From: Thomas Faber Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2017 13:06:14 +0000 (+0000) Subject: [MBEDTLS] X-Git-Tag: backups/GSoC_2017/rapps@75905~4^2~48 X-Git-Url: https://git.reactos.org/?p=reactos.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=0f34777514482c0211a8e3337cb9ad222a94dbf6 [MBEDTLS] - Update to version 2.6.0 CORE-13739 svn path=/trunk/; revision=75740 --- diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/aes.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/aes.c index f8e2273813f..dadfbe3c68e 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/aes.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/aes.c @@ -712,9 +712,9 @@ exit: * AES-ECB block encryption */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) -void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) { int i; uint32_t *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3; @@ -762,16 +762,25 @@ void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, PUT_UINT32_LE( X1, output, 4 ); PUT_UINT32_LE( X2, output, 8 ); PUT_UINT32_LE( X3, output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ +void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ); +} + /* * AES-ECB block decryption */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) -void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) { int i; uint32_t *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3; @@ -819,9 +828,18 @@ void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, PUT_UINT32_LE( X1, output, 4 ); PUT_UINT32_LE( X2, output, 8 ); PUT_UINT32_LE( X3, output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ +void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ); +} + /* * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption */ @@ -848,11 +866,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, #endif if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) - mbedtls_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ); + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); else - mbedtls_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ); - - return( 0 ); + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c index 757bece8bee..ab510e2df56 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c @@ -618,11 +618,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) if( slen == sizeof( s ) - 2 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - if( s[slen - 1] == '\n' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } - if( s[slen - 1] == '\r' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } p = s + slen; - while( --p >= s ) + while( p-- > s ) if( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, *p ) != 0 ) break; @@ -1792,7 +1792,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) ); - if( neg ) + if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) { X->s = -1; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, N, X ) ); @@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi int ret; mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 ) + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U2 ); diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c index 4a81e02015b..dd9d02ba31c 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ "uCjn8pwUOkABXK8Mss90fzCfCEOtIA==\r\n" \ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ); const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" @@ -60,8 +61,10 @@ const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = "UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb\r\n" "a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm\r\n" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec ); const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[] = "PolarSSLTest"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec ) - 1; const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" @@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = "C12r0Lz3ri/moSEpNZWqPjkCMCE2f53GXcYLqyfyJR078c/xNSUU5+Xxl7VZ414V\r\n" "fGa5kHvHARBPc8YAIVIqDvHH1Q==\r\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec ); const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" @@ -85,6 +89,7 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = "AwEHoUQDQgAEN8xW2XYJHlpyPsdZLf8gbu58+QaRdNCtFLX3aCJZYpJO5QDYIxH/\r\n" "6i/SNF1dFr2KiMJrdw1VzYoqDvoByLTt/w==\r\n" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec ); const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" @@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = "lgOsjnhw3fIOoLIWy2WOGsk/LGF++DzvrRzuNiACMQCd8iem1XS4JK7haj8xocpU\r\n" "LwjQje5PDGHfd3h9tP38Qknu5bJqws0md2KOKHyeV0U=\r\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec ); const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" @@ -108,20 +114,45 @@ const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = "AwEHoUQDQgAEV+WusXPf06y7k7iB/xKu7uZTrM5VU/Y0Dswu42MlC9+Y4vNcYDaW\r\n" "wNUYFHDlf5/VS0UY5bBs1Vz4lo+HcKPkxw==\r\n" "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec ) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec ); const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec ); -#else -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA \ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 \ +"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ +"MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ +"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ +"MTcwNTA0MTY1NzAxWhcNMjcwNTA1MTY1NzAxWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ +"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ +"CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ +"mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ +"50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ +"YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ +"R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ +"KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ +"gZUwgZIwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MGMGA1UdIwRcMFqA\r\n" \ +"FLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/oT+kPTA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8GA1UE\r\n" \ +"CgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0GCAQAwDAYDVR0T\r\n" \ +"BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAHK/HHrTZMnnVMpde1io+voAtql7j\r\n" \ +"4sRhLrjD7o3THtwRbDa2diCvpq0Sq23Ng2LMYoXsOxoL/RQK3iN7UKxV3MKPEr0w\r\n" \ +"XQS+kKQqiT2bsfrjnWMVHZtUOMpm6FNqcdGm/Rss3vKda2lcKl8kUnq/ylc1+QbB\r\n" \ +"G6A6tUvQcr2ZyWfVg+mM5XkhTrOOXus2OLikb4WwEtJTJRNE0f+yPODSUz0/vT57\r\n" \ +"ApH0CnB80bYJshYHPHHymOtleAB8KSYtqm75g/YNobjnjB6cm4HkW3OZRVIl6fYY\r\n" \ +"n20NRVA1Vjs6GAROr4NqW4k/+LofY9y0LLDE+p0oIEKXIsIvhPr39swxSA==\r\n" \ +"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SOME + +static const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; + +#endif + +#if !defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SOME) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 \ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ "MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ "MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ @@ -143,7 +174,15 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec ); "m/UTSLBNFNHesiTZeH31NcxYGdHSme9Nc/gfidRa0FLOCfWxRlFqAI47zG9jAQCZ\r\n" \ "7Z2mCGDNMhjQc+BYcdnl0lPXjdDK6V0qCg1dVewhUBcW5gZKzV7e9+DpVA==\r\n" \ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA; + +#if !defined (TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SOME) +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); +#endif + +static const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; + +#endif const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" @@ -176,8 +215,10 @@ const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = "wN48lslbHnqqagr6Xm1nNOSVl8C/6kbJEsMpLhAezfRtGwvOucoaE+WbeUNolGde\r\n" "P/eQiddSf0brnpiLJRh7qZrl9XuqYdpUqnoEdMAfotDOID8OtV7gt8a48ad8VPW2\r\n" "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa ); const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = "PolarSSLTest"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1; const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" @@ -200,6 +241,7 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = "RRQfaD8neM9c1S/iJ/amTVqJxA1KOdOS5780WhPfSArA+g4qAmSjelc3p4wWpha8\r\n" "zhuYwjVuX6JHG0c=\r\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa ); const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" @@ -229,28 +271,31 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = "4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE\r\n" "TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg==\r\n" "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa ); const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -"MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" -"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" -"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA3WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA3WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" -"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMTEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" +"MIIDhTCCAm2gAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" +"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" +"MTcwNTA1MTMwNzU5WhcNMjcwNTA2MTMwNzU5WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" +"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" "BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n" "M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n" "1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw\r\n" "MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n" "4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n" "/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n" -"o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n" -"BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOC\r\n" -"AQEAAn86isAM8X+mVwJqeItt6E9slhEQbAofyk+diH1Lh8Y9iLlWQSKbw/UXYjx5\r\n" -"LLPZcniovxIcARC/BjyZR9g3UwTHNGNm+rwrqa15viuNOFBchykX/Orsk02EH7NR\r\n" -"Alw5WLPorYjED6cdVQgBl9ot93HdJogRiXCxErM7NC8/eP511mjq+uLDjLKH8ZPQ\r\n" -"8I4ekHJnroLsDkIwXKGIsvIBHQy2ac/NwHLCQOK6mfum1pRx52V4Utu5dLLjD5bM\r\n" -"xOBC7KU4xZKuMXXZM6/93Yb51K/J4ahf1TxJlTWXtnzDr9saEYdNy2SKY/6ZiDNH\r\n" -"D+stpAKiQLAWaAusIWKYEyw9MQ==\r\n" +"o4GSMIGPMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITBjBgNVHSMEXDBa\r\n" +"gBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/6E/pD0wOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNV\r\n" +"BAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEAMAkGA1Ud\r\n" +"EwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC7yO786NvcHpK8UovKIG9cB32oSQQom\r\n" +"LoR0eHDRzdqEkoq7yGZufHFiRAAzbMqJfogRtxlrWAeB4y/jGaMBV25IbFOIcH2W\r\n" +"iCEaMMbG+VQLKNvuC63kmw/Zewc9ThM6Pa1Hcy0axT0faf1B/U01j0FIcw/6mTfK\r\n" +"D8w48OIwc1yr0JtutCVjig5DC0yznGMt32RyseOLcUe+lfq005v2PAiCozr5X8rE\r\n" +"ofGZpiM2NqRPePgYy+Vc75Zk28xkRQq1ncprgQb3S4vTsZdScpM9hLf+eMlrgqlj\r\n" +"c5PLSkXBeLE5+fedkyfTaLxxQlgCpuoOhKBm04/R1pWNzUHyqagjO9Q=\r\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa ); const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" @@ -280,28 +325,32 @@ const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = "bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv\r\n" "8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA==\r\n" "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa ); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa ); const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa ); -#else -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) /* Concatenation of all available CA certificates */ -const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = +#ifdef TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 +#endif +#ifdef TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 +#endif +#ifdef TEST_CA_CRT_EC + TEST_CA_CRT_EC +#endif + ""; const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cas_pem ); #endif /* List of all available CA certificates */ const char * mbedtls_test_cas[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa, +#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1, +#endif +#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec, @@ -309,8 +358,11 @@ const char * mbedtls_test_cas[] = { NULL }; const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ), +#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1 ), +#endif +#if defined(TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256 ), #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ), @@ -319,7 +371,7 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa; +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa; /* SHA1 or SHA256 */ const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa; const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa; const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa; diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/cmac.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/cmac.c index 9b7ef710f24..c72c58f009f 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/cmac.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/cmac.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* +/** * \file cmac.c * * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES @@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ static void cmac_xor_block( unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, const unsigned char *input2, const size_t block_size ) { - size_t index; + size_t idx; - for( index = 0; index < block_size; index++ ) - output[ index ] = input1[ index ] ^ input2[ index ]; + for( idx = 0; idx < block_size; idx++ ) + output[ idx ] = input1[ idx ] ^ input2[ idx ]; } /* diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/dhm.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/dhm.c index 6ff983b635a..5f825ba52fe 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/dhm.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/dhm.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, */ do { - mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) ); @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, */ do { - mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) ); @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, count = 0; do { - mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vi, mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ), f_rng, p_rng ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vi, mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ), f_rng, p_rng ) ); while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) >= 0 ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) ); diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c index c9fc5161814..055e70e409d 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c @@ -51,9 +51,12 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #include +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" + #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline @@ -750,6 +755,12 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) return( 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); /* @@ -798,6 +809,13 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, if( t_len < 2 ) return( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, *T ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, T, t_len); + } +#endif + if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( t_len, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); @@ -914,6 +932,13 @@ static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, dbl_count++; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); /* Special case for A = -3 */ @@ -1005,6 +1030,13 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, add_count++; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, P, Q ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + /* * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) */ @@ -1082,15 +1114,23 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p { int ret; mbedtls_mpi l, ll; - size_t p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; + size_t p_size; int count = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + + p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll ); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ do { - mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) ); @@ -1236,6 +1276,7 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, k ) ); cleanup: + return( ret ); } @@ -1299,6 +1340,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R } cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Txi ); return( ret ); @@ -1443,6 +1485,13 @@ static int ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P { int ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, P ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( P->X ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); @@ -1464,15 +1513,23 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P { int ret; mbedtls_mpi l; - size_t p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; + size_t p_size; int count = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, P, f_rng, p_rng ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + + p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ do { - mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) ); @@ -1514,6 +1571,13 @@ static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int ret; mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB ); @@ -1614,7 +1678,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif /* Common sanity checks */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) @@ -1624,15 +1691,33 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ #if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) - return( ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + ret = ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ); + #endif #if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - return( ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + ret = ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ); + #endif - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +cleanup: + + if ( is_grp_capable ) + { + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + return( ret ); } #if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) @@ -1725,6 +1810,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, { int ret; mbedtls_ecp_point mP; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif if( ecp_get_type( grp ) != ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); @@ -1734,10 +1822,25 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, &mP, m, P ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, R, n, Q ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, &mP, R ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) ); cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if ( is_grp_capable ) + { + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP ); return( ret ); @@ -2091,4 +2194,6 @@ cleanup: #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp_curves.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp_curves.c index 768e4ced2c5..3fd78fe9982 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp_curves.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp_curves.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ #include +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline @@ -1324,4 +1326,6 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/entropy.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/entropy.c index 23fb66af001..c88fc51fa23 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/entropy.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/entropy.c @@ -134,24 +134,24 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, size_t threshold, int strong ) { - int index, ret = 0; + int idx, ret = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); #endif - index = ctx->source_count; - if( index >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES ) + idx = ctx->source_count; + if( idx >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES; goto exit; } - ctx->source[index].f_source = f_source; - ctx->source[index].p_source = p_source; - ctx->source[index].threshold = threshold; - ctx->source[index].strong = strong; + ctx->source[idx].f_source = f_source; + ctx->source[idx].p_source = p_source; + ctx->source[idx].threshold = threshold; + ctx->source[idx].strong = strong; ctx->source_count++; diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c index 5180416da60..f80125ad817 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c @@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); + if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ // END generated code diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/gcm.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/gcm.c index 89d436ef555..2f34930f4cd 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/gcm.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/gcm.c @@ -279,8 +279,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t use_len, olen = 0; /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ - if( ( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 || - ( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 ) + /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ + if( iv_len == 0 || + ( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 || + ( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); } diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/platform.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/platform.c index 12c2a112596..b54a855545b 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/platform.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/platform.c @@ -306,4 +306,24 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) +/* + * Placeholder platform setup that does nothing by default + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ) +{ + (void)ctx; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Placeholder platform teardown that does nothing by default + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ) +{ + (void)ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/rsa.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/rsa.c index b81fdc99f6b..5dcc72237b4 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/rsa.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/rsa.c @@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ * [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8 * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone * + * [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks + * Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and + * Stefan Mangard + * https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2 + * */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) @@ -63,6 +68,11 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { + volatile unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0; +} + /* * Initialize an RSA context */ @@ -358,6 +368,27 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } +/* + * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple + * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, + * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3]. + * + * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n) + * observations on avarage. + * + * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has + * to make 2^112 observations on avarage. + * + * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048 + * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys. + * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by + * side-channel attacks like the one in [3]) + * + * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a + * single trace. + */ +#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28 + /* * Do an RSA private key operation */ @@ -370,12 +401,34 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret; size_t olen; mbedtls_mpi T, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi D_blind; + mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; +#else + mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; + mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; + mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; +#endif /* Make sure we have private key info, prevent possible misuse */ if( ctx->P.p == NULL || ctx->Q.p == NULL || ctx->D.p == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); +#endif + } + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -398,19 +451,60 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); + + D = &D_blind; +#else + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP ) ); + + DP = &DP_blind; + + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ ) ); + + DQ = &DQ_blind; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); #else /* - * faster decryption using the CRT + * Faster decryption using the CRT * * T1 = input ^ dP mod P * T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T1, &T, &ctx->DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T2, &T, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T1, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T2, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) ); /* * T = (T1 - T2) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P @@ -446,6 +540,17 @@ cleanup: #endif mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); +#endif + } if( ret != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret ); @@ -498,6 +603,8 @@ static void mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, dlen -= use_len; } + + mbedtls_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -726,7 +833,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; /* * Unmask data and generate lHash @@ -735,7 +842,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; } @@ -786,15 +893,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * the different error conditions. */ if( bad != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto cleanup; + } if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + goto cleanup; + } *olen = ilen - (p - buf); memcpy( output, p, *olen ); + ret = 0; - return( 0 ); +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) ); + + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -828,7 +946,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto cleanup; p = buf; bad = 0; @@ -873,15 +991,25 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, bad |= ( pad_count < 8 ); if( bad ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto cleanup; + } if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + goto cleanup; + } *olen = ilen - (p - buf); memcpy( output, p, *olen ); + ret = 0; - return( 0 ); +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ @@ -983,6 +1111,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + /* No need to zeroize salt: we didn't use it. */ return( ret ); } @@ -992,6 +1121,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ); mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ); mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ); + mbedtls_zeroize( salt, sizeof( salt ) ); /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ if( msb % 8 == 0 ) @@ -1339,7 +1469,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret; size_t len, siglen, asn1_len; - unsigned char *p, *end; + unsigned char *p, *p0, *end; mbedtls_md_type_t msg_md_alg; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; @@ -1371,7 +1501,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); p++; } - p++; + p++; /* skip 00 byte */ + + /* We've read: 00 01 PS 00 where PS must be at least 8 bytes */ + if( p - buf < 11 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); len = siglen - ( p - buf ); @@ -1391,24 +1525,29 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, end = p + len; /* - * Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure + * Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure. + * Insist on 2-byte length tags, to protect against variants of + * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification. */ + p0 = p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); - - if( asn1_len + 2 != len ) + if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len + 2 != len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + p0 = p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); - - if( asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len ) + if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + p0 = p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + if( p != p0 + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); oid.p = p; p += oid.len; @@ -1422,13 +1561,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * assume the algorithm parameters must be NULL */ + p0 = p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + if( p != p0 + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + p0 = p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); - - if( asn1_len != hashlen ) + if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len != hashlen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) != 0 ) diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cache.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cache.c index 4b9d8f2e873..3302ec11a5d 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cache.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cache.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) { int ret = 1; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t t = time( NULL ), oldest = 0; + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ), oldest = 0; mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; #endif mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.c index 1fd26b1370c..ecd94c8a6c0 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -1819,6 +1819,24 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciph return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); } } + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c index aab107c8548..135e36bd8f4 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c @@ -266,11 +266,12 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ ) - { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); #else for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ ) +#endif { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); #endif if( info == NULL ) { @@ -291,11 +292,12 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ ) - { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); #else for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ ) +#endif { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); #endif elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id >> 8; elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id & 0xFF; @@ -1057,8 +1059,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) { @@ -1071,10 +1071,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } } @@ -1084,10 +1082,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1110,6 +1106,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, len != 1 || buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1125,6 +1124,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || len != 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1145,6 +1147,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1165,6 +1170,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1184,6 +1192,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || len != 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1208,6 +1219,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( list_size + 1 != len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1219,7 +1232,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; #endif @@ -1232,6 +1245,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || @@ -1260,6 +1275,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( ret ); } @@ -1276,7 +1293,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } /* * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; @@ -1290,15 +1312,27 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ if( len < 4 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; if( list_len != len - 2 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } name_len = buf[2]; if( name_len != list_len - 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ ) @@ -1311,6 +1345,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ @@ -1415,6 +1452,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { + /* No alert on a read error. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -1435,11 +1473,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-handshake message during renego" ) ); + + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -1466,6 +1508,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1520,6 +1564,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( n > 32 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1532,6 +1578,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } } @@ -1542,6 +1590,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1569,6 +1619,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } @@ -1580,6 +1632,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } @@ -1617,6 +1671,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( ret ); } } @@ -1636,6 +1692,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1647,6 +1705,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1664,6 +1724,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; @@ -1682,6 +1744,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1852,9 +1916,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( handshake_failure == 1 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1993,7 +2056,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( (*p) + len > end ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message " + "(psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2135,8 +2199,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used HashAlgorithm " - "that was not offered" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", + *(p)[0] ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2194,7 +2258,8 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; unsigned char *p, *end; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) ); @@ -2218,6 +2283,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( ret ); } @@ -2239,6 +2306,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2251,11 +2320,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) { - ssl->record_read = 1; + /* Current message is probably either + * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; goto exit; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must " + "not be skipped" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2272,6 +2347,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } /* FALLTROUGH */ @@ -2293,6 +2370,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2309,6 +2388,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2324,6 +2405,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2334,12 +2417,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) { size_t sig_len, hashlen; unsigned char hash[64]; @@ -2358,12 +2437,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) &md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2395,6 +2478,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( end != p + sig_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2466,6 +2551,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ), 0 ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( ret ); } @@ -2489,6 +2576,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2498,19 +2587,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); return( ret ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ exit: ssl->state++; @@ -2520,23 +2611,15 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -2546,58 +2629,51 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret; unsigned char *buf; size_t n = 0; size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); ssl->state++; return( 0 ); } - if( ssl->record_read == 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } - ssl->record_read = 1; + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } - ssl->client_auth = 0; ssl->state++; - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ) - ssl->client_auth++; + ssl->client_auth = ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request", ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) ); if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) + { + /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; goto exit; - - ssl->record_read = 0; + } /* * struct { @@ -2632,6 +2708,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); } @@ -2647,7 +2725,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d" + ",%d", sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); } #endif @@ -2656,6 +2735,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); } } @@ -2669,6 +2750,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); } @@ -2677,12 +2760,7 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { @@ -2690,26 +2768,24 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) ); - if( ssl->record_read == 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } - ssl->record_read = 0; if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) || ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ); } @@ -2729,7 +2805,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret; size_t i, n; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) ); @@ -2816,10 +2893,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; @@ -2989,7 +3063,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; int ret; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); @@ -3018,7 +3093,8 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; size_t n = 0, offset = 0; unsigned char hash[48]; unsigned char *hash_start = hash; @@ -3190,6 +3266,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -3207,6 +3285,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } @@ -3220,6 +3300,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } @@ -3245,6 +3327,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); } diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c index 5264f25d602..c949a14558a 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c @@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( servername_list_size + 2 != len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -113,6 +115,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -137,6 +141,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( servername_list_size != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -148,8 +154,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) { @@ -160,10 +164,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } } @@ -173,10 +175,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -188,46 +188,83 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + +/* + * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: + * + * Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension + * to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange + * message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows. + * + * We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate + * chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair. + * This needs to be done at a later stage. + * + */ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { size_t sig_alg_list_size; + const unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; - const int *md_cur; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur; + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur; sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } - /* - * For now, ignore the SignatureAlgorithm part and rely on offered - * ciphersuites only for that part. To be fixed later. + /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according + * to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices + * to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm. * - * So, just look at the HashAlgorithm part. + * This will change when we also consider certificate signatures, + * in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash + * pair list from the extension. */ - for( md_cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md_cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md_cur++ ) { - for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 ) { - if( *md_cur == (int) mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] ) ) { - ssl->handshake->sig_alg = p[0]; - goto have_sig_alg; - } + + for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 ) + { + /* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */ + + if( ( sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( p[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext" + " unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1] ) ); + continue; } - } - /* Some key echanges do not need signatures at all */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no signature_algorithm in common" ) ); - return( 0 ); + /* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */ + md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] ); + if( md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" + " unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0] ) ); + continue; + } -have_sig_alg: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", - ssl->handshake->sig_alg ) ); + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_cur ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" + " match sig %d and hash %d", + sig_cur, md_cur ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " + "hash alg %d not supported", md_cur ) ); + } + } return( 0 ); } @@ -249,6 +286,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, list_size % 2 != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -256,6 +295,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->handshake->curves != NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -266,7 +307,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; if( ( curves = mbedtls_calloc( our_size, sizeof( *curves ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } ssl->handshake->curves = curves; @@ -299,6 +344,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( list_size + 1 != len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -344,6 +391,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( ret ); } @@ -362,6 +411,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -379,6 +430,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( len != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -399,6 +452,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( len != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -422,6 +477,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( len != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -533,11 +590,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ if( len < 4 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; if( list_len != len - 2 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } /* * Use our order of preference @@ -551,13 +616,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { /* If the list is well formed, we should get equality first */ if( theirs > end ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } cur_len = *theirs++; /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ if( cur_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } if( cur_len == ours_len && memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 ) @@ -609,7 +682,8 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info ) { mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); uint32_t flags; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) @@ -712,6 +786,11 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; +#endif + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( suite_id ); if( suite_info == NULL ) { @@ -778,6 +857,25 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether + * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info ); + if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " + "for signature algorithm %d", sig_type ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a @@ -815,10 +913,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -964,9 +1060,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " "during renegotiation" ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -1004,11 +1099,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ciphersuite_info = NULL; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) - { for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) #else for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) - { for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) #endif { @@ -1026,7 +1119,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) goto have_ciphersuite_v2; } - } if( got_common_suite ) { @@ -1053,10 +1145,8 @@ have_ciphersuite_v2: ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1069,6 +1159,9 @@ have_ciphersuite_v2: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ +/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during + ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is + not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret, got_common_suite; @@ -1087,6 +1180,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; int major, minor; + /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, + * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed + * signature-hash pairs. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) @@ -1103,6 +1205,7 @@ read_record_header: { if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 ) { + /* No alert on a read error. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -1115,7 +1218,7 @@ read_record_header: if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) #endif if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) - return ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ); + return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) ); #endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); @@ -1206,7 +1309,8 @@ read_record_header: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -1354,10 +1458,8 @@ read_record_header: " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); } @@ -1385,6 +1487,8 @@ read_record_header: sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1408,6 +1512,8 @@ read_record_header: if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1440,6 +1546,7 @@ read_record_header: /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ if( cookie_len != 0 ) { + /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1464,6 +1571,8 @@ read_record_header: ( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1482,6 +1591,8 @@ read_record_header: comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1520,6 +1631,8 @@ read_record_header: if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1530,6 +1643,8 @@ read_record_header: msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } } @@ -1549,6 +1664,8 @@ read_record_header: if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } switch( ext_id ) @@ -1584,10 +1701,11 @@ read_record_header: if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) break; #endif - ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); + + sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ @@ -1694,6 +1812,8 @@ read_record_header: if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } } @@ -1702,7 +1822,7 @@ read_record_header: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for( i = 0, p = buf + 41 + sess_len; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) + for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) { if( p[0] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) @@ -1724,6 +1844,26 @@ read_record_header: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + + /* + * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client + * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. + */ + if( sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_default ) != 0 ) + md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + /* * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ @@ -1735,11 +1875,10 @@ read_record_header: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV during renegotiation" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " + "during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } #endif @@ -1783,9 +1922,8 @@ read_record_header: if( handshake_failure == 1 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1799,11 +1937,9 @@ read_record_header: ciphersuite_info = NULL; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) - { for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) #else for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) - { for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) #endif { @@ -1820,19 +1956,20 @@ read_record_header: if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) goto have_ciphersuite; } - } if( got_common_suite ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " "but none of them usable" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); } @@ -1849,6 +1986,28 @@ have_ciphersuite: mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); #endif + /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + if( sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, + sig_alg ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", + mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ) ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " + "%d - should not happen", sig_alg ) ); + } + } +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) ); return( 0 ); @@ -2454,7 +2613,8 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); @@ -2476,7 +2636,8 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ unsigned char *buf, *p; @@ -2590,35 +2751,40 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; */ p += 2; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) - crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; - else -#endif - crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; total_dn_size = 0; - while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) + + if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED ) { - dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) + crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + else +#endif + crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; - if( end < p || - (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || - (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) + while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); - break; - } + dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size ); - memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); - p += dn_size; + if( end < p || + (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || + (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); + break; + } + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size ); + memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); + p += dn_size; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size ); - total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; - crt = crt->next; + total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; + crt = crt->next; + } } ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; @@ -2672,74 +2838,81 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED) unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; + size_t len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) unsigned char *dig_signed = p; - size_t dig_signed_len = 0, len; - ((void) dig_signed); - ((void) dig_signed_len); - ((void) len); -#endif + size_t dig_signed_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } -#endif + /* + * + * Part 1: Extract static ECDH parameters and abort + * if ServerKeyExchange not needed. + * + */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters + * from certificate at this point. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) ) { ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */ + /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use + * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); ssl->state++; return( 0 ); } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__NON_PFS__ENABLED */ + /* + * + * Part 2: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. + * + */ + + /* + * - ECJPAKE key exchanges + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { - size_t jlen; const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p, end - p, &jlen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + p, end - p, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); return( ret ); } - p += jlen; - n += jlen; + p += len; + n += len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + /* + * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support + * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, + * we use empty support identity hints here. + **/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) { - /* Note: we don't support identity hints, until someone asks - * for them. */ *(p++) = 0x00; *(p++) = 0x00; @@ -2748,10 +2921,11 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + /* + * - DHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) { if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) { @@ -2783,8 +2957,10 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) dig_signed = p; dig_signed_len = len; +#endif p += len; n += len; @@ -2794,13 +2970,13 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED */ + /* + * - ECDHE key exchanges + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: @@ -2843,8 +3019,10 @@ curve_matching_done: return( ret ); } - dig_signed = p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) + dig_signed = p; dig_signed_len = len; +#endif p += len; n += len; @@ -2853,29 +3031,44 @@ curve_matching_done: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + /* + * + * Part 3: For key exchanges involving the server signing the + * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) { size_t signature_len = 0; unsigned int hashlen = 0; unsigned char hash[64]; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; /* - * Choose hash algorithm. NONE means MD5 + SHA1 here. + * 3.1: Choose hash algorithm: + * A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. + * B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 + * (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) + * C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) */ + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { - md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->handshake->sig_alg ); - - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + /* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ + if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || + ( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, + sig_alg ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + /* (... because we choose a cipher suite + * only if there is a matching hash.) */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } } @@ -2883,19 +3076,23 @@ curve_matching_done: #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) { + /* B: Default hash SHA1 */ md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; } else -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ { + /* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %d for signing", md_alg ) ); + /* - * Compute the hash to be signed + * 3.2: Compute the hash to be signed */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) @@ -2920,6 +3117,7 @@ curve_matching_done: * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random * + ServerParams); */ + mbedtls_md5_starts( &mbedtls_md5 ); mbedtls_md5_update( &mbedtls_md5, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); mbedtls_md5_update( &mbedtls_md5, dig_signed, dig_signed_len ); @@ -2981,7 +3179,7 @@ curve_matching_done: (unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) ); /* - * Make the signature + * 3.3: Compute and add the signature */ if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) { @@ -2992,16 +3190,31 @@ curve_matching_done: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { - *(p++) = ssl->handshake->sig_alg; - *(p++) = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ); + /* + * For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm + * explicitly through a prefix to the signature. + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + * + */ + + *(p++) = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ); + *(p++) = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_alg ); n += 2; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), md_alg, hash, hashlen, - p + 2 , &signature_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + p + 2 , &signature_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -3015,9 +3228,9 @@ curve_matching_done: n += signature_len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ + + /* Done with actual work; add header and send. */ ssl->out_msglen = 4 + n; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; @@ -3259,13 +3472,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ); } @@ -3533,7 +3741,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); @@ -3563,7 +3772,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; #endif mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c index 1c33b9528f7..4cec7755ebe 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c @@ -3475,7 +3475,6 @@ static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) */ static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; int major_ver, minor_ver; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); @@ -3496,14 +3495,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); } @@ -3729,27 +3722,35 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); - do { + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) + { + do { + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); + + } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + if( 0 != ret ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer" ), ret ); return( ret ); } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); - - } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ); - - if( 0 != ret ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); - return( ret ); + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + } } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + else { - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= reuse previously read message" ) ); + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); @@ -3761,31 +3762,116 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret; - if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + /* + * Step A + * + * Consume last content-layer message and potentially + * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' + * consumption state. + * + * (1) Handshake messages: + * Remove last handshake message, move content + * and adapt in_msglen. + * + * (2) Alert messages: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * NOTE: This needs to be fixed, since like for + * handshake messages it is allowed to have + * multiple alerts witin a single record. + * Internal reference IOTSSL-1321. + * + * (3) Change cipher spec: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (4) Application data: + * Don't do anything - the record layer provides + * the application data as a stream transport + * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. + * + */ + + /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ + if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) { + /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data + * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during + * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + /* * Get next Handshake message in the current record */ - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; - memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, - ssl->in_msglen ); + /* Notes: + * (1) in_hslen is *NOT* necessarily the size of the + * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake + * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment + * size instead. Using the total handshake message + * size here is FAULTY and should be changed at + * some point. Internal reference IOTSSL-1414. + * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one + * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen + * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. + * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. + * The following check is therefore mandatory, and + * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. + * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of + * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected + * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; + memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, + ssl->in_msglen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + } + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + } + /* Case (4): Application data */ + else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { return( 0 ); } - - ssl->in_hslen = 0; + /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } /* - * Read the record header and parse it + * Step B + * + * Fetch and decode new record if current one is fully consumed. + * */ + + if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) + { + /* There's something left to be processed in the current record. */ + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Need to fetch a new record */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) read_record_header: #endif + /* Current record either fully processed or to be discarded. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); @@ -3877,6 +3963,12 @@ read_record_header: } #endif + /* As above, invalid records cause + * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); goto read_record_header; } @@ -4032,6 +4124,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; ssl->out_msglen = 2; @@ -4043,7 +4136,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); return( ret ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); return( 0 ); @@ -4059,6 +4151,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; @@ -4098,7 +4191,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + #else +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -4221,6 +4317,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) size_t i, n; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + uint8_t alert; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); @@ -4260,6 +4357,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -4281,6 +4380,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) ); + /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send + one. The client should know what's going on, so we + don't send an alert. */ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) return( 0 ); @@ -4302,6 +4404,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); + /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send + one. The client should know what's going on, so we + don't send an alert. */ ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) return( 0 ); @@ -4316,6 +4421,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -4323,6 +4430,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + 3 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } @@ -4337,6 +4446,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } @@ -4352,6 +4463,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); } @@ -4364,6 +4477,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } @@ -4374,13 +4489,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); - if( 0 != ret && ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ) != ret ) + switch( ret ) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -4401,6 +4536,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->session->peer_cert == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } @@ -4411,6 +4548,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server cert changed during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } } @@ -4434,12 +4573,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; } - if( ca_chain == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED ); - } - /* * Main check: verify certificate */ @@ -4468,6 +4601,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); if( ret == 0 ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; @@ -4476,8 +4611,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ciphersuite_info, - ! ssl->conf->endpoint, + ciphersuite_info, + ! ssl->conf->endpoint, &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); @@ -4485,8 +4620,67 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; } - if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) ) + { ret = 0; + } + + if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + else + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x", + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); @@ -4539,12 +4733,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 || ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ); } @@ -4567,6 +4765,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so + treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); } } @@ -4591,6 +4791,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); } } @@ -5169,6 +5371,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -5184,6 +5388,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + hash_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED ); } @@ -5191,6 +5397,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) buf, hash_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED ); } @@ -5246,7 +5454,11 @@ static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; - handshake->sig_alg = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs ); +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) mbedtls_dhm_init( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); @@ -5492,7 +5704,8 @@ static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) ssl->in_hslen = 0; ssl->nb_zero = 0; - ssl->record_read = 0; + + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + 13; ssl->out_msgtype = 0; @@ -6052,6 +6265,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ) } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ) { @@ -6515,7 +6736,7 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) */ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret, record_read = 0; + int ret; size_t n; if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) @@ -6538,8 +6759,22 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) } #endif + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -6549,17 +6784,49 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ) - { - record_read = 1; - } - else if( ret != 0 ) + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); return( ret ); } } + /* + * TODO + * + * The logic should be streamlined here: + * + * Instead of + * + * - Manually checking whether ssl->in_offt is NULL + * - Fetching a new record if yes + * - Setting ssl->in_offt if one finds an application record + * - Resetting keep_current_message after handling the application data + * + * one should + * + * - Adapt read_record to set ssl->in_offt automatically + * when a new application data record is processed. + * - Always call mbedtls_ssl_read_record here. + * + * This way, the logic of ssl_read would be much clearer: + * + * (1) Always call record layer and see what kind of record is on + * and have it ready for consumption (in particular, in_offt + * properly set for application data records). + * (2) If it's application data (either freshly fetched + * or something already being partially processed), + * serve the read request from it. + * (3) If it's something different from application data, + * handle it accordingly, e.g. potentially start a + * renegotiation. + * + * This will also remove the need to manually reset + * ssl->keep_current_message = 0 below. + * + */ + if( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) { /* Start timer if not already running */ @@ -6569,16 +6836,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); } - if( ! record_read ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) - return( 0 ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); } if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && @@ -6602,10 +6866,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) ); + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); @@ -6616,7 +6886,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) #endif return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) { @@ -6629,23 +6901,29 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) #endif return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ if( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) { - /* - * SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" alert - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so + we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ @@ -6670,6 +6948,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) } else { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && @@ -6679,25 +6961,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) } #endif ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ) - { - record_read = 1; - } - else if( ret != 0 ) + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); return( ret ); } } - /* If a non-handshake record was read during renego, fallthrough, - * else tell the user they should call mbedtls_ssl_read() again */ - if( ! record_read ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); } else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) { - if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) { if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) @@ -6745,7 +7020,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ } n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) @@ -6755,11 +7030,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) ssl->in_msglen -= n; if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) - /* all bytes consumed */ + { + /* all bytes consumed */ ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else + { /* more data available */ ssl->in_offt += n; + } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); @@ -7152,7 +7432,7 @@ static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, #endif MBEDTLS_MD_NONE @@ -7234,6 +7514,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; @@ -7377,6 +7661,19 @@ unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); } +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + switch( type ) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); + } +} + mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) { switch( sig ) @@ -7395,6 +7692,57 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( set->rsa ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( set->ecdsa ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + if( set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->rsa = md_alg; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + if( set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->ecdsa = md_alg; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + set->rsa = md_alg; + set->ecdsa = md_alg; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + /* * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX */ diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/threading.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/threading.c index a7828262a11..2cc170e96c6 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/threading.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/threading.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) { - if( mutex == NULL || mutex->is_valid ) + if( mutex == NULL ) return; mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init( &mutex->mutex, NULL ) == 0; diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c index 0e692b8a0dd..3f75c9c1256 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ @@ -71,6 +74,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ @@ -119,6 +125,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ @@ -161,6 +170,33 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c index 5e3d41f6265..666f57fdd6a 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c @@ -498,25 +498,25 @@ static int x509_parse_int( unsigned char **p, size_t n, int *res ) return( 0 ); } -static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *time) +static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - CHECK_RANGE( 0, 9999, time->year ); - CHECK_RANGE( 0, 23, time->hour ); - CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, time->min ); - CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, time->sec ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 9999, t->year ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 23, t->hour ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->min ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->sec ); - switch( time->mon ) + switch( t->mon ) { case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12: - CHECK_RANGE( 1, 31, time->day ); + CHECK_RANGE( 1, 31, t->day ); break; case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11: - CHECK_RANGE( 1, 30, time->day ); + CHECK_RANGE( 1, 30, t->day ); break; case 2: - CHECK_RANGE( 1, 28 + (time->year % 4 == 0), time->day ); + CHECK_RANGE( 1, 28 + (t->year % 4 == 0), t->day ); break; default: return( ret ); @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *time) * field. */ static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, - mbedtls_x509_time *time ) + mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) { int ret; @@ -544,26 +544,26 @@ static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, /* * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute */ - CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, yearlen, &time->year ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, yearlen, &tm->year ) ); if ( 2 == yearlen ) { - if ( time->year < 50 ) - time->year += 100; + if ( tm->year < 50 ) + tm->year += 100; - time->year += 1900; + tm->year += 1900; } - CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &time->mon ) ); - CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &time->day ) ); - CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &time->hour ) ); - CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &time->min ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->mon ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->day ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->hour ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->min ) ); /* * Parse seconds if present */ if ( len >= 2 ) { - CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &time->sec ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->sec ) ); len -= 2; } else @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, if ( 0 != len ) return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); - CHECK( x509_date_is_valid( time ) ); + CHECK( x509_date_is_valid( tm ) ); return ( 0 ); } @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, * generalTime GeneralizedTime } */ int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_time *time ) + mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) { int ret; size_t len, year_len; @@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, if( ret != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret ); - return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, time ); + return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, tm ); } int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ) @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ) */ int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) int ret; uint32_t flags; mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crl.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crl.c index 361883966fa..d796d296e84 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crl.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crl.c @@ -354,14 +354,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, return( ret ); } - crl->version++; - - if( crl->version > 2 ) + if( crl->version < 0 || crl->version > 1 ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); } + crl->version++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1, &crl->sig_md, &crl->sig_pk, &crl->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c index edc6ba001d1..f7fae5b2ef9 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c @@ -87,9 +87,11 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = { - /* Hashes from SHA-1 and above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) + /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) | - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ) | +#endif + /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | @@ -748,14 +750,14 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * return( ret ); } - crt->version++; - - if( crt->version > 3 ) + if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); } + crt->version++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1146,7 +1148,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) p, (int) len - 1, NULL, NULL ); if( w_ret == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename ); if( w_ret < 0 ) @@ -1159,6 +1164,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; +cleanup: FindClose( hFind ); #else /* _WIN32 */ int t_ret; @@ -1171,13 +1177,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) if( dir == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 ) { closedir( dir ); return( ret ); } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) { @@ -1210,10 +1216,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) cleanup: closedir( dir ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #endif /* _WIN32 */ @@ -2057,8 +2063,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_child( /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA */ if( 1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ); + /* return immediately as the goal is to avoid unbounded recursion */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); } if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) ) @@ -2202,11 +2208,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = NULL; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; - if( profile == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - *flags = 0; + if( profile == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + if( cn != NULL ) { name = &crt->subject; @@ -2280,7 +2289,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, parent, ca_crl, profile, pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto exit; } else { @@ -2295,17 +2304,30 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, ret = x509_crt_verify_child( crt, parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto exit; } else { ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto exit; } } +exit: + /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by + * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the + * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + *flags = (uint32_t) -1; + return( ret ); + } + if( *flags != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ); diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_csr.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_csr.c index be3ce0690e5..166fdb9d2f7 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_csr.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_csr.c @@ -170,14 +170,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return( ret ); } - csr->version++; - - if( csr->version != 1 ) + if( csr->version != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); } + csr->version++; + /* * subject Name */ diff --git a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c index 5a9cef288c3..442ef6e6a1e 100644 --- a/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c +++ b/reactos/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, } static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *time, size_t size ) + const char *t, size_t size ) { int ret; size_t len = 0; @@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, /* * write MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME if year < 2050 (2 bytes shorter) */ - if( time[0] == '2' && time[1] == '0' && time [2] < '5' ) + if( t[0] == '2' && t[1] == '0' && t[2] < '5' ) { MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, - (const unsigned char *) time + 2, + (const unsigned char *) t + 2, size - 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) ); @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, else { MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, - (const unsigned char *) time, + (const unsigned char *) t, size ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) ); diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/aes.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/aes.h index f139c924d03..5b5247dd350 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/aes.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/aes.h @@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0020 /**< Invalid key length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0022 /**< Invalid data input length. */ +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) // Regular implementation // @@ -255,10 +260,12 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * \param ctx AES context * \param input Plaintext block * \param output Output (ciphertext) block + * + * \return 0 if successful */ -void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief Internal AES block decryption function @@ -268,10 +275,49 @@ void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * \param ctx AES context * \param input Ciphertext block * \param output Output (plaintext) block + * + * \return 0 if successful */ -void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function + * without return value. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_aes_encrypt_ext() in 2.5.0 + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param input Plaintext block + * \param output Output (ciphertext) block + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function + * without return value. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_aes_decrypt_ext() in 2.5.0 + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param input Ciphertext block + * \param output Output (plaintext) block + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/bignum.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/bignum.h index fd862f2061a..f4a8e821798 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/bignum.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/bignum.h @@ -105,36 +105,71 @@ /* * Define the base integer type, architecture-wise. * - * 32-bit integers can be forced on 64-bit arches (eg. for testing purposes) - * by defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and undefining MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM - */ -#if ( ! defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && \ - defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_AMD64) ) - #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 - typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; - typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; -#else - #if ( ! defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ - defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ - defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \ - (defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__)) || \ - defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) ) ) - #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 - typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; - typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; - /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ - typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); - #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL - #else - #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 - typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; - typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; - typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; - #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL - #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && __GNUC__ && 64-bit platform */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && _MSC_VER && _M_AMD64 */ + * 32 or 64-bit integer types can be forced regardless of the underlying + * architecture by defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + * respectively and undefining MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM. + * + * Double-width integers (e.g. 128-bit in 64-bit architectures) can be + * disabled by defining MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_AMD64) + /* Always choose 64-bit when using MSC */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ + defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ + defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \ + ( defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__) ) || \ + defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) ) + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ + typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + #elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && defined(__aarch64__) + /* + * __ARMCC_VERSION is defined for both armcc and armclang and + * __aarch64__ is only defined by armclang when compiling 64-bit code + */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ + typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + /* Default to 32-bit compilation */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ + typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -342,7 +377,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** - * \brief Read X from an opened file + * \brief Read MPI from a line in an opened file * * \param X Destination MPI * \param radix Input numeric base @@ -351,6 +386,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if * the file read buffer is too small or a * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code + * + * \note On success, this function advances the file stream + * to the end of the current line or to EOF. + * + * The function returns 0 on an empty line. + * + * Leading whitespaces are ignored, as is a + * '0x' prefix for radix 16. + * */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ); @@ -667,8 +711,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if N is negative or nil - MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if A has no inverse mod N + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if N is <= 1, + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if A has no inverse mod N. */ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ); diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h index 361b582d6b5..e1437ab6e8f 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -152,6 +152,38 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -620,6 +652,15 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) ) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + /* * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this * workaround since this is included by every single file before the diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h index 1d95e26bf6a..038f42ec29c 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h @@ -209,9 +209,6 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C #define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C #endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_BC -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_BC -#endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY #define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY #endif @@ -320,9 +317,6 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C #endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_C -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_C -#endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG #endif @@ -347,9 +341,6 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C #define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C #endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PBKDF2_C -#define POLARSSL_PBKDF2_C MBEDTLS_PBKDF2_C -#endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C #endif @@ -431,9 +422,6 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE #endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MALLOC -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MALLOC MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MALLOC -#endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR #endif @@ -494,12 +482,6 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT #endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV -#define POLARSSL_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES #define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES #endif @@ -524,9 +506,6 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL #define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL #endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION -#endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY #define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY #endif @@ -754,7 +733,6 @@ #define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT #define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION #define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 -#define MD_CONTEXT_T_INIT MBEDTLS_MD_CONTEXT_T_INIT #define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC #define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS #define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE @@ -1019,19 +997,13 @@ #define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H #define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_LOG_FULL MBEDTLS_DEBUG_LOG_FULL -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_LOG_RAW MBEDTLS_DEBUG_LOG_RAW #define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT #define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H #define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_P #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_P #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P #define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H @@ -1119,9 +1091,6 @@ #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD2_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD4_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD5_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE @@ -1149,7 +1118,6 @@ #define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND #define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PBKDF2_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PBKDF2_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA @@ -1181,7 +1149,6 @@ #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RIPEMD160_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED @@ -1191,9 +1158,6 @@ #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SHA1_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SHA256_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SHA512_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY @@ -1307,7 +1271,6 @@ #define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 #define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_H #define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC #define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM #define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB @@ -1321,7 +1284,7 @@ #define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 #define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS #define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_H +#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG #define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H #define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE @@ -1331,7 +1294,6 @@ #define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS #define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN #define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#define POLARSSL_PBKDF2_H MBEDTLS_PBKDF2_H #define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H #define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H #define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H @@ -1714,7 +1676,6 @@ #define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define UL64 MBEDTLS_UL64 #define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 #define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 #define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 @@ -1738,7 +1699,6 @@ #define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert #define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret #define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define _ssl_ticket_keys mbedtls_ssl_ticket_keys #define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform #define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl #define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry @@ -1838,7 +1798,6 @@ #define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions #define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish #define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free -#define cipher_free_ctx mbedtls_cipher_free_ctx #define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size #define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode #define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size @@ -1857,7 +1816,6 @@ #define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t #define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t #define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset -#define cipher_self_test mbedtls_cipher_self_test #define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv #define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode #define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey @@ -1868,7 +1826,6 @@ #define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context #define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free #define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init -#define ctr_drbg_init_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init_entropy_len #define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random #define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add #define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed @@ -1879,14 +1836,12 @@ #define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update #define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file #define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file -#define debug_fmt mbedtls_debug_fmt #define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf #define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt #define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp #define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi #define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg #define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret -#define debug_set_log_mode mbedtls_debug_set_log_mode #define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold #define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context #define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc @@ -1930,7 +1885,6 @@ #define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public #define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params #define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public -#define ecdh_self_test mbedtls_ecdh_self_test #define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side #define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context #define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free @@ -1939,7 +1893,6 @@ #define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info #define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init #define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature -#define ecdsa_self_test mbedtls_ecdsa_self_test #define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign #define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det #define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify @@ -1947,7 +1900,6 @@ #define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det #define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info #define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info -#define ecp_add mbedtls_ecp_add #define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey #define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv #define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey @@ -1964,7 +1916,6 @@ #define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free #define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id #define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init -#define ecp_group_read_string mbedtls_ecp_group_read_string #define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list #define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero #define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair @@ -1979,7 +1930,6 @@ #define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary #define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test #define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero -#define ecp_sub mbedtls_ecp_sub #define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group #define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point #define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group @@ -2017,7 +1967,6 @@ #define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context #define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free #define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init -#define hmac_drbg_init_buf mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init_buf #define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random #define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add #define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed @@ -2033,14 +1982,8 @@ #define md mbedtls_md #define md2 mbedtls_md2 #define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context -#define md2_file mbedtls_md2_file #define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish #define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free -#define md2_hmac mbedtls_md2_hmac -#define md2_hmac_finish mbedtls_md2_hmac_finish -#define md2_hmac_reset mbedtls_md2_hmac_reset -#define md2_hmac_starts mbedtls_md2_hmac_starts -#define md2_hmac_update mbedtls_md2_hmac_update #define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info #define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init #define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process @@ -2049,14 +1992,8 @@ #define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update #define md4 mbedtls_md4 #define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context -#define md4_file mbedtls_md4_file #define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish #define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free -#define md4_hmac mbedtls_md4_hmac -#define md4_hmac_finish mbedtls_md4_hmac_finish -#define md4_hmac_reset mbedtls_md4_hmac_reset -#define md4_hmac_starts mbedtls_md4_hmac_starts -#define md4_hmac_update mbedtls_md4_hmac_update #define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info #define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init #define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process @@ -2065,14 +2002,8 @@ #define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update #define md5 mbedtls_md5 #define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context -#define md5_file mbedtls_md5_file #define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish #define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free -#define md5_hmac mbedtls_md5_hmac -#define md5_hmac_finish mbedtls_md5_hmac_finish -#define md5_hmac_reset mbedtls_md5_hmac_reset -#define md5_hmac_starts mbedtls_md5_hmac_starts -#define md5_hmac_update mbedtls_md5_hmac_update #define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info #define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init #define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process @@ -2083,7 +2014,6 @@ #define md_file mbedtls_md_file #define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish #define md_free mbedtls_md_free -#define md_free_ctx mbedtls_md_free_ctx #define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name #define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size #define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type @@ -2111,7 +2041,6 @@ #define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status #define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify #define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify -#define memory_set_own mbedtls_memory_set_own #define mpi mbedtls_mpi #define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int @@ -2187,8 +2116,6 @@ #define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support #define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc #define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb -#define pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pbkdf2_hmac -#define pbkdf2_self_test mbedtls_pbkdf2_self_test #define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context #define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free #define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init @@ -2248,13 +2175,11 @@ #define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll #define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit #define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf -#define platform_set_malloc_free mbedtls_platform_set_malloc_free #define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf #define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf #define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit #define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf #define polarssl_free mbedtls_free -#define polarssl_malloc mbedtls_malloc #define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free #define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init #define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock @@ -2264,14 +2189,8 @@ #define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror #define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 #define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context -#define ripemd160_file mbedtls_ripemd160_file #define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish #define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free -#define ripemd160_hmac mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac -#define ripemd160_hmac_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_finish -#define ripemd160_hmac_reset mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_reset -#define ripemd160_hmac_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_starts -#define ripemd160_hmac_update mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_update #define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info #define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init #define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process @@ -2285,12 +2204,10 @@ #define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey #define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context #define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy -#define rsa_decrypt_func mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func #define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free #define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key #define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info #define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init -#define rsa_key_len_func mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func #define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt #define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt #define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign @@ -2308,19 +2225,12 @@ #define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext #define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test #define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding -#define rsa_sign_func mbedtls_rsa_sign_func #define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp #define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm #define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 #define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context -#define sha1_file mbedtls_sha1_file #define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish #define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free -#define sha1_hmac mbedtls_sha1_hmac -#define sha1_hmac_finish mbedtls_sha1_hmac_finish -#define sha1_hmac_reset mbedtls_sha1_hmac_reset -#define sha1_hmac_starts mbedtls_sha1_hmac_starts -#define sha1_hmac_update mbedtls_sha1_hmac_update #define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info #define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init #define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process @@ -2330,14 +2240,8 @@ #define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info #define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 #define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context -#define sha256_file mbedtls_sha256_file #define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish #define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free -#define sha256_hmac mbedtls_sha256_hmac -#define sha256_hmac_finish mbedtls_sha256_hmac_finish -#define sha256_hmac_reset mbedtls_sha256_hmac_reset -#define sha256_hmac_starts mbedtls_sha256_hmac_starts -#define sha256_hmac_update mbedtls_sha256_hmac_update #define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info #define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init #define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process @@ -2347,14 +2251,8 @@ #define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info #define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 #define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context -#define sha512_file mbedtls_sha512_file #define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish #define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free -#define sha512_hmac mbedtls_sha512_hmac -#define sha512_hmac_finish mbedtls_sha512_hmac_finish -#define sha512_hmac_reset mbedtls_sha512_hmac_reset -#define sha512_hmac_starts mbedtls_sha512_hmac_starts -#define sha512_hmac_update mbedtls_sha512_hmac_update #define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info #define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init #define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process @@ -2387,7 +2285,6 @@ #define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup #define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write #define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t -#define ssl_curve_is_acceptable mbedtls_ssl_curve_is_acceptable #define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys #define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check #define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update @@ -2477,8 +2374,6 @@ #define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version #define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version #define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert -#define ssl_set_own_cert_alt mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert_alt -#define ssl_set_own_cert_rsa mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert_rsa #define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk #define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb #define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation @@ -2487,7 +2382,6 @@ #define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng #define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session #define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache -#define ssl_set_session_ticket_lifetime mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_ticket_lifetime #define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets #define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni #define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport @@ -2495,7 +2389,6 @@ #define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify #define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk #define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states -#define ssl_ticket_keys mbedtls_ssl_ticket_keys #define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform #define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free #define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write @@ -2524,7 +2417,6 @@ #define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key #define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec #define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa -#define test_dhm_params mbedtls_test_dhm_params #define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt #define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec #define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa @@ -2579,8 +2471,6 @@ #define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time #define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper #define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name -#define x509_oid_get_description mbedtls_x509_oid_get_description -#define x509_oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_x509_oid_get_numeric_string #define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test #define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence #define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h index 00eb2881e84..46d026af1d6 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h @@ -57,6 +57,34 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + * + * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit + * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). + * + * Used in: + * include/mbedtls/bignum.h + * library/bignum.c + * + * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. + * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to + * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer + * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, + * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to + * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. + * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. + * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. + * + * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. + * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit + * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some + * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For + * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling + * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 * @@ -165,6 +193,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING @@ -220,16 +249,16 @@ * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT * * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your - * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto or hash module (e.g. - * platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep in mind that - * the function prototypes should remain the same. + * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash + * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep + * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. * * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. * * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer - * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base function - * declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from + * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base + * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding @@ -248,6 +277,16 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +/* + * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is + * implemented with two .c files: + * - ecp.c + * - ecp_curves.c + * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT + * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure + * that you provide functionality for both .c files. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT @@ -265,9 +304,15 @@ * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible * with this definition. * - * Note: if you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set - * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES - * tables. + * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are + * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, + * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should + * be overriden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt + * must stay untouched. + * + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set + * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES + * tables. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. @@ -287,6 +332,59 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * + * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind + * that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation + * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the + * alternative. + * + * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * and implementing the following functions: + * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( + * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_deinit( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the + * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 + * otherwise. + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_deinit are + * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to + * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac if the group is + * supported (your mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function returns 1 when + * receives it as an argument). If the group is not supported then the original + * implementation is used. The other functions and the definition of + * mbedtls_ecp_group and mbedtls_ecp_point will not change, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac and + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable must be compatible with this definition. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + */ +/* Required for all the functions in this section */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT +/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT + /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY * @@ -2192,7 +2290,8 @@ * library/ssl_tls.c * library/x509write_crt.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS and SHA1-signed certificates. + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C @@ -2577,6 +2676,26 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate signing. + * Without this build-time option, SHA-1 support must be activated explicitly + * through mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile. Turning on this option is not + * recommended because of it is possible to generte SHA-1 collisions, however + * this may be safe for legacy infrastructure where additional controls apply. + */ +// #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES + +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake + * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 + * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. + * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by + * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use + * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default + * for compatibility with existing peers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE + /* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ /* Target and application specific configurations */ diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h index ca3e2291a32..7eaf37220d2 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h @@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ extern "C" { * \param f_rng RNG function * \param p_rng RNG parameter * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * prescribed by SEC1 4.1.3 step 5. + * * \return 0 if successful, * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code */ @@ -91,6 +95,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, * \param blen Length of buf * \param md_alg MD algorithm used to hash the message * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * prescribed by SEC1 4.1.3 step 5. + * * \return 0 if successful, * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code */ @@ -109,6 +117,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi * \param r First integer of the signature * \param s Second integer of the signature * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * prescribed by SEC1 4.1.4 step 3. + * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code @@ -122,7 +134,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * serialized as defined in RFC 4492 page 20. * (Not thread-safe to use same context in multiple threads) * - * \note The deterministice version (RFC 6979) is used if + * \note The deterministic version (RFC 6979) is used if * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is defined. * * \param ctx ECDSA context @@ -138,6 +150,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * size of the curve used, plus 9 (eg. 73 bytes if a 256-bit * curve is used). MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * prescribed by SEC1 4.1.3 step 5. + * * \return 0 if successful, * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code @@ -174,6 +190,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t * size of the curve used, plus 9 (eg. 73 bytes if a 256-bit * curve is used). MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * prescribed by SEC1 4.1.3 step 5. + * * \return 0 if successful, * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code @@ -195,6 +215,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, * \param sig Signature to read and verify * \param slen Size of sig * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * prescribed by SEC1 4.1.4 step 3. + * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if the signature is diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecjpake.h index b8a54a24b0e..520324de117 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecjpake.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecjpake.h @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *secret, size_t len ); -/* +/** * \brief Check if a context is ready for use * * \param ctx Context to check diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h index 648d7562acf..7a4e68f3605 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -39,6 +39,15 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 /**< Invalid private or public key. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 /**< Signature is valid but shorter than the user-supplied length. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) +/* + * default mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation + * + * (in case MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined then the developer has to provide an + * alternative implementation for the whole module and it will replace this + * one.) + */ + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -454,7 +463,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp * \brief Set a group using well-known domain parameters * * \param grp Destination group - * \param index Index in the list of well-known domain parameters + * \param id Index in the list of well-known domain parameters * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if initialization failed @@ -463,7 +472,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp * \note Index should be a value of RFC 4492's enum NamedCurve, * usually in the form of a MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macro. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id index ); +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ); /** * \brief Set a group from a TLS ECParameters record @@ -656,16 +665,22 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed */ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ); -#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#include "ecp_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + #endif /* ecp.h */ diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..31cfc39b9fa --- /dev/null +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_internal.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve + * point arithmetic. + * + * Copyright (C) 2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along + * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * [1] BERNSTEIN, Daniel J. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records. + * + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + * + * [4] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. + * + * + * [5] HANKERSON, Darrel, MENEZES, Alfred J., VANSTONE, Scott. Guide to Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography. + * + * [6] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-4. + * + * + * [7] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer + * Security (TLS), RFC 4492. + * + * + * [8] + * + * [9] COHEN, Henri. A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory. + * Springer Science & Business Media, 1 Aug 2000 + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + +/** + * \brief Indicate if the Elliptic Curve Point module extension can + * handle the group. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the elliptic curve group that will be the + * basis of the cryptographic computations. + * + * \return Non-zero if successful. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief Initialise the Elliptic Curve Point module extension. + * + * If mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable returns true for a + * group, this function has to be able to initialise the + * module for it. + * + * This module can be a driver to a crypto hardware + * accelerator, for which this could be an initialise function. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module needs to be + * initialised for. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief Frees and deallocates the Elliptic Curve Point module + * extension. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module was initialised for. + */ +void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) +/** + * \brief Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt The point on the curve to be randomised, given with Jacobian + * coordinates. + * + * \param f_rng A function pointer to the random number generator. + * + * \param p_rng A pointer to the random number generator state. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) +/** + * \brief Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates. + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, + * (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in + * ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base + * point, the factor being less than its order, so none of + * them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even + * multiple, due to the choice of precomputed points in the + * modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as + * meaning 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.22: + * 1A := 8M + 3S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the first summand, given with Jacobian + * coordinates + * + * \param Q Pointer to the second summand, given with affine + * coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + * when the implementation is based on the "dbl-1998-cmo-2" + * doubling formulas in [8] and standard optimizations are + * applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the point that has to be doubled, given with + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) + * points. + * + * Using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P + * the cost is: + * 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + * (See for example Algorithm 10.3.4. in [9]) + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is + * zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param T Array of pointers to the points to normalise. + * + * \param t_len Number of elements in the array. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * an error if one of the points is zero. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.2.1: + * 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); +#endif + +#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ + +#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P the point on the curve to be randomised given with + * projective coordinates. This is an input/output parameter. + * + * \param f_rng a function pointer to the random number generator + * + * \param p_rng a pointer to the random number generator state + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1. + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); +#endif + +#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#endif /* ecp_internal.h */ + diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h index bcda3203d1d..6d7b4356c63 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ * Name ID Nr of Errors * PEM 1 9 * PKCS#12 1 4 (Started from top) - * X509 2 19 + * X509 2 20 * PKCS5 2 4 (Started from top) * DHM 3 9 * PK 3 14 (Started from top) diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/platform.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/platform.h index b2a1d6ac90d..98714ef3bbc 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/platform.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/platform.h @@ -290,6 +290,54 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + +/** + * \brief Platform context structure + * + * \note This structure may be used to assist platform-specific + * setup/teardown operations. + */ +typedef struct { + char dummy; /**< Placeholder member as empty structs are not portable */ +} +mbedtls_platform_context; + +#else +#include "platform_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Perform any platform initialisation operations + * + * \param ctx mbed TLS context + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \note This function is intended to allow platform specific initialisation, + * and should be called before any other library functions. Its + * implementation is platform specific, and by default, unless platform + * specific code is provided, it does nothing. + * + * Its use and whether its necessary to be called is dependent on the + * platform. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); +/** + * \brief Perform any platform teardown operations + * + * \param ctx mbed TLS context + * + * \note This function should be called after every other mbed TLS module has + * been correctly freed using the appropriate free function. + * Its implementation is platform specific, and by default, unless + * platform specific code is provided, it does nothing. + * + * Its use and whether its necessary to be called is dependent on the + * platform. + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h index 8db5bb03bb3..9683520ce0b 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -331,9 +331,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise - * an error is thrown. + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size ctx->len of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes + * if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an arbitrary + * decrypted message. If it is not large enough to hold + * the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function will return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \note The input buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -357,9 +363,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise - * an error is thrown. + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size ctx->len of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes + * if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an arbitrary + * decrypted message. If it is not large enough to hold + * the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function will return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \note The input buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -385,9 +397,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise - * an error is thrown. + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size ctx->len of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes + * if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an arbitrary + * decrypted message. If it is not large enough to hold + * the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function will return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \note The input buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h index 46d5aa55945..c0992dcec45 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 + /* * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. @@ -533,6 +536,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; /* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; #endif @@ -751,6 +755,10 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) unsigned int fallback : 1; /*!< is this a fallback? */ #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + unsigned int cert_req_ca_list : 1; /*!< enable sending CA list in + Certificate Request messages? */ +#endif }; @@ -839,7 +847,9 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, including the handshake header */ int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ - int record_read; /*!< record is already present */ + + int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message + on next call to record layer? */ /* * Record layer (outgoing data) @@ -1044,7 +1054,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ); * * If set, the verify callback is called for each * certificate in the chain. For implementation - * information, please see \c x509parse_verify() + * information, please see \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_vrfy verification function @@ -2033,6 +2043,20 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in + * CertificateRequest messages. + * (Default: do send) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h index fca10dd7be0..305b5403074 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -262,6 +262,47 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED #endif +/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using ECDH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges that don't involve ephemeral keys */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges that involve ephemeral keys */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED +#endif + /* Key exchanges using a PSK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ @@ -270,7 +311,13 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED #endif -/* Key exchanges using a ECDHE */ +/* Key exchanges using DHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using ECDHE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -311,11 +358,128 @@ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( int ciphersuit #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); #endif int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h index 7ed56eb0e04..6bcbc282e03 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h @@ -159,6 +159,24 @@ extern "C" { #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +/* + * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t +{ + /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable + * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's + * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - + * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures + * to hash algorithms. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; + mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + /* * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. */ @@ -167,8 +185,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params /* * Handshake specific crypto variables */ - int sig_alg; /*!< Hash algorithm for signature */ - int verify_sig_alg; /*!< Signature algorithm for verify */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ #endif @@ -181,7 +202,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ #endif -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ @@ -197,7 +218,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ @@ -220,7 +241,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params resending messages */ unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter for resending messages */ -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* * Checksum contexts @@ -331,6 +352,28 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear @@ -362,6 +405,79 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl SSL context to use + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); @@ -386,6 +502,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); #endif diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h index 4edf6de2067..70ed98b6c38 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h @@ -40,17 +40,17 @@ * Major, Minor, Patchlevel */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 4 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 6 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 /** * The single version number has the following structure: * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02040200 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.4.2" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.4.2" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02060000 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.6.0" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.6.0" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h index ce4c845b1aa..a1b81a309ae 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 /**< Read/write of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 /**< Destination buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */ /* \} name */ /** @@ -248,12 +249,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *se * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR". * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. * - * \param time mbedtls_x509_time to check + * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check * * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occured, * 0 otherwise. */ -int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *time ); +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ); /** * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time @@ -262,12 +263,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *time ); * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR". * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. * - * \param time mbedtls_x509_time to check + * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check * * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occured, * 0 otherwise. */ -int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *time ); +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ); /** * \brief Checkup routine @@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x50 mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, void **sig_opts ); int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_time *time ); + mbedtls_x509_time *t ); int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, diff --git a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crt.h index 58b1326093a..e7f5085e97c 100644 --- a/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crt.h +++ b/reactos/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crt.h @@ -269,7 +269,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, * * All flags left after returning from the callback * are also returned to the application. The function should - * return 0 for anything but a fatal error. + * return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates) + * other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code + * immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal + * errors, a specific error code should be used (different + * from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not + * be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR + * can be used if no better code is available. * * \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed * using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info() @@ -291,12 +297,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, * \param f_vrfy verification function * \param p_vrfy verification parameter * - * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED - * in which case *flags will have one or more - * MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX flags - * set, - * or another error in case of a fatal error encountered - * during the verification process. + * \return 0 (and flags set to 0) if the chain was verified and valid, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED if the chain was verified + * but found to be invalid, in which case *flags will have one + * or more MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set, or another error (and flags set to 0xffffffff) + * in case of a fatal error encountered during the + * verification process. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,