2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
26 #include "wine/debug.h"
27 #include "wine/unicode.h"
28 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt
);
31 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain
);
33 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
37 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
38 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
39 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
40 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
42 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
48 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
49 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates
;
50 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus
;
51 } CertificateChainEngine
, *PCertificateChainEngine
;
53 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection
,
54 DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
58 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
59 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection
, stores
[i
], 0, 0);
62 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
66 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
67 CertCloseStore(stores
[i
], 0);
70 static const WCHAR rootW
[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
72 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
73 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store
,
76 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching
= NULL
;
78 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
80 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
, hash
, &size
))
82 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
84 matching
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
85 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
, &blob
, NULL
);
90 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store
)
96 HCERTSTORE rootStore
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
97 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= NULL
, check
;
100 cert
= CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store
, cert
);
103 if (!(check
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore
, cert
)))
106 CertFreeCertificateContext(check
);
108 } while (ret
&& cert
);
110 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert
);
111 CertCloseStore(rootStore
, 0);
116 HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root
,
117 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
)
119 static const WCHAR caW
[] = { 'C','A',0 };
120 static const WCHAR myW
[] = { 'M','y',0 };
121 static const WCHAR trustW
[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
122 PCertificateChainEngine engine
=
123 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine
));
127 HCERTSTORE worldStores
[4];
130 engine
->hRoot
= root
;
131 engine
->hWorld
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
132 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
133 worldStores
[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine
->hRoot
);
134 worldStores
[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW
);
135 worldStores
[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW
);
136 worldStores
[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW
);
137 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
138 sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]), worldStores
);
139 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
140 pConfig
->cAdditionalStore
, pConfig
->rghAdditionalStore
);
141 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]),
143 engine
->dwFlags
= pConfig
->dwFlags
;
144 engine
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
= pConfig
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
145 engine
->MaximumCachedCertificates
=
146 pConfig
->MaximumCachedCertificates
;
147 if (pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
)
148 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
;
150 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS
;
155 BOOL WINAPI
CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
,
156 HCERTCHAINENGINE
*phChainEngine
)
160 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig
, phChainEngine
);
162 if (pConfig
->cbSize
!= sizeof(*pConfig
))
164 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
167 *phChainEngine
= NULL
;
168 ret
= CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
172 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
174 if (pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
)
175 root
= CertDuplicateStore(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
177 root
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
178 engine
= CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root
, pConfig
);
181 *phChainEngine
= engine
;
190 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
)
192 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
194 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine
);
196 if (engine
&& InterlockedDecrement(&engine
->ref
) == 0)
198 CertCloseStore(engine
->hWorld
, 0);
199 CertCloseStore(engine
->hRoot
, 0);
200 CryptMemFree(engine
);
204 static HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
206 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
)
208 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config
= { 0 };
209 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
211 config
.cbSize
= sizeof(config
);
212 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config
, &engine
);
213 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
, engine
,
215 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
!= engine
)
216 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine
);
218 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
221 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
223 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
);
226 typedef struct _CertificateChain
228 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context
;
231 } CertificateChain
, *PCertificateChain
;
233 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
235 return CertCompareCertificateName(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
236 &cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
, &cert
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
);
239 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
)
241 CertFreeCertificateContext(element
->pCertContext
);
242 CryptMemFree(element
);
245 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
247 DWORD i
, j
, cyclicCertIndex
= 0;
249 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
250 for (i
= 0; !cyclicCertIndex
&& i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
251 for (j
= i
+ 1; !cyclicCertIndex
&& j
< chain
->cElement
; j
++)
252 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
253 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
254 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
))
258 chain
->rgpElement
[cyclicCertIndex
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
259 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
260 /* Release remaining certs */
261 for (i
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
262 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
264 chain
->cElement
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1;
268 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
269 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
)
272 return chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
273 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
;
278 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*chainStatus
,
279 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*elementStatus
)
281 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
282 chainStatus
->dwErrorStatus
|= elementStatus
->dwErrorStatus
;
283 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
286 chainStatus
->dwInfoStatus
|= (elementStatus
->dwInfoStatus
& 0xfffffff0);
289 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
290 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, DWORD subjectInfoStatus
)
293 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
297 if (!chain
->cElement
)
298 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
300 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemRealloc(chain
->rgpElement
,
301 (chain
->cElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
302 if (chain
->rgpElement
)
304 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
++] = element
;
305 memset(element
, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
306 element
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
);
307 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert
);
308 if (chain
->cElement
> 1)
309 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 2]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
311 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
312 if (!(chain
->cElement
% engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
))
314 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain
);
315 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
316 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
318 element
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
320 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
321 &element
->TrustStatus
);
325 CryptMemFree(element
);
330 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
334 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
335 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
336 CryptMemFree(chain
->rgpElement
);
340 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot
,
341 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
343 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot
,
344 rootElement
->pCertContext
);
347 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
348 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
;
350 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot
);
353 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot
,
354 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
356 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
= rootElement
->pCertContext
;
358 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root
->dwCertEncodingType
,
359 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
, (void *)root
,
360 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
, (void *)root
, 0, NULL
))
362 TRACE_(chain
)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
363 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
364 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
366 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot
, rootElement
);
369 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
370 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
371 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
372 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
373 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
375 static BOOL
CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
,
376 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*constraints
, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified
)
379 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
380 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
382 constraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= FALSE
;
385 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
388 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
389 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
393 if (info
->SubjectType
.cbData
== 1)
395 info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG
;
401 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
,
402 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
405 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
407 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
408 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
409 0, NULL
, constraints
, &size
);
412 constraints
->fCA
= defaultIfNotSpecified
;
417 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
418 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
419 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
420 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
421 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
422 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
423 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
424 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
425 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
426 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
427 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
428 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
429 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
430 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
431 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
432 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
433 * the next certificate in the chain.
434 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
435 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
436 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
437 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
439 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
442 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
443 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*chainConstraints
,
444 DWORD remainingCAs
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL
*pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
446 BOOL validBasicConstraints
, implicitCA
= FALSE
;
447 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
451 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
452 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
455 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
457 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
,
460 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
461 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CertFindCertificateInStore(
462 engine
->hWorld
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
,
467 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
472 if ((validBasicConstraints
= CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert
,
473 &constraints
, implicitCA
)))
475 chainConstraints
->fCA
= constraints
.fCA
;
476 if (!constraints
.fCA
)
478 TRACE_(chain
)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs
+ 1);
479 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
481 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
)
483 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
484 * entire remaining chain.
486 if (!chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
||
487 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
<
488 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
490 TRACE_(chain
)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
491 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
492 chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= TRUE
;
493 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
=
494 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
;
498 if (chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
&&
499 remainingCAs
> chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
501 TRACE_(chain
)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
502 remainingCAs
, chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
503 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
504 *pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
506 return validBasicConstraints
;
509 static BOOL
url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
510 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
514 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
517 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
520 else if (constraint
[0] == '.')
522 if (lstrlenW(name
) > lstrlenW(constraint
))
523 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
527 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
531 static BOOL
rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
532 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
537 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
540 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
543 else if ((at
= strchrW(constraint
, '@')))
544 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
547 if ((at
= strchrW(name
, '@')))
548 match
= url_matches(constraint
, at
+ 1, trustErrorStatus
);
550 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
555 static BOOL
dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
556 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
560 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
563 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
566 else if (lstrlenW(name
) >= lstrlenW(constraint
))
567 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
569 /* else: name is too short, no match */
574 static BOOL
ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*constraint
,
575 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*name
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
579 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint
->cbData
, constraint
->pbData
,
580 name
->cbData
, name
->pbData
);
582 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
583 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
585 if (constraint
->cbData
!= sizeof(DWORD
) * 2 && constraint
->cbData
!= 32)
586 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
587 else if (name
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) &&
588 constraint
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) * 2)
590 DWORD subnet
, mask
, addr
;
592 memcpy(&subnet
, constraint
->pbData
, sizeof(subnet
));
593 memcpy(&mask
, constraint
->pbData
+ sizeof(subnet
), sizeof(mask
));
594 memcpy(&addr
, name
->pbData
, sizeof(addr
));
595 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
596 * don't need to swap to host order
598 match
= (subnet
& mask
) == (addr
& mask
);
600 else if (name
->cbData
== 16 && constraint
->cbData
== 32)
602 const BYTE
*subnet
, *mask
, *addr
;
605 subnet
= constraint
->pbData
;
606 mask
= constraint
->pbData
+ 16;
609 for (i
= 0; match
&& i
< 16; i
++)
610 if ((subnet
[i
] & mask
[i
]) != (addr
[i
] & mask
[i
]))
613 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
618 static void CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
,
619 const CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
,
620 DWORD errorIfFound
, DWORD errorIfNotFound
)
625 for (i
= 0; i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
627 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
628 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
630 switch (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
632 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
633 match
= rfc822_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
634 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
636 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
637 match
= dns_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
638 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
640 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
641 match
= url_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
642 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
644 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
645 match
= ip_address_matches(&constraint
->u
.IPAddress
,
646 &subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.IPAddress
, trustErrorStatus
);
648 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
650 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
651 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
);
653 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
657 *trustErrorStatus
|= match
? errorIfFound
: errorIfNotFound
;
660 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION
get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO
*cert
)
664 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
,
665 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
667 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
,
668 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
672 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
673 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, const CERT_INFO
*cert
,
674 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
676 /* If there aren't any existing constraints, don't bother checking */
677 if (nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
|| nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
)
679 CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
);
683 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
686 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
687 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
688 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
689 &subjectName
, &size
))
693 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
694 CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(
695 &nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
, subjectName
,
697 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
, 0);
698 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
699 CRYPT_FindMatchingNameEntry(
700 &nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
, subjectName
,
702 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
);
703 LocalFree(subjectName
);
707 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
|
708 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
712 if (nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
)
714 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
|
715 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
716 if (nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
)
718 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
723 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
724 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO
*cert
)
726 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
= NULL
;
730 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, cert
->cExtension
,
735 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
736 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
737 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &info
,
743 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
)
748 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
749 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
750 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
751 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
752 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
753 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
754 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
755 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
757 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
758 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
760 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
761 if (info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
762 info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
764 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
767 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
768 if (info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
769 info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
771 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
777 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
781 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
782 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
783 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
784 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
785 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
786 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
787 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
789 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
790 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
793 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
> 0; i
--)
795 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
797 if ((nameConstraints
= CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
798 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
)))
800 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints
))
801 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
802 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
805 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--)
807 DWORD errorStatus
= 0;
809 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
810 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
812 if (j
== 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
813 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
))
815 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints
,
816 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
818 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
823 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
828 static LPWSTR
name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*name
)
830 DWORD len
= cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
831 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, NULL
, 0);
836 str
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
838 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
839 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, str
, len
);
844 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*entry
)
848 switch (entry
->dwAltNameChoice
)
850 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME
:
851 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
852 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pOtherName
->pszObjId
));
854 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
855 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
856 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszRfc822Name
));
858 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
859 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
860 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszDNSName
));
862 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
863 str
= name_value_to_str(&entry
->u
.DirectoryName
);
864 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str
));
867 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
868 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszURL
));
870 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
871 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
872 entry
->u
.IPAddress
.cbData
);
874 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID
:
875 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
876 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pszRegisteredID
));
879 TRACE_(chain
)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry
->dwAltNameChoice
);
883 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type
, const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
885 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
888 TRACE_(chain
)("%s:\n", type
);
889 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
890 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
891 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &name
, &size
))
895 TRACE_(chain
)("%d alt name entries:\n", name
->cAltEntry
);
896 for (i
= 0; i
< name
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
897 dump_alt_name_entry(&name
->rgAltEntry
[i
]);
902 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
904 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
907 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
908 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
911 TRACE_(chain
)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0]);
912 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
913 info
->fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
914 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", info
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
919 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
921 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
922 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
924 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
925 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
926 0, NULL
, &constraints
, &size
))
928 TRACE_(chain
)("basic constraints:\n");
929 TRACE_(chain
)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints
.fCA
? "" : "not");
930 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
931 constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
932 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
);
936 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
938 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
939 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
941 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
942 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
944 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
945 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
948 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE
);
949 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE
);
950 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
951 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
952 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
953 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
954 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
955 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
);
957 #undef trace_usage_bit
958 if (usage
.cbData
> 1 && usage
.pbData
[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
)
959 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
963 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE
*subtree
)
965 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree
->Base
);
966 TRACE_(chain
)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
967 subtree
->dwMinimum
, subtree
->fMaximum
, subtree
->dwMaximum
);
970 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
972 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
975 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
976 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
977 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &nameConstraints
,
982 TRACE_(chain
)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
983 nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
);
984 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
985 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
]);
986 TRACE_(chain
)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
987 nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
);
988 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
989 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
]);
990 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
994 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
996 CERT_POLICIES_INFO
*policies
;
999 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_CERT_POLICIES
,
1000 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1005 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policies:\n", policies
->cPolicyInfo
);
1006 for (i
= 0; i
< policies
->cPolicyInfo
; i
++)
1008 TRACE_(chain
)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1009 debugstr_a(policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].pszPolicyIdentifier
));
1010 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1011 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
);
1012 for (j
= 0; j
< policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
; j
++)
1013 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1014 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].rgPolicyQualifier
[j
].
1015 pszPolicyQualifierId
));
1017 LocalFree(policies
);
1021 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1023 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1026 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1027 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1032 TRACE_(chain
)("%d usages:\n", usage
->cUsageIdentifier
);
1033 for (i
= 0; i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1034 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
1039 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1041 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1042 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1044 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
1045 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
1047 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1048 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1051 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1052 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1053 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1054 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1055 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE
);
1056 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE
);
1057 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1058 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1059 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1061 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1065 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1067 TRACE_(chain
)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext
->pszObjId
),
1068 ext
->fCritical
? "" : "not ");
1069 if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1070 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext
);
1071 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME
))
1072 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext
);
1073 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1074 dump_basic_constraints(ext
);
1075 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1076 dump_key_usage(ext
);
1077 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1078 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext
);
1079 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2
))
1080 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext
);
1081 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1082 dump_basic_constraints2(ext
);
1083 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1084 dump_name_constraints(ext
);
1085 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_CERT_POLICIES
))
1086 dump_cert_policies(ext
);
1087 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1088 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext
);
1089 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE
))
1090 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext
);
1093 static LPCWSTR
filetime_to_str(const FILETIME
*time
)
1095 static WCHAR date
[80];
1096 WCHAR dateFmt
[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1099 if (!time
) return NULL
;
1101 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE
, dateFmt
,
1102 sizeof(dateFmt
) / sizeof(dateFmt
[0]));
1103 FileTimeToSystemTime(time
, &sysTime
);
1104 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, 0, &sysTime
, dateFmt
, date
,
1105 sizeof(date
) / sizeof(date
[0]));
1109 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1114 TRACE_(chain
)("%p: version %d\n", cert
, cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1115 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1116 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, NULL
, 0);
1117 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1120 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1121 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, name
, len
);
1122 TRACE_(chain
)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1125 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1127 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1130 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1132 TRACE_(chain
)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1135 TRACE_(chain
)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1136 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotBefore
)),
1137 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotAfter
)));
1138 TRACE_(chain
)("%d extensions\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
);
1139 for (i
= 0; i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1140 dump_extension(&cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
]);
1143 static BOOL
CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1144 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL isCA
, DWORD index
)
1146 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1150 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE
, cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
,
1151 cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1154 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1155 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1157 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, X509_BITS
,
1158 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1162 else if (usage
.cbData
> 2)
1164 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1165 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1171 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1172 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1175 usageBits
= usage
.pbData
[usage
.cbData
- 1];
1182 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1183 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1184 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1185 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1186 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1187 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1188 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1189 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1190 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1191 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1192 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1193 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1194 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1195 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1196 * certificate in the chain.
1200 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
1201 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
1203 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1204 engine
->hWorld
, cert
);
1206 ret
= localCert
!= NULL
;
1207 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
1212 WARN_(chain
)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1216 if (!(usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1218 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1227 if (ext
&& (usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1229 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1238 static BOOL
CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1240 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1243 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12: "In general, this extension will only
1244 * appear in end entity certificates." And, "If a certificate contains
1245 * both a key usage extension and an extended key usage extension, then
1246 * both extensions MUST be processed independently and the certificate MUST
1247 * only be used for a purpose consistent with both extensions." This seems
1248 * to imply that it should be checked if present, and ignored if not.
1249 * Unfortunately some CAs, e.g. the Thawte SGC CA, don't include the code
1250 * signing extended key usage, whereas they do include the keyCertSign
1251 * key usage. Thus, when checking for a CA, we only require the
1252 * code signing extended key usage if the extended key usage is critical.
1254 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1255 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1256 if (ext
&& ext
->fCritical
)
1258 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1261 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1262 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1263 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
);
1268 /* Explicitly require the code signing extended key usage for a CA
1269 * with an extended key usage extension. That is, don't assume
1270 * a cert is allowed to be a CA if it specifies the
1271 * anyExtendedKeyUsage usage oid. See again RFC 5280, section
1272 * 4.2.1.12: "Applications that require the presence of a
1273 * particular purpose MAY reject certificates that include the
1274 * anyExtendedKeyUsage OID but not the particular OID expected for
1278 for (i
= 0; !ret
&& i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1279 if (!strcmp(usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
],
1280 szOID_PKIX_KP_CODE_SIGNING
))
1290 static BOOL
CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1295 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1297 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].fCritical
)
1299 LPCSTR oid
= cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].pszObjId
;
1301 if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1303 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1305 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1307 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1309 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1311 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1313 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1317 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1326 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1330 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1331 switch (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
)
1334 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1336 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1337 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1339 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->IssuerUniqueId
.cbData
||
1340 cert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectUniqueId
.cbData
)
1342 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1343 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1345 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1349 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1350 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1352 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1356 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1359 WARN_(chain
)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1365 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1366 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, LPFILETIME time
)
1368 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
1370 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated
= FALSE
;
1371 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
= { FALSE
, FALSE
, 0 };
1373 TRACE_(chain
)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1374 chain
->cElement
, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time
)));
1375 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
>= 0; i
--)
1379 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
1380 dump_element(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1381 if (i
== chain
->cElement
- 1)
1382 isRoot
= CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1383 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1386 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1388 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1389 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1391 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1392 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1394 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time
,
1395 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
) != 0)
1396 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1397 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
;
1400 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1401 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
1402 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
,
1403 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->pCertContext
,
1404 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
,
1405 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, 0, NULL
))
1406 chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1407 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
1408 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1409 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1411 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
1412 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1413 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1414 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine
,
1415 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, i
- 1, isRoot
,
1416 &pathLengthConstraintViolated
))
1417 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1418 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1419 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
&&
1420 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
)
1422 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1423 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
--;
1428 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1429 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1430 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, FALSE
))
1431 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1432 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1434 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine
, chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
,
1435 isRoot
, constraints
.fCA
, i
))
1436 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1437 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1439 if (!CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(
1440 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1441 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1442 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1443 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
))
1445 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1446 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1448 pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
1449 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1450 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
|
1451 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1453 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1454 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1455 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1456 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1457 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1458 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
1459 &chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1461 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain
);
1462 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement
->pCertContext
))
1464 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
1465 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1466 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine
->hRoot
, rootElement
);
1468 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
, &rootElement
->TrustStatus
);
1471 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store
, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
,
1472 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
, DWORD
*infoStatus
)
1474 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= NULL
;
1475 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1479 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
,
1480 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1482 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO
*info
;
1485 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1486 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1487 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1493 if (info
->CertIssuer
.cbData
&& info
->CertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1495 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1496 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
, &info
->CertIssuer
,
1497 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1498 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1499 &info
->CertSerialNumber
, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1500 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1501 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1504 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1506 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1508 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1509 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1510 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1511 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1514 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1519 else if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2
,
1520 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1522 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO
*info
;
1525 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1526 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1527 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1533 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
&&
1534 info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1536 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName
= NULL
;
1539 for (i
= 0; !directoryName
&&
1540 i
< info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
; i
++)
1541 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
1542 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
)
1544 &info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
];
1547 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1548 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
,
1549 &directoryName
->u
.DirectoryName
, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1550 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1551 &info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
,
1552 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1553 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1554 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1557 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1560 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
1562 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1564 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1565 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1566 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1567 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1570 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1577 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1578 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME
,
1579 &subject
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
, prevIssuer
);
1580 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1585 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
1586 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
1588 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
1589 HCERTSTORE world
, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
1592 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
1594 while (ret
&& !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
) &&
1595 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert
))
1597 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(world
, cert
, NULL
,
1598 &chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1602 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, issuer
,
1603 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1604 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
1605 * close the enumeration that found it
1607 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer
);
1612 TRACE_(chain
)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
1613 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
;
1620 static BOOL
CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1621 HCERTSTORE world
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
,
1622 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*ppChain
)
1625 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
;
1627 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
);
1629 chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1632 memset(chain
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1633 chain
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1634 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, cert
, 0);
1637 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, world
, chain
);
1639 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, pTime
);
1643 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
);
1651 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
1652 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1653 PCertificateChain
*ppChain
)
1655 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1656 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain
= NULL
;
1660 world
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
1661 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
1662 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, engine
->hWorld
, 0, 0);
1663 if (hAdditionalStore
)
1664 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, hAdditionalStore
, 0, 0);
1665 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
1668 if ((ret
= CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
,
1671 PCertificateChain chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
1676 chain
->world
= world
;
1677 chain
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
1678 chain
->context
.TrustStatus
= simpleChain
->TrustStatus
;
1679 chain
->context
.cChain
= 1;
1680 chain
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1681 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0] = simpleChain
;
1682 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1683 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1684 chain
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
1685 chain
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
1694 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
1695 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
1696 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
, DWORD iElement
)
1698 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1702 memset(copy
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1703 copy
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1705 CryptMemAlloc((iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1706 if (copy
->rgpElement
)
1711 memset(copy
->rgpElement
, 0,
1712 (iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1713 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
<= iElement
; i
++)
1715 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
1716 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
1720 *element
= *chain
->rgpElement
[i
];
1721 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
1722 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1723 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
1724 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
1726 memset(&element
->TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
1727 copy
->rgpElement
[copy
->cElement
++] = element
;
1734 for (i
= 0; i
<= iElement
; i
++)
1735 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
[i
]);
1736 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
);
1750 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain
)
1754 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
1755 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
]);
1756 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
);
1757 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1758 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1761 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain
)
1765 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
1766 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
1767 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
1768 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpChain
);
1769 CertCloseStore(chain
->world
, 0);
1770 CryptMemFree(chain
);
1773 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
1774 * simple chain iChain.
1776 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain
,
1777 DWORD iChain
, DWORD iElement
)
1779 PCertificateChain copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
1784 copy
->world
= CertDuplicateStore(chain
->world
);
1785 copy
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
1786 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
1787 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
1789 memset(©
->context
.TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
1790 copy
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1791 copy
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1792 copy
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
1793 copy
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
1794 copy
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(
1795 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1796 if (copy
->context
.rgpChain
)
1801 memset(copy
->context
.rgpChain
, 0,
1802 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1805 for (i
= 0; ret
&& iChain
&& i
< iChain
- 1; i
++)
1807 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
1808 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
1809 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1);
1810 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
1818 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
1819 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
1821 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
1826 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy
);
1830 copy
->context
.cChain
= iChain
+ 1;
1841 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
1842 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1843 PCertificateChain chain
)
1845 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1846 PCertificateChain alternate
;
1848 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
1850 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
1851 * order of alternate creation:
1853 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
1854 chain
= (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
1855 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
- 1];
1856 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
1857 if (chain
->context
.cChain
<= 1 && chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0]->cElement
<= 1)
1861 DWORD i
, j
, infoStatus
;
1862 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer
= NULL
;
1865 for (i
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&& i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
1866 for (j
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&&
1867 j
< chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1; j
++)
1869 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
=
1870 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
1871 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
1872 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
+ 1]->pCertContext
);
1874 alternateIssuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer
->hCertStore
,
1875 subject
, prevIssuer
, &infoStatus
);
1877 if (alternateIssuer
)
1881 alternate
= CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain
, i
, j
);
1884 BOOL ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
,
1885 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], alternateIssuer
, infoStatus
);
1887 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
1888 * to close the enumeration that found it
1890 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer
);
1893 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, alternate
->world
,
1894 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
1896 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
,
1897 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], pTime
);
1898 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1899 &alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1903 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate
);
1909 TRACE("%p\n", alternate
);
1913 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
1914 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
1915 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
1916 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
1917 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
1919 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
1920 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
1921 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
1922 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
1924 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
1925 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
1927 static DWORD
CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain
*chain
)
1929 DWORD quality
= CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST
;
1931 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1932 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
))
1933 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
;
1934 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1935 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1936 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1937 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1938 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
))
1939 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN
;
1940 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1941 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED
))
1942 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID
;
1943 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
1944 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
))
1945 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
1949 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
1950 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
1951 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
1953 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
1954 PCertificateChain chain
)
1958 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
1959 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
1960 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
1961 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
1962 * lower quality contexts.
1964 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
1966 PCertificateChain alternate
=
1967 (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
];
1969 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate
) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain
))
1971 alternate
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
=
1972 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
;
1973 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
1974 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
;
1975 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
] =
1976 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
1977 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
1978 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
1985 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain
,
1986 const CertificateChain
*alternate
)
1990 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
1991 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
1992 CryptMemRealloc(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
,
1993 (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
+ 1) *
1994 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
1996 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
1997 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
1998 if (chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
)
2000 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
2001 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
++] =
2002 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)alternate
;
2010 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2011 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
*chain
, DWORD i
)
2014 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= NULL
;
2016 for (j
= 0, iElement
= 0; !element
&& j
< chain
->cChain
; j
++)
2018 if (iElement
+ chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
< i
)
2019 iElement
+= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
;
2021 element
= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->rgpElement
[i
- iElement
];
2026 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
{
2028 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage
;
2029 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
;
2031 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
,
2032 LPFILETIME pTime
, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
, DWORD chainFlags
)
2036 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT
)
2038 else if ((chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
) ||
2039 (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT
))
2043 for (i
= 0, cContext
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2045 if (i
< chain
->cChain
- 1 ||
2046 chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
)
2047 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
;
2049 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1;
2056 PCCERT_CONTEXT
*contexts
=
2057 CryptMemAlloc(cContext
* sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT
*));
2061 DWORD i
, j
, iContext
, revocationFlags
;
2062 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara
= { sizeof(revocationPara
), 0 };
2063 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus
=
2064 { sizeof(revocationStatus
), 0 };
2067 for (i
= 0, iContext
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&& i
< chain
->cChain
;
2070 for (j
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&&
2071 j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2072 contexts
[iContext
++] =
2073 chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
2075 revocationFlags
= CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG
;
2076 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY
)
2077 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION
;
2078 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT
)
2079 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG
;
2080 revocationPara
.pftTimeToUse
= pTime
;
2081 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
== sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2083 revocationPara
.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
=
2084 pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
2085 revocationPara
.fCheckFreshnessTime
=
2086 pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2087 revocationPara
.dwFreshnessTime
=
2088 pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2090 ret
= CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
2091 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE
, cContext
, (void **)contexts
,
2092 revocationFlags
, &revocationPara
, &revocationStatus
);
2095 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
2096 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain
, revocationStatus
.dwIndex
);
2099 switch (revocationStatus
.dwError
)
2101 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK
:
2102 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL
:
2103 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE
:
2104 error
= CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN
;
2106 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE
:
2107 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION
;
2109 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED
:
2110 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED
;
2113 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus
.dwError
);
2118 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2119 element
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2121 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2123 CryptMemFree(contexts
);
2128 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name
, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH
*usageMatch
)
2132 TRACE_(chain
)("%s: %s\n", name
,
2133 usageMatch
->dwType
== USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND
? "AND" : "OR");
2134 for (i
= 0; i
< usageMatch
->Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
2135 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usageMatch
->Usage
.rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
2138 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
)
2140 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->cbSize
);
2141 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
))
2142 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
);
2143 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2145 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2146 &pChainPara
->RequestedIssuancePolicy
);
2147 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
);
2148 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2149 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2153 BOOL WINAPI
CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
2154 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
2155 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara
, DWORD dwFlags
, LPVOID pvReserved
,
2156 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
* ppChainContext
)
2159 PCertificateChain chain
= NULL
;
2161 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pCertContext
,
2162 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
, pvReserved
, ppChainContext
);
2165 *ppChainContext
= NULL
;
2168 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
2171 if (!pCertContext
->pCertInfo
->SignatureAlgorithm
.pszObjId
)
2173 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA
);
2178 hChainEngine
= CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2179 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
2180 dump_chain_para(pChainPara
);
2181 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2182 ret
= CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine
, pCertContext
, pTime
,
2183 hAdditionalStore
, &chain
);
2186 PCertificateChain alternate
= NULL
;
2187 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain
;
2190 alternate
= CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine
,
2191 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
2193 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2194 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2195 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2198 ret
= CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain
, alternate
);
2199 } while (ret
&& alternate
);
2200 chain
= CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain
);
2201 if (!(dwFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS
))
2202 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
2203 pChain
= (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
2204 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain
, pTime
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
);
2206 *ppChainContext
= pChain
;
2208 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain
);
2210 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret
);
2214 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI
CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2215 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2217 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2219 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2222 InterlockedIncrement(&chain
->ref
);
2223 return pChainContext
;
2226 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2228 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2230 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2234 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain
->ref
) == 0)
2235 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain
);
2239 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
, DWORD error
,
2240 LONG
*iChain
, LONG
*iElement
)
2244 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2245 for (j
= 0; j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2246 if (chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2255 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2256 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2257 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2259 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2260 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2261 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2263 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2264 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2265 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2266 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2268 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2269 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2271 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2272 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2273 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2274 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2276 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2278 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CHAINING
;
2279 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
,
2280 &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
, &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2281 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2282 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2285 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2289 static BYTE msTestPubKey1
[] = {
2290 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2291 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2292 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2293 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2294 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2295 static BYTE msTestPubKey2
[] = {
2296 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2297 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2298 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2299 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2300 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2302 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2303 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2304 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2306 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2309 if (ret
&& pPolicyStatus
->dwError
== CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
)
2311 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2312 BOOL isMSTestRoot
= FALSE
;
2313 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert
=
2314 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
]->
2315 rgpElement
[pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
]->pCertContext
;
2317 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2318 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1
), msTestPubKey1
},
2319 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2
), msTestPubKey2
},
2322 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2323 for (i
= 0; !isMSTestRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2326 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2327 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2328 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2329 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2330 &failingCert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2331 isMSTestRoot
= TRUE
;
2334 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT
;
2339 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2340 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2341 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2343 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2344 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2345 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
)
2347 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
2348 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2349 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2350 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2353 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2357 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext
,
2358 LPCWSTR server_name
)
2360 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2361 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
2364 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2365 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
2366 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
2367 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
2368 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
2370 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
2371 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
2372 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2373 &subjectName
, &size
))
2377 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
2378 * in section 4.2.1.6:
2379 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
2381 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but common usage is
2382 * to accept a certificate if any name matches.
2384 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
2386 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
2387 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
)
2389 TRACE_(chain
)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
2390 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
));
2391 if (!strcmpiW(server_name
,
2392 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
))
2396 LocalFree(subjectName
);
2401 static BOOL
find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
,
2404 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2407 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< name
->cRDN
; i
++)
2408 for (j
= 0; j
< name
->rgRDN
[i
].cRDNAttr
; j
++)
2409 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
,
2410 name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
].pszObjId
))
2412 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2414 attr
= &name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
];
2415 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
2416 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
2417 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
2418 * value with a case-insensitive match.
2420 matches
= !memicmpW(component
, (LPWSTR
)attr
->Value
.pbData
,
2421 attr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
));
2426 static BOOL
match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component
, DWORD allowed_len
,
2427 LPCWSTR server_component
, DWORD server_len
, BOOL allow_wildcards
,
2430 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr
, server_ptr
;
2431 BOOL matches
= TRUE
;
2433 *see_wildcard
= FALSE
;
2434 if (server_len
< allowed_len
)
2436 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
2437 debugstr_wn(server_component
, server_len
),
2438 debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2439 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
2440 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
2444 for (allowed_ptr
= allowed_component
, server_ptr
= server_component
;
2445 matches
&& allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
;
2446 allowed_ptr
++, server_ptr
++)
2448 if (*allowed_ptr
== '*')
2450 if (allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
- 1)
2452 WARN_(chain
)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
2455 else if (!allow_wildcards
)
2457 WARN_(chain
)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
2462 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
2463 * the component also matches.
2465 *see_wildcard
= TRUE
;
2469 matches
= tolowerW(*allowed_ptr
) == tolowerW(*server_ptr
);
2471 if (matches
&& server_ptr
- server_component
< server_len
)
2473 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
2474 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
2476 matches
= *allowed_ptr
== '*';
2481 static BOOL
match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name
, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr
)
2483 LPCWSTR allowed
= (LPCWSTR
)nameAttr
->Value
.pbData
;
2484 LPCWSTR allowed_component
= allowed
;
2485 DWORD allowed_len
= nameAttr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
);
2486 LPCWSTR server_component
= server_name
;
2487 DWORD server_len
= strlenW(server_name
);
2488 BOOL matches
= TRUE
, allow_wildcards
= TRUE
;
2490 TRACE_(chain
)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2492 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
2493 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
2494 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
2495 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
2498 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
2499 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
2500 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
2501 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
2503 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
2504 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
2505 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
2506 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
2509 LPCWSTR allowed_dot
, server_dot
;
2511 allowed_dot
= memchrW(allowed_component
, '.',
2512 allowed_len
- (allowed_component
- allowed
));
2513 server_dot
= memchrW(server_component
, '.',
2514 server_len
- (server_component
- server_name
));
2515 /* The number of components must match */
2516 if ((!allowed_dot
&& server_dot
) || (allowed_dot
&& !server_dot
))
2519 WARN_(chain
)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
2520 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2522 WARN_(chain
)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
2523 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2528 LPCWSTR allowed_end
, server_end
;
2531 allowed_end
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
: allowed
+ allowed_len
;
2532 server_end
= server_dot
? server_dot
: server_name
+ server_len
;
2533 matches
= match_domain_component(allowed_component
,
2534 allowed_end
- allowed_component
, server_component
,
2535 server_end
- server_component
, allow_wildcards
, &has_wildcard
);
2536 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
2540 allow_wildcards
= FALSE
;
2543 allowed_component
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
+ 1 : allowed_end
;
2544 server_component
= server_dot
? server_dot
+ 1 : server_end
;
2547 } while (matches
&& allowed_component
&&
2548 allowed_component
- allowed
< allowed_len
&&
2549 server_component
&& server_component
- server_name
< server_len
);
2550 TRACE_(chain
)("returning %d\n", matches
);
2554 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPCWSTR server_name
)
2556 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2557 CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
2560 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2561 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_UNICODE_NAME
,
2562 cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.pbData
, cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.cbData
,
2563 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2566 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
2567 * make sure all of them are present.
2569 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
, name
))
2571 LPCWSTR ptr
= server_name
;
2575 LPCWSTR dot
= strchrW(ptr
, '.'), end
;
2576 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
2577 WCHAR component
[255];
2580 end
= dot
? dot
: ptr
+ strlenW(ptr
);
2582 if (len
>= sizeof(component
) / sizeof(component
[0]))
2584 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too long\n",
2585 debugstr_wn(ptr
, len
));
2590 memcpy(component
, ptr
, len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
2592 matches
= find_matching_domain_component(name
, component
);
2594 ptr
= dot
? dot
+ 1 : end
;
2595 } while (matches
&& ptr
&& *ptr
);
2599 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2601 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
2602 * make sure the common name matches.
2604 if ((attr
= CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME
, name
)))
2605 matches
= match_common_name(server_name
, attr
);
2612 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2613 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2614 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2616 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2617 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2618 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2620 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2621 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2622 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2623 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2625 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2626 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2628 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2629 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2630 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2631 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2633 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2635 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2636 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2637 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2638 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2639 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2640 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2642 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2643 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
)
2645 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_EXPIRED
;
2646 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2647 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2648 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2651 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2652 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
2653 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
2655 if (!pPolicyStatus
->dwError
&& pPolicyPara
&&
2656 pPolicyPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA
))
2658 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
*sslPara
= pPolicyPara
->pvExtraPolicyPara
;
2660 if (sslPara
&& sslPara
->u
.cbSize
>= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
))
2662 if (sslPara
->dwAuthType
== AUTHTYPE_SERVER
&&
2663 sslPara
->pwszServerName
)
2665 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
;
2666 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt
;
2669 cert
= pChainContext
->rgpChain
[0]->rgpElement
[0]->pCertContext
;
2670 altNameExt
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
->pCertInfo
);
2671 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
2672 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
2673 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
2674 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
2675 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
2676 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
2677 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
2678 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
2679 * domainComponent attribute."
2682 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt
,
2683 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
2685 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert
,
2686 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
2689 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH
;
2690 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= 0;
2691 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
2699 static BYTE msPubKey1
[] = {
2700 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
2701 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
2702 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
2703 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
2704 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
2705 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
2706 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
2707 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
2708 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
2709 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
2710 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
2711 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
2712 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
2713 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
2714 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
2715 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
2716 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
2717 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2718 static BYTE msPubKey2
[] = {
2719 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
2720 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
2721 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
2722 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
2723 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
2724 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
2725 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
2726 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
2727 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
2728 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
2729 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
2730 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
2731 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
2732 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
2733 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
2734 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
2735 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
2736 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2737 static BYTE msPubKey3
[] = {
2738 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
2739 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
2740 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
2741 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
2742 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
2743 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
2744 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
2745 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
2746 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
2747 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
2748 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
2749 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
2750 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
2751 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
2752 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
2753 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
2754 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
2755 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
2756 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
2757 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
2758 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
2759 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
2760 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
2761 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
2762 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
2763 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
2764 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
2765 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
2766 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
2767 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
2768 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
2769 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
2770 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
2771 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
2772 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
2775 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2776 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2777 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2779 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2782 if (ret
&& !pPolicyStatus
->dwError
)
2784 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2785 BOOL isMSRoot
= FALSE
;
2787 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2788 { sizeof(msPubKey1
), msPubKey1
},
2789 { sizeof(msPubKey2
), msPubKey2
},
2790 { sizeof(msPubKey3
), msPubKey3
},
2792 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain
=
2793 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pChainContext
->cChain
-1 ];
2794 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
=
2795 rootChain
->rgpElement
[rootChain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
2797 for (i
= 0; !isMSRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2800 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2801 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2802 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2803 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2804 &root
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2808 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
2813 typedef BOOL (WINAPI
*CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc
)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2814 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2815 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
);
2817 BOOL WINAPI
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2818 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2819 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2821 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set
= NULL
;
2823 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy
= NULL
;
2824 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc
= NULL
;
2826 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID
), pChainContext
,
2827 pPolicyPara
, pPolicyStatus
);
2829 if (!HIWORD(szPolicyOID
))
2831 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID
))
2833 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE
):
2834 verifyPolicy
= verify_base_policy
;
2836 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE
):
2837 verifyPolicy
= verify_authenticode_policy
;
2839 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL
):
2840 verifyPolicy
= verify_ssl_policy
;
2842 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
):
2843 verifyPolicy
= verify_basic_constraints_policy
;
2845 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT
):
2846 verifyPolicy
= verify_ms_root_policy
;
2849 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID
));
2855 set
= CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
2856 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC
, 0);
2857 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set
, X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szPolicyOID
, 0,
2858 (void **)&verifyPolicy
, &hFunc
);
2861 ret
= verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2864 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc
, 0);
2865 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret
, pPolicyStatus
->dwError
);