediate certificates, we are forced to accept V3
1791 * certificates without key usage extensions as well.
1792 */
1793 ret = TRUE;
1794 }
1795 else
1796 {
1797 if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1798 {
1799 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1800 ret = FALSE;
1801 }
1802 else
1803 ret = TRUE;
1804 }
1805 }
1806 else
1807 {
1808 if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1809 {
1810 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1811 ret = FALSE;
1812 }
1813 else
1814 ret = TRUE;
1815 }
1816 return ret;
1817 }
1818
1819 static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1820 {
1821 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1822 DWORD i;
1823
1824 for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1825 {
1826 if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
1827 {
1828 LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
1829
1830 if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1831 ret = TRUE;
1832 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1833 ret = TRUE;
1834 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1835 ret = TRUE;
1836 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1837 ret = TRUE;
1838 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1839 ret = TRUE;
1840 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1841 ret = TRUE;
1842 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1843 ret = TRUE;
1844 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1845 ret = TRUE;
1846 else
1847 {
1848 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1849 debugstr_a(oid));
1850 ret = FALSE;
1851 }
1852 }
1853 }
1854 return ret;
1855 }
1856
1857 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1858 {
1859 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1860
1861 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1862 switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
1863 {
1864 case CERT_V1:
1865 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1866 * section 4.1.2.8:
1867 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1868 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1869 */
1870 if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
1871 cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
1872 ret = FALSE;
1873 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1874 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1875 */
1876 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1877 ret = FALSE;
1878 break;
1879 case CERT_V2:
1880 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1881 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1882 */
1883 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1884 ret = FALSE;
1885 break;
1886 case CERT_V3:
1887 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1888 break;
1889 default:
1890 WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1891 ret = FALSE;
1892 }
1893 return ret;
1894 }
1895
1896 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
1897 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
1898 {
1899 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
1900 int i;
1901 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
1902 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
1903 DWORD type;
1904
1905 TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1906 chain->cElement, filetime_to_str(time));
1907 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
1908 {
1909 BOOL isRoot;
1910
1911 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
1912 dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1913 if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
1914 isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1915 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, NULL);
1916 else
1917 isRoot = FALSE;
1918 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1919 {
1920 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1921 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1922 */
1923 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1924 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1925 }
1926 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
1927 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
1928 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1929 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
1930 if (i != 0)
1931 {
1932 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1933 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1934 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
1935 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
1936 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
1937 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
1938 chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1939 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
1940 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1941 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1942 */
1943 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
1944 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1945 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1946 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
1947 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
1948 &pathLengthConstraintViolated))
1949 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1950 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1951 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
1952 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
1953 {
1954 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1955 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
1956 }
1957 }
1958 else
1959 {
1960 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1961 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1962 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
1963 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1964 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1965 }
1966 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
1967 isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
1968 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1969 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
1970 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
1971 {
1972 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1973 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1974 */
1975 pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
1976 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1977 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
1978 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1979 }
1980 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1981 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1982 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1983 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1984 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION |
1985 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT;
1986 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1987 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1988 }
1989 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
1990 CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(chain);
1991 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext, &type))
1992 {
1993 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1994 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | type;
1995 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
1996 }
1997 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
1998 }
1999
2000 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindIssuer(const CertificateChainEngine *engine, const CERT_CONTEXT *cert,
2001 HCERTSTORE store, DWORD type, void *para, DWORD flags, PCCERT_CONTEXT prev_issuer)
2002 {
2003 CRYPT_URL_ARRAY *urls;
2004 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer;
2005 DWORD size;
2006 BOOL res;
2007
2008 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, type, para, prev_issuer);
2009 if(issuer) {
2010 TRACE("Found in store %p\n", issuer);
2011 return issuer;
2012 }
2013
2014 /* FIXME: For alternate issuers, we don't search world store nor try to retrieve issuer from URL.
2015 * This needs more tests.
2016 */
2017 if(prev_issuer)
2018 return NULL;
2019
2020 if(engine->hWorld) {
2021 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, type, para, NULL);
2022 if(issuer) {
2023 TRACE("Found in world %p\n", issuer);
2024 return issuer;
2025 }
2026 }
2027
2028 res = CryptGetObjectUrl(URL_OID_CERTIFICATE_ISSUER, (void*)cert, 0, NULL, &size, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2029 if(!res)
2030 return NULL;
2031
2032 urls = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, size);
2033 if(!urls)
2034 return NULL;
2035
2036 res = CryptGetObjectUrl(URL_OID_CERTIFICATE_ISSUER, (void*)cert, 0, urls, &size, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2037 if(res)
2038 {
2039 CERT_CONTEXT *new_cert;
2040 HCERTSTORE new_store;
2041 unsigned i;
2042
2043 for(i=0; i < urls->cUrl; i++)
2044 {
2045 TRACE("Trying URL %s\n", debugstr_w(urls->rgwszUrl[i]));
2046
2047 res = CryptRetrieveObjectByUrlW(urls->rgwszUrl[i], CONTEXT_OID_CERTIFICATE,
2048 (flags & CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL) ? CRYPT_CACHE_ONLY_RETRIEVAL : CRYPT_AIA_RETRIEVAL,
2049 0, (void**)&new_cert, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2050 if(!res)
2051 {
2052 TRACE("CryptRetrieveObjectByUrlW failed: %u\n", GetLastError());
2053 continue;
2054 }
2055
2056 /* FIXME: Use new_cert->hCertStore once cert ref count bug is fixed. */
2057 new_store = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY, 0, 0, CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
2058 CertAddCertificateContextToStore(new_store, new_cert, CERT_STORE_ADD_NEW, NULL);
2059 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(new_store, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, type, para, NULL);
2060 CertFreeCertificateContext(new_cert);
2061 CertCloseStore(new_store, 0);
2062 if(issuer)
2063 {
2064 TRACE("Found downloaded issuer %p\n", issuer);
2065 break;
2066 }
2067 }
2068 }
2069
2070 HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, urls);
2071 return issuer;
2072 }
2073
2074 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2075 HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject, PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer,
2076 DWORD flags, DWORD *infoStatus)
2077 {
2078 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
2079 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
2080 DWORD size;
2081
2082 *infoStatus = 0;
2083 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
2084 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2085 {
2086 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
2087 BOOL ret;
2088
2089 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
2090 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2091 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2092 &info, &size);
2093 if (ret)
2094 {
2095 CERT_ID id;
2096
2097 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
2098 {
2099 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
2100 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
2101 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
2102 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
2103 &info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
2104
2105 issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
2106 if (issuer)
2107 {
2108 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
2109 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
2110 }
2111 }
2112 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
2113 {
2114 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
2115
2116 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
2117 issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
2118 if (issuer)
2119 {
2120 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2121 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2122 }
2123 }
2124 LocalFree(info);
2125 }
2126 }
2127 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
2128 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2129 {
2130 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
2131 BOOL ret;
2132
2133 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
2134 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2135 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2136 &info, &size);
2137 if (ret)
2138 {
2139 CERT_ID id;
2140
2141 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
2142 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
2143 {
2144 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
2145 DWORD i;
2146
2147 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
2148 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
2149 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
2150 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
2151 directoryName =
2152 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
2153 if (directoryName)
2154 {
2155 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
2156 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
2157 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
2158 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
2159 &info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
2160 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
2161
2162 issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
2163 if (issuer)
2164 {
2165 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
2166 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
2167 }
2168 }
2169 else
2170 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
2171 }
2172 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
2173 {
2174 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
2175 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
2176 issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
2177 if (issuer)
2178 {
2179 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2180 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2181 }
2182 }
2183 LocalFree(info);
2184 }
2185 }
2186 else
2187 {
2188 issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
2189 &subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, flags, prevIssuer);
2190 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
2191 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
2192 }
2193 return issuer;
2194 }
2195
2196 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
2197 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
2198 */
2199 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2200 HCERTSTORE world, DWORD flags, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
2201 {
2202 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2203 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
2204
2205 while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
2206 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert, NULL))
2207 {
2208 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(engine, world, cert, NULL, flags,
2209 &chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2210
2211 if (issuer)
2212 {
2213 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
2214 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2215 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
2216 * close the enumeration that found it
2217 */
2218 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
2219 cert = issuer;
2220 }
2221 else
2222 {
2223 TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
2224 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
2225 break;
2226 }
2227 }
2228 return ret;
2229 }
2230
2231 static LPCSTR debugstr_filetime(LPFILETIME pTime)
2232 {
2233 if (!pTime)
2234 return "(nil)";
2235 return wine_dbg_sprintf("%p (%s)", pTime, filetime_to_str(pTime));
2236 }
2237
2238 static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2239 HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, DWORD flags,
2240 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
2241 {
2242 BOOL ret = FALSE;
2243 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
2244
2245 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %s)\n", engine, world, cert, debugstr_filetime(pTime));
2246
2247 chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2248 if (chain)
2249 {
2250 memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2251 chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2252 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
2253 if (ret)
2254 {
2255 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, flags, chain);
2256 if (ret)
2257 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
2258 }
2259 if (!ret)
2260 {
2261 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
2262 chain = NULL;
2263 }
2264 *ppChain = chain;
2265 }
2266 return ret;
2267 }
2268
2269 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2270 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore, DWORD flags,
2271 CertificateChain **ppChain)
2272 {
2273 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
2274 HCERTSTORE world;
2275 BOOL ret;
2276
2277 world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
2278 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
2279 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
2280 if (hAdditionalStore)
2281 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
2282 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
2283 * supported yet.
2284 */
2285 if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime, flags, &simpleChain)))
2286 {
2287 CertificateChain *chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2288
2289 if (chain)
2290 {
2291 chain->ref = 1;
2292 chain->world = world;
2293 chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2294 chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
2295 chain->context.cChain = 1;
2296 chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2297 chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
2298 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2299 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2300 chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2301 chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2302 }
2303 else
2304 {
2305 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(simpleChain);
2306 ret = FALSE;
2307 }
2308 *ppChain = chain;
2309 }
2310 return ret;
2311 }
2312
2313 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
2314 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
2315 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
2316 {
2317 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2318
2319 if (copy)
2320 {
2321 memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2322 copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2323 copy->rgpElement =
2324 CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2325 if (copy->rgpElement)
2326 {
2327 DWORD i;
2328 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2329
2330 memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
2331 (iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2332 for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
2333 {
2334 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2335 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2336
2337 if (element)
2338 {
2339 *element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
2340 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2341 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
2342 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
2343 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2344 */
2345 memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2346 copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
2347 }
2348 else
2349 ret = FALSE;
2350 }
2351 if (!ret)
2352 {
2353 for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
2354 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
2355 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
2356 CryptMemFree(copy);
2357 copy = NULL;
2358 }
2359 }
2360 else
2361 {
2362 CryptMemFree(copy);
2363 copy = NULL;
2364 }
2365 }
2366 return copy;
2367 }
2368
2369 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(CertificateChain *chain)
2370 {
2371 DWORD i;
2372
2373 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2374 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
2375 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
2376 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2377 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2378 }
2379
2380 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(CertificateChain *chain)
2381 {
2382 DWORD i;
2383
2384 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2385 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2386 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
2387 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
2388 CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
2389 CryptMemFree(chain);
2390 }
2391
2392 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
2393 * simple chain iChain.
2394 */
2395 static CertificateChain *CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(CertificateChain *chain,
2396 DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
2397 {
2398 CertificateChain *copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2399
2400 if (copy)
2401 {
2402 copy->ref = 1;
2403 copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
2404 copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2405 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
2406 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2407 */
2408 memset(&copy->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2409 copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2410 copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2411 copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2412 copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2413 copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
2414 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2415 if (copy->context.rgpChain)
2416 {
2417 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2418 DWORD i;
2419
2420 memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
2421 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2422 if (iChain)
2423 {
2424 for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
2425 {
2426 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2427 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2428 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
2429 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2430 ret = FALSE;
2431 }
2432 }
2433 else
2434 i = 0;
2435 if (ret)
2436 {
2437 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2438 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2439 iElement);
2440 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2441 ret = FALSE;
2442 }
2443 if (!ret)
2444 {
2445 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
2446 copy = NULL;
2447 }
2448 else
2449 copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
2450 }
2451 else
2452 {
2453 CryptMemFree(copy);
2454 copy = NULL;
2455 }
2456 }
2457 return copy;
2458 }
2459
2460 static CertificateChain *CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
2461 CertificateChainEngine *engine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2462 DWORD flags, CertificateChain *chain)
2463 {
2464 CertificateChain *alternate;
2465
2466 TRACE("(%p, %s, %p, %p)\n", engine, debugstr_filetime(pTime),
2467 hAdditionalStore, chain);
2468
2469 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
2470 * order of alternate creation:
2471 */
2472 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2473 chain = (CertificateChain*)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2474 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
2475 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
2476 if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
2477 alternate = NULL;
2478 else
2479 {
2480 DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
2481 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
2482
2483 alternate = NULL;
2484 for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2485 for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
2486 j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
2487 {
2488 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
2489 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2490 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2491 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
2492
2493 alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(engine, prevIssuer->hCertStore,
2494 subject, prevIssuer, flags, &infoStatus);
2495 }
2496 if (alternateIssuer)
2497 {
2498 i--;
2499 j--;
2500 alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
2501 if (alternate)
2502 {
2503 BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
2504 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
2505
2506 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2507 * to close the enumeration that found it
2508 */
2509 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
2510 if (ret)
2511 {
2512 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
2513 flags, alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
2514 if (ret)
2515 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
2516 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
2517 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
2518 &alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
2519 }
2520 if (!ret)
2521 {
2522 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
2523 alternate = NULL;
2524 }
2525 }
2526 }
2527 }
2528 TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
2529 return alternate;
2530 }
2531
2532 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2533 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2534 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2535 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2536 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2537
2538 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2539 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2540 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2541 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2542
2543 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2544 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2545
2546 static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
2547 {
2548 DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
2549
2550 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2551 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
2552 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
2553 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2554 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
2555 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2556 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2557 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
2558 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
2559 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2560 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
2561 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
2562 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2563 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
2564 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
2565 return quality;
2566 }
2567
2568 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2569 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2570 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2571 */
2572 static CertificateChain *CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2573 CertificateChain *chain)
2574 {
2575 DWORD i;
2576
2577 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2578 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2579 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2580 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2581 * lower quality contexts.
2582 */
2583 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2584 {
2585 CertificateChain *alternate =
2586 (CertificateChain*)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
2587
2588 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
2589 {
2590 alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
2591 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
2592 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2593 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
2594 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
2595 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2596 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2597 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2598 chain = alternate;
2599 }
2600 }
2601 return chain;
2602 }
2603
2604 static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(CertificateChain *chain,
2605 const CertificateChain *alternate)
2606 {
2607 BOOL ret;
2608
2609 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2610 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2611 CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
2612 (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
2613 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2614 else
2615 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2616 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2617 if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
2618 {
2619 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2620 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
2621 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
2622 ret = TRUE;
2623 }
2624 else
2625 ret = FALSE;
2626 return ret;
2627 }
2628
2629 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2630 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
2631 {
2632 DWORD j, iElement;
2633 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
2634
2635 for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
2636 {
2637 if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
2638 iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
2639 else
2640 element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
2641 }
2642 return element;
2643 }
2644
2645 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
2646 DWORD cbSize;
2647 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
2648 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
2649
2650 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2651 LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2652 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
2653 {
2654 DWORD cContext;
2655
2656 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
2657 cContext = 1;
2658 else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
2659 (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
2660 {
2661 DWORD i;
2662
2663 for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2664 {
2665 if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
2666 chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
2667 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
2668 else
2669 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
2670 }
2671 }
2672 else
2673 cContext = 0;
2674 if (cContext)
2675 {
2676 DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
2677 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
2678 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
2679 { sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
2680 BOOL ret;
2681
2682 revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
2683 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
2684 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
2685 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
2686 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
2687 revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
2688 if (hAdditionalStore)
2689 {
2690 revocationPara.cCertStore = 1;
2691 revocationPara.rgCertStore = &hAdditionalStore;
2692 revocationPara.hCrlStore = hAdditionalStore;
2693 }
2694 if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2695 {
2696 revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
2697 pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
2698 revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
2699 pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
2700 revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
2701 pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
2702 }
2703 for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain; i++)
2704 {
2705 for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
2706 j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++, iContext++)
2707 {
2708 PCCERT_CONTEXT certToCheck =
2709 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2710
2711 if (j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1)
2712 revocationPara.pIssuerCert =
2713 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext;
2714 else
2715 revocationPara.pIssuerCert = certToCheck;
2716
2717 ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2718 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, 1, (void **)&certToCheck,
2719 revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
2720
2721 if (!ret && revocationStatus.dwError == CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK &&
2722 revocationPara.pIssuerCert == certToCheck)
2723 {
2724 FIXME("Unable to find CRL for CA certificate\n");
2725 ret = TRUE;
2726 revocationStatus.dwError = 0;
2727 }
2728
2729 if (!ret)
2730 {
2731 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2732 chain, iContext);
2733 DWORD error;
2734
2735 switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
2736 {
2737 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
2738 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
2739 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
2740 /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed
2741 * to be offline too.
2742 */
2743 error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
2744 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2745 break;
2746 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
2747 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2748 break;
2749 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
2750 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
2751 break;
2752 default:
2753 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
2754 error = 0;
2755 }
2756 if (element)
2757 {
2758 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2759 element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2760 }
2761 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2762 }
2763 }
2764 }
2765 }
2766 }
2767
2768 static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2769 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2770 {
2771 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) &&
2772 pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2773 {
2774 PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert;
2775 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
2776 BOOL validForUsage;
2777
2778 /* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
2779 endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
2780 /* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
2781 * public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
2782 * "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
2783 * certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
2784 * basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
2785 * If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
2786 * if that usage is included in the extension:
2787 * "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
2788 * for one of the purposes indicated."
2789 * There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
2790 * have to be respected:
2791 * "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
2792 * MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
2793 * but not the particular OID expected for the application."
2794 * For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
2795 * the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
2796 */
2797 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
2798 endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2799 {
2800 const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage =
2801 &pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage;
2802 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
2803 DWORD size;
2804
2805 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2806 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2807 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
2808 {
2809 if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND)
2810 {
2811 DWORD i, j;
2812
2813 /* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
2814 validForUsage = TRUE;
2815 for (i = 0; validForUsage &&
2816 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2817 {
2818 BOOL match = FALSE;
2819
2820 for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2821 match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2822 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2823 if (!match)
2824 validForUsage = FALSE;
2825 }
2826 }
2827 else
2828 {
2829 DWORD i, j;
2830
2831 /* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
2832 validForUsage = FALSE;
2833 for (i = 0; !validForUsage &&
2834 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2835 {
2836 for (j = 0; !validForUsage &&
2837 j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2838 validForUsage =
2839 !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2840 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2841 }
2842 }
2843 LocalFree(usage);
2844 }
2845 else
2846 validForUsage = FALSE;
2847 }
2848 else
2849 {
2850 /* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
2851 * "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
2852 * key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
2853 * be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
2854 * that application."
2855 * Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
2856 * accept chains without it.
2857 */
2858 TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
2859 validForUsage = TRUE;
2860 }
2861 if (!validForUsage)
2862 {
2863 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2864 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2865 chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2866 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2867 }
2868 }
2869 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) &&
2870 pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2871 FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
2872 }
2873
2874 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
2875 {
2876 if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2877 {
2878 DWORD i;
2879
2880 TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
2881 usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
2882 for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2883 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2884 }
2885 }
2886
2887 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2888 {
2889 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
2890 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
2891 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
2892 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2893 {
2894 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2895 &pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
2896 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
2897 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
2898 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
2899 }
2900 }
2901
2902 BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2903 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2904 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
2905 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
2906 {
2907 CertificateChainEngine *engine;
2908 BOOL ret;
2909 CertificateChain *chain = NULL;
2910
2911 TRACE("(%p, %p, %s, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
2912 debugstr_filetime(pTime), hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags,
2913 pvReserved, ppChainContext);
2914
2915 engine = get_chain_engine(hChainEngine, TRUE);
2916 if (!engine)
2917 return FALSE;
2918
2919 if (ppChainContext)
2920 *ppChainContext = NULL;
2921 if (!pChainPara)
2922 {
2923 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
2924 return FALSE;
2925 }
2926 if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
2927 {
2928 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
2929 return FALSE;
2930 }
2931
2932 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
2933 dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
2934 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2935 ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(engine, pCertContext, pTime,
2936 hAdditionalStore, dwFlags, &chain);
2937 if (ret)
2938 {
2939 CertificateChain *alternate = NULL;
2940 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
2941
2942 do {
2943 alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(engine,
2944 pTime, hAdditionalStore, dwFlags, chain);
2945
2946 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2947 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2948 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2949 */
2950 if (alternate)
2951 ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
2952 } while (ret && alternate);
2953 chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
2954 if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
2955 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2956 pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2957 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, hAdditionalStore,
2958 pChainPara, dwFlags);
2959 CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara);
2960 TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n",
2961 pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
2962 if (ppChainContext)
2963 *ppChainContext = pChain;
2964 else
2965 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
2966 }
2967 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
2968 return ret;
2969 }
2970
2971 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2972 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2973 {
2974 CertificateChain *chain = (CertificateChain*)pChainContext;
2975
2976 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2977
2978 if (chain)
2979 InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
2980 return pChainContext;
2981 }
2982
2983 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2984 {
2985 CertificateChain *chain = (CertificateChain*)pChainContext;
2986
2987 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2988
2989 if (chain)
2990 {
2991 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
2992 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
2993 }
2994 }
2995
2996 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertFindChainInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
2997 DWORD certEncodingType, DWORD findFlags, DWORD findType,
2998 const void *findPara, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT prevChainContext)
2999 {
3000 FIXME("(%p, %08x, %08x, %d, %p, %p): stub\n", store, certEncodingType,
3001 findFlags, findType, findPara, prevChainContext);
3002 return NULL;
3003 }
3004
3005 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
3006 LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
3007 {
3008 DWORD i, j;
3009
3010 for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
3011 for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
3012 if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3013 error)
3014 {
3015 *iChain = i;
3016 *iElement = j;
3017 return;
3018 }
3019 }
3020
3021 static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3022 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3023 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3024 {
3025 DWORD checks = 0;
3026
3027 if (pPolicyPara)
3028 checks = pPolicyPara->dwFlags;
3029 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3030 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3031 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3032 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
3033 {
3034 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
3035 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3036 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3037 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3038 }
3039 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
3040 {
3041 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
3042 find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
3043 &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3044 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
3045 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3046 }
3047 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
3048 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
3049 !(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG))
3050 {
3051 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3052 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3053 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3054 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3055 }
3056 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
3057 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
3058 {
3059 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
3060 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3061 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3062 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3063 }
3064 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
3065 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3066 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
3067 !(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG))
3068 {
3069 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
3070 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3071 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3072 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3073 }
3074 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
3075 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3076 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT &&
3077 !(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG))
3078 {
3079 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
3080 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3081 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3082 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3083 }
3084 return TRUE;
3085 }
3086
3087 static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
3088 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
3089 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
3090 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
3091 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
3092 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3093 static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
3094 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
3095 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
3096 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
3097 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
3098 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3099
3100 static void dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(
3101 AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara)
3102 {
3103 if (extraPara)
3104 {
3105 TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", extraPara->cbSize);
3106 TRACE_(chain)("dwRegPolicySettings = %08x\n",
3107 extraPara->dwRegPolicySettings);
3108 TRACE_(chain)("pSignerInfo = %p\n", extraPara->pSignerInfo);
3109 }
3110 }
3111
3112 static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3113 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3114 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3115 {
3116 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3117 pPolicyStatus);
3118 AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara = NULL;
3119
3120 if (pPolicyPara)
3121 extraPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
3122 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
3123 dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(extraPara);
3124 if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
3125 {
3126 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3127 BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
3128 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
3129 pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
3130 rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
3131 DWORD i;
3132 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3133 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
3134 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
3135 };
3136
3137 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
3138 for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3139 i++)
3140 {
3141 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3142 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3143 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3144 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3145 &failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3146 isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
3147 }
3148 if (isMSTestRoot)
3149 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
3150 }
3151 return ret;
3152 }
3153
3154 static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3155 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3156 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3157 {
3158 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3159 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3160 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
3161 {
3162 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
3163 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3164 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3165 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3166 }
3167 else
3168 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3169 return TRUE;
3170 }
3171
3172 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext,
3173 LPCWSTR server_name)
3174 {
3175 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3176 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
3177 DWORD size;
3178
3179 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3180 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
3181 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
3182 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
3183 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
3184 */
3185 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
3186 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
3187 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3188 &subjectName, &size))
3189 {
3190 DWORD i;
3191
3192 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
3193 * in section 4.2.1.6:
3194 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
3195 * MAY be included."
3196 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
3197 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
3198 */
3199 for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
3200 {
3201 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
3202 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
3203 {
3204 TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
3205 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
3206 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName[0] == '*')
3207 {
3208 LPCWSTR server_name_dot;
3209
3210 /* Matching a wildcard: a wildcard matches a single name
3211 * component, which is terminated by a dot. RFC 1034
3212 * doesn't define whether multiple wildcards are allowed,
3213 * but I will assume that they are not until proven
3214 * otherwise. RFC 1034 also states that 'the "*" label
3215 * always matches at least one whole label and sometimes
3216 * more, but always whole labels.' Native crypt32 does not
3217 * match more than one label with a wildcard, so I do the
3218 * same here. Thus, a wildcard only accepts the first
3219 * label, then requires an exact match of the remaining
3220 * string.
3221 */
3222 server_name_dot = strchrW(server_name, '.');
3223 if (server_name_dot)
3224 {
3225 if (!strcmpiW(server_name_dot,
3226 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName + 1))
3227 matches = TRUE;
3228 }
3229 }
3230 else if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
3231 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
3232 matches = TRUE;
3233 }
3234 }
3235 LocalFree(subjectName);
3236 }
3237 return matches;
3238 }
3239
3240 static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(const CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
3241 LPCWSTR component)
3242 {
3243 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3244 DWORD i, j;
3245
3246 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
3247 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
3248 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
3249 name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
3250 {
3251 const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr;
3252
3253 attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
3254 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
3255 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
3256 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
3257 * value with a case-insensitive match.
3258 */
3259 matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
3260 attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
3261 }
3262 return matches;
3263 }
3264
3265 static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
3266 LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
3267 BOOL *see_wildcard)
3268 {
3269 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
3270 BOOL matches = TRUE;
3271
3272 *see_wildcard = FALSE;
3273
3274 if (server_len < allowed_len)
3275 {
3276 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
3277 debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
3278 debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3279 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
3280 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
3281 */
3282 return FALSE;
3283 }
3284 for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
3285 matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
3286 allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
3287 {
3288 if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
3289 {
3290 if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
3291 {
3292 WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
3293 matches = FALSE;
3294 }
3295 else if (!allow_wildcards)
3296 {
3297 WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
3298 matches = FALSE;
3299 }
3300 else
3301 {
3302 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
3303 * the component also matches.
3304 */
3305 *see_wildcard = TRUE;
3306 break;
3307 }
3308 }
3309 if (matches)
3310 matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
3311 }
3312 if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
3313 {
3314 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
3315 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
3316 */
3317 matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
3318 }
3319 return matches;
3320 }
3321
3322 static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, const CERT_RDN_ATTR *nameAttr)
3323 {
3324 LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
3325 LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
3326 DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
3327 LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
3328 DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
3329 BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
3330
3331 TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3332
3333 /* Remove trailing NULLs from the allowed name; while they shouldn't appear
3334 * in a certificate in the first place, they sometimes do, and they should
3335 * be ignored.
3336 */
3337 while (allowed_len && allowed_component[allowed_len - 1] == 0)
3338 allowed_len--;
3339
3340 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
3341 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
3342 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
3343 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
3344 * but not bar.com."
3345 *
3346 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
3347 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
3348 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
3349 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
3350 *
3351 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
3352 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
3353 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
3354 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
3355 */
3356 do {
3357 LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
3358
3359 allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
3360 allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
3361 server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
3362 server_len - (server_component - server_name));
3363 /* The number of components must match */
3364 if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
3365 {
3366 if (!allowed_dot)
3367 WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
3368 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3369 else
3370 WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
3371 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3372 matches = FALSE;
3373 }
3374 else
3375 {
3376 LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
3377 BOOL has_wildcard;
3378
3379 allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
3380 server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
3381 matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
3382 allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
3383 server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
3384 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
3385 * may follow
3386 */
3387 if (!has_wildcard)
3388 allow_wildcards = FALSE;
3389 if (matches)
3390 {
3391 allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
3392 server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
3393 }
3394 }
3395 } while (matches && allowed_component &&
3396 allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
3397 server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
3398 TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
3399 return matches;
3400 }
3401
3402 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
3403 {
3404 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3405 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
3406 DWORD size;
3407
3408 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3409 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
3410 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
3411 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3412 &name, &size))
3413 {
3414 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
3415 * make sure all of them are present.
3416 */
3417 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
3418 {
3419 LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
3420
3421 do {
3422 LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
3423 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
3424 WCHAR component[255];
3425 DWORD len;
3426
3427 end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
3428 len = end - ptr;
3429 if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0]))
3430 {
3431 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
3432 debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
3433 matches = FALSE;
3434 }
3435 else
3436 {
3437 memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
3438 component[len] = 0;
3439 matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
3440 }
3441 ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
3442 } while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
3443 }
3444 else
3445 {
3446 DWORD i, j;
3447
3448 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
3449 * make sure at least one common name matches. From RFC 2818,
3450 * section 3.1:
3451 * "If more than one identity of a given type is present in the
3452 * certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any
3453 * one of the set is considered acceptable.)"
3454 */
3455 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
3456 for (j = 0; !matches && j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
3457 {
3458 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
3459
3460 if (attr->pszObjId && !strcmp(szOID_COMMON_NAME,
3461 attr->pszObjId))
3462 matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
3463 }
3464 }
3465 LocalFree(name);
3466 }
3467 return matches;
3468 }
3469
3470 static void dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara)
3471 {
3472 if (sslPara)
3473 {
3474 TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", sslPara->u.cbSize);
3475 TRACE_(chain)("dwAuthType = %d\n", sslPara->dwAuthType);
3476 TRACE_(chain)("fdwChecks = %08x\n", sslPara->fdwChecks);
3477 TRACE_(chain)("pwszServerName = %s\n",
3478 debugstr_w(sslPara->pwszServerName));
3479 }
3480 }
3481
3482 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3483 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3484 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3485 {
3486 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = NULL;
3487 DWORD checks = 0;
3488
3489 if (pPolicyPara)
3490 sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
3491 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
3492 dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(sslPara);
3493 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
3494 checks = sslPara->fdwChecks;
3495 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3496 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3497 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
3498 {
3499 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
3500 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3501 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3502 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3503 }
3504 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3505 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
3506 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA))
3507 {
3508 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3509 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3510 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3511 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3512 }
3513 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
3514 {
3515 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3516 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3517 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3518 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3519 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
3520 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3521 }
3522 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3523 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID &&
3524 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID))
3525 {
3526 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
3527 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3528 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3529 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3530 }
3531 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3532 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
3533 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE))
3534 {
3535 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
3536 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3537 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3538 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3539 }
3540 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3541 CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED && !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
3542 {
3543 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOKED;
3544 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3545 CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3546 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3547 }
3548 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3549 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION &&
3550 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
3551 {
3552 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE;
3553 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3554 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3555 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3556 }
3557 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3558 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT)
3559 {
3560 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
3561 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3562 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3563 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3564 }
3565 else
3566 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3567 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
3568 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
3569 */
3570 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
3571 pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
3572 {
3573 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
3574 {
3575 if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
3576 sslPara->pwszServerName &&
3577 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID))
3578 {
3579 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
3580 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
3581 BOOL matches;
3582
3583 cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
3584 altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
3585 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
3586 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
3587 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
3588 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
3589 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
3590 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
3591 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
3592 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
3593 * domainComponent attribute."
3594 */
3595 if (altNameExt)
3596 matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
3597 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3598 else
3599 matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
3600 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3601 if (!matches)
3602 {
3603 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
3604 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
3605 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3606 }
3607 }
3608 }
3609 }
3610 return TRUE;
3611 }
3612
3613 static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
3614 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
3615 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
3616 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
3617 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
3618 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
3619 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
3620 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
3621 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
3622 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
3623 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
3624 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
3625 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
3626 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
3627 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
3628 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
3629 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
3630 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
3631 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3632 static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
3633 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
3634 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
3635 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
3636 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
3637 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
3638 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
3639 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
3640 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
3641 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
3642 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
3643 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
3644 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
3645 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
3646 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
3647 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
3648 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
3649 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
3650 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3651 static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
3652 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
3653 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
3654 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
3655 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
3656 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
3657 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
3658 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
3659 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
3660 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
3661 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
3662 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
3663 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
3664 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
3665 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
3666 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
3667 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
3668 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
3669 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
3670 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
3671 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
3672 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
3673 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
3674 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
3675 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
3676 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
3677 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
3678 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
3679 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
3680 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
3681 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
3682 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
3683 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
3684 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
3685 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
3686 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
3687 0x01 };
3688
3689 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3690 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3691 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3692 {
3693 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3694 pPolicyStatus);
3695
3696 if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
3697 {
3698 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3699 BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
3700 DWORD i;
3701 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3702 { sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
3703 { sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
3704 { sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
3705 };
3706 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
3707 pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
3708 PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
3709 rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
3710
3711 for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3712 i++)
3713 {
3714 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3715 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3716 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3717 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3718 &root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3719 isMSRoot = TRUE;
3720 }
3721 if (isMSRoot)
3722 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3723 }
3724 return ret;
3725 }
3726
3727 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3728 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3729 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
3730
3731 static void dump_policy_para(PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA para)
3732 {
3733 if (para)
3734 {
3735 TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", para->cbSize);
3736 TRACE_(chain)("dwFlags = %08x\n", para->dwFlags);
3737 TRACE_(chain)("pvExtraPolicyPara = %p\n", para->pvExtraPolicyPara);
3738 }
3739 }
3740
3741 BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3742 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3743 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3744 {
3745 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
3746 BOOL ret = FALSE;
3747 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
3748 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
3749
3750 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
3751 pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
3752 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
3753 dump_policy_para(pPolicyPara);
3754
3755 if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID))
3756 {
3757 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
3758 {
3759 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
3760 verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
3761 break;
3762 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
3763 verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
3764 break;
3765 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
3766 verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
3767 break;
3768 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
3769 verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
3770 break;
3771 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
3772 verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
3773 break;
3774 default:
3775 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
3776 }
3777 }
3778 if (!verifyPolicy)
3779 {
3780 if (!set)
3781 set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
3782 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
3783 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
3784 (void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
3785 }
3786 if (verifyPolicy)
3787 ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3788 pPolicyStatus);
3789 if (hFunc)
3790 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
3791 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
3792 return ret;
3793 }
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