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[reactos.git] / dll / win32 / crypt32 / chain.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
3 *
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
8 *
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
13 *
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
17 *
18 */
19 #include <stdarg.h>
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
21 #include "windef.h"
22 #include "winbase.h"
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
25 #include "wincrypt.h"
26 #include "wine/debug.h"
27 #include "wine/unicode.h"
28 #include "crypt32_private.h"
29
30 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
31 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
32
33 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
34
35 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
36
37 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
38 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
39 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
40 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
41 */
42 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
43 {
44 LONG ref;
45 HCERTSTORE hRoot;
46 HCERTSTORE hWorld;
47 DWORD dwFlags;
48 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
49 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
50 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
51 } CertificateChainEngine, *PCertificateChainEngine;
52
53 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
54 DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
55 {
56 DWORD i;
57
58 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
59 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
60 }
61
62 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
63 {
64 DWORD i;
65
66 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
67 CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
68 }
69
70 static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
71
72 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
73 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
74 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
75 {
76 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
77 BYTE hash[20];
78 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
79
80 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
81 {
82 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
83
84 matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
85 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
86 }
87 return matching;
88 }
89
90 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
91 {
92 BOOL ret = TRUE;
93
94 if (store)
95 {
96 HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
97 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
98
99 do {
100 cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
101 if (cert)
102 {
103 if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
104 ret = FALSE;
105 else
106 CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
107 }
108 } while (ret && cert);
109 if (cert)
110 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
111 CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
112 }
113 return ret;
114 }
115
116 HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root,
117 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig)
118 {
119 static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
120 static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
121 static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
122 PCertificateChainEngine engine =
123 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
124
125 if (engine)
126 {
127 HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
128
129 engine->ref = 1;
130 engine->hRoot = root;
131 engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
132 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
133 worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
134 worldStores[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW);
135 worldStores[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW);
136 worldStores[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW);
137 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
138 sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
139 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
140 pConfig->cAdditionalStore, pConfig->rghAdditionalStore);
141 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]),
142 worldStores);
143 engine->dwFlags = pConfig->dwFlags;
144 engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pConfig->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
145 engine->MaximumCachedCertificates =
146 pConfig->MaximumCachedCertificates;
147 if (pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus)
148 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus;
149 else
150 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
151 }
152 return engine;
153 }
154
155 BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
156 HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
157 {
158 BOOL ret;
159
160 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
161
162 if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(*pConfig))
163 {
164 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
165 return FALSE;
166 }
167 *phChainEngine = NULL;
168 ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
169 if (ret)
170 {
171 HCERTSTORE root;
172 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
173
174 if (pConfig->hRestrictedRoot)
175 root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
176 else
177 root = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
178 engine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root, pConfig);
179 if (engine)
180 {
181 *phChainEngine = engine;
182 ret = TRUE;
183 }
184 else
185 ret = FALSE;
186 }
187 return ret;
188 }
189
190 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
191 {
192 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
193
194 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
195
196 if (engine && InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref) == 0)
197 {
198 CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
199 CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
200 CryptMemFree(engine);
201 }
202 }
203
204 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
205 {
206 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine)
207 {
208 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { 0 };
209 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
210
211 config.cbSize = sizeof(config);
212 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config, &engine);
213 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine, engine,
214 NULL);
215 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine != engine)
216 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
217 }
218 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
219 }
220
221 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
222 {
223 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine);
224 }
225
226 typedef struct _CertificateChain
227 {
228 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
229 HCERTSTORE world;
230 LONG ref;
231 } CertificateChain, *PCertificateChain;
232
233 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
234 {
235 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
236 DWORD size;
237 BOOL ret;
238
239 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
240 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
241 {
242 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
243
244 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
245 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
246 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
247 &info, &size);
248 if (ret)
249 {
250 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
251 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
252 {
253 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
254 DWORD i;
255
256 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
257 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
258 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
259 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
260 directoryName =
261 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
262 if (directoryName)
263 {
264 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
265 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
266 && CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
267 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
268 }
269 else
270 {
271 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
272 ret = FALSE;
273 }
274 }
275 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
276 {
277 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
278 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
279 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
280 {
281 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
282
283 if (buf)
284 {
285 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
286 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
287 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
288 CryptMemFree(buf);
289 }
290 }
291 else
292 ret = FALSE;
293 }
294 LocalFree(info);
295 }
296 }
297 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
298 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
299 {
300 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
301
302 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
303 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
304 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
305 &info, &size);
306 if (ret)
307 {
308 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
309 {
310 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
311 &info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) &&
312 CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber,
313 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
314 }
315 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
316 {
317 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
318 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
319 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
320 {
321 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
322
323 if (buf)
324 {
325 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
326 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
327 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
328 CryptMemFree(buf);
329 }
330 else
331 ret = FALSE;
332 }
333 else
334 ret = FALSE;
335 }
336 else
337 ret = FALSE;
338 LocalFree(info);
339 }
340 }
341 else
342 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
343 &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer);
344 return ret;
345 }
346
347 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
348 {
349 CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
350 CryptMemFree(element);
351 }
352
353 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
354 {
355 DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
356
357 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
358 for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
359 for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
360 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
361 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
362 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
363 cyclicCertIndex = j;
364 if (cyclicCertIndex)
365 {
366 chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
367 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
368 /* Release remaining certs */
369 for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
370 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
371 /* Truncate chain */
372 chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
373 }
374 }
375
376 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
377 static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
378 {
379 if (chain->cElement)
380 return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
381 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
382 else
383 return FALSE;
384 }
385
386 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
387 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
388 {
389 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
390 chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
391 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
392 * chain.
393 */
394 chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
395 }
396
397 static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
398 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
399 {
400 BOOL ret = FALSE;
401 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
402
403 if (element)
404 {
405 if (!chain->cElement)
406 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
407 else
408 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
409 (chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
410 if (chain->rgpElement)
411 {
412 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
413 memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
414 element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
415 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
416 if (chain->cElement > 1)
417 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
418 = subjectInfoStatus;
419 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
420 if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
421 {
422 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
423 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
424 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
425 */
426 element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
427 }
428 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
429 &element->TrustStatus);
430 ret = TRUE;
431 }
432 else
433 CryptMemFree(element);
434 }
435 return ret;
436 }
437
438 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
439 {
440 DWORD i;
441
442 for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
443 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
444 CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
445 CryptMemFree(chain);
446 }
447
448 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
449 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
450 {
451 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
452 rootElement->pCertContext);
453
454 if (!trustedRoot)
455 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
456 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
457 else
458 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
459 }
460
461 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot,
462 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
463 {
464 PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
465
466 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
467 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
468 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
469 {
470 TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
471 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
472 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
473 }
474 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
475 }
476
477 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
478 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
479 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
480 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
481 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
482 */
483 static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
484 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
485 {
486 BOOL ret = TRUE;
487 PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
488 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
489
490 constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
491 if (ext)
492 {
493 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
494 DWORD size = 0;
495
496 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
497 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
498 NULL, &info, &size);
499 if (ret)
500 {
501 if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
502 constraints->fCA =
503 info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
504 LocalFree(info);
505 }
506 }
507 else
508 {
509 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
510 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
511 if (ext)
512 {
513 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
514
515 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
516 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
517 0, NULL, constraints, &size);
518 }
519 else
520 constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
521 }
522 return ret;
523 }
524
525 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
526 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
527 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
528 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
529 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
530 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
531 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
532 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
533 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
534 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
535 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
536 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
537 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
538 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
539 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
540 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
541 * the next certificate in the chain.
542 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
543 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
544 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
545 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
546 * occurs.
547 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
548 * chain is valid.
549 */
550 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
551 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
552 DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
553 {
554 BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
555 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
556
557 if (isRoot)
558 implicitCA = TRUE;
559 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
560 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
561 {
562 BYTE hash[20];
563 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
564
565 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
566 hash, &size))
567 {
568 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
569 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
570 engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
571 &blob, NULL);
572
573 if (localCert)
574 {
575 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
576 implicitCA = TRUE;
577 }
578 }
579 }
580 if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
581 &constraints, implicitCA)))
582 {
583 chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
584 if (!constraints.fCA)
585 {
586 TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
587 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
588 }
589 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
590 {
591 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
592 * entire remaining chain.
593 */
594 if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
595 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
596 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
597 {
598 TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
599 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
600 chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
601 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
602 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
603 }
604 }
605 }
606 if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
607 remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
608 {
609 TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
610 remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
611 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
612 *pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
613 }
614 return validBasicConstraints;
615 }
616
617 static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
618 {
619 BOOL match;
620
621 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
622 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
623 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
624 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
625 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
626 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
627 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
628 * and for email addresses,
629 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
630 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
631 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
632 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
633 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
634 */
635 if (constraint[0] == '.')
636 {
637 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
638 if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
639 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
640 constraint);
641 else
642 {
643 /* name is too short, no match */
644 match = FALSE;
645 }
646 }
647 else
648 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
649 return match;
650 }
651
652 static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
653 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
654 {
655 BOOL match = FALSE;
656
657 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
658
659 if (!constraint)
660 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
661 else if (!name)
662 ; /* no match */
663 else
664 {
665 LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
666 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
667 WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
668
669 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
670 * section 4.2.1.10:
671 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
672 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
673 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
674 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
675 *
676 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
677 colon = strchrW(name, ':');
678 if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
679 name = colon + 3;
680 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
681 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
682 * Those are removed next.)
683 */
684 authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
685 if (!authority_end)
686 authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
687 if (!authority_end)
688 authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
689 /* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion
690 * of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion
691 * is found (indicated by '@').
692 */
693 for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' &&
694 *colon != '@'; colon--)
695 ;
696 if (*colon == ':')
697 authority_end = colon;
698 /* Remove any username from the authority */
699 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
700 name = at;
701 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
702 if (*authority_end)
703 {
704 if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) /
705 sizeof(hostname_buf[0]))
706 {
707 memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
708 (authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
709 hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
710 hostname = hostname_buf;
711 }
712 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
713 }
714 else
715 hostname = name;
716 if (hostname)
717 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
718 }
719 return match;
720 }
721
722 static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
723 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
724 {
725 BOOL match = FALSE;
726 LPCWSTR at;
727
728 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
729
730 if (!constraint)
731 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
732 else if (!name)
733 ; /* no match */
734 else if (strchrW(constraint, '@'))
735 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
736 else
737 {
738 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
739 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
740 else
741 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
742 }
743 return match;
744 }
745
746 static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
747 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
748 {
749 BOOL match = FALSE;
750
751 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
752
753 if (!constraint)
754 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
755 else if (!name)
756 ; /* no match */
757 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
758 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
759 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
760 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
761 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
762 * would not."
763 */
764 else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
765 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
766 else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
767 {
768 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
769 constraint);
770 if (match)
771 {
772 BOOL dot = FALSE;
773 LPCWSTR ptr;
774
775 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
776 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
777 * matching portion of the name.
778 */
779 for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
780 !dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
781 if (*ptr == '.')
782 dot = TRUE;
783 match = dot;
784 }
785 }
786 /* else: name is too short, no match */
787
788 return match;
789 }
790
791 static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
792 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
793 {
794 BOOL match = FALSE;
795
796 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
797 name->cbData, name->pbData);
798
799 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
800 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
801 */
802 if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
803 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
804 else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
805 constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
806 {
807 DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
808
809 memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
810 memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
811 memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
812 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
813 * don't need to swap to host order
814 */
815 match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
816 }
817 else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
818 {
819 const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
820 DWORD i;
821
822 subnet = constraint->pbData;
823 mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
824 addr = name->pbData;
825 match = TRUE;
826 for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
827 if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
828 match = FALSE;
829 }
830 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
831
832 return match;
833 }
834
835 static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
836 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
837 {
838 CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
839 DWORD size;
840 BOOL match = FALSE;
841
842 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
843 constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
844 {
845 DWORD i;
846
847 match = TRUE;
848 for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
849 match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
850 CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
851 (CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
852 LocalFree(constraintName);
853 }
854 return match;
855 }
856
857 static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
858 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
859 {
860 BOOL match = FALSE;
861
862 if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
863 {
864 if (present)
865 *present = TRUE;
866 switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
867 {
868 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
869 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
870 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
871 break;
872 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
873 match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
874 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
875 break;
876 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
877 match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
878 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
879 break;
880 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
881 match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
882 &name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
883 break;
884 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
885 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
886 &name->u.DirectoryName);
887 break;
888 default:
889 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
890 constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
891 *trustErrorStatus |=
892 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
893 }
894 }
895 else if (present)
896 *present = FALSE;
897 return match;
898 }
899
900 static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
901 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
902 {
903 DWORD i;
904 BOOL match = FALSE;
905
906 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
907 match = alt_name_matches(name,
908 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
909 return match;
910 }
911
912 static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
913 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
914 BOOL *present)
915 {
916 DWORD i;
917 BOOL match = FALSE;
918
919 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
920 match = alt_name_matches(name,
921 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
922 present);
923 return match;
924 }
925
926 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
927 {
928 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
929
930 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
931 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
932 if (!ext)
933 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
934 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
935 return ext;
936 }
937
938 static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
939 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
940 {
941 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
942 DWORD size;
943
944 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
945 altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
946 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
947 &subjectAltName, &size))
948 {
949 DWORD i;
950
951 for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
952 {
953 BOOL nameFormPresent;
954
955 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
956 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
957 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
958 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
959 * the certificate is acceptable."
960 */
961 if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
962 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
963 trustErrorStatus))
964 {
965 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
966 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
967 *trustErrorStatus |=
968 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
969 }
970 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
971 if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
972 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
973 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
974 {
975 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
976 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
977 *trustErrorStatus |=
978 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
979 }
980 }
981 LocalFree(subjectAltName);
982 }
983 else
984 *trustErrorStatus |=
985 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
986 }
987
988 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
989 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
990 {
991 DWORD i;
992 BOOL match = FALSE;
993
994 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
995 {
996 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
997 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
998
999 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1000 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1001 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1002 }
1003 return match;
1004 }
1005
1006 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1007 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
1008 BOOL *present)
1009 {
1010 DWORD i;
1011 BOOL match = FALSE;
1012
1013 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1014 {
1015 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1016 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1017
1018 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1019 {
1020 *present = TRUE;
1021 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1022 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1023 }
1024 }
1025 return match;
1026 }
1027
1028 static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
1029 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1030 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1031 {
1032 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
1033 DWORD size;
1034
1035 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
1036 subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
1037 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1038 {
1039 DWORD i, j;
1040
1041 for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
1042 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
1043 if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
1044 szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
1045 {
1046 BOOL nameFormPresent;
1047
1048 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
1049 * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1050 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
1051 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
1052 * the certificate is acceptable."
1053 */
1054 if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
1055 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1056 trustErrorStatus))
1057 {
1058 TRACE_(chain)(
1059 "email address in subject name is excluded\n");
1060 *trustErrorStatus |=
1061 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1062 }
1063 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
1064 if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
1065 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1066 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
1067 {
1068 TRACE_(chain)(
1069 "email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
1070 *trustErrorStatus |=
1071 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1072 }
1073 }
1074 LocalFree(name);
1075 }
1076 else
1077 *trustErrorStatus |=
1078 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1079 }
1080
1081 static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1082 {
1083 BOOL empty;
1084
1085 if (!name->cbData)
1086 empty = TRUE;
1087 else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
1088 {
1089 /* An empty sequence is also empty */
1090 empty = TRUE;
1091 }
1092 else
1093 empty = FALSE;
1094 return empty;
1095 }
1096
1097 static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1098 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1099 {
1100 BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
1101 DWORD i;
1102
1103 /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
1104 * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
1105 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
1106 * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
1107 * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
1108 * attribute [RFC2985]."
1109 * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
1110 */
1111 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
1112 i++)
1113 if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1114 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1115 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1116 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
1117 i++)
1118 if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1119 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1120 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1121 if (hasEmailConstraint)
1122 compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
1123 trustErrorStatus);
1124 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1125 {
1126 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1127 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1128
1129 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
1130 directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
1131 {
1132 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
1133 *trustErrorStatus |=
1134 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1135 }
1136 }
1137 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1138 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
1139 * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
1140 * acceptable."
1141 * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
1142 */
1143 if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
1144 {
1145 BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
1146
1147 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1148 {
1149 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1150 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1151
1152 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1153 {
1154 hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
1155 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
1156 subjectName);
1157 }
1158 }
1159 if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
1160 {
1161 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
1162 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1163 }
1164 }
1165 }
1166
1167 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
1168 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
1169 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1170 {
1171 CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
1172
1173 if (ext)
1174 compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
1175 trustErrorStatus);
1176 /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
1177 * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1178 * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
1179 * subject alternative names."
1180 */
1181 compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
1182 trustErrorStatus);
1183 }
1184
1185 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1186 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
1187 {
1188 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
1189
1190 CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
1191
1192 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
1193 cert->rgExtension)))
1194 {
1195 DWORD size;
1196
1197 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1198 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1199 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
1200 &size);
1201 }
1202 return info;
1203 }
1204
1205 static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
1206 {
1207 DWORD i;
1208 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1209
1210 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
1211 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1212 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
1213 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
1214 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
1215 */
1216 if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
1217 {
1218 WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
1219 ret = FALSE;
1220 }
1221 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
1222 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1223 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
1224 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
1225 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
1226 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
1227 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
1228 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
1229 * certificate."
1230 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
1231 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
1232 */
1233 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1234 if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1235 info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1236 {
1237 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
1238 ret = FALSE;
1239 }
1240 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1241 if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1242 info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1243 {
1244 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
1245 ret = FALSE;
1246 }
1247 return ret;
1248 }
1249
1250 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1251 {
1252 int i, j;
1253
1254 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
1255 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
1256 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
1257 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
1258 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
1259 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
1260 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
1261 * them.
1262 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
1263 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
1264 * constraints.
1265 */
1266 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1267 {
1268 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1269
1270 if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
1271 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
1272 {
1273 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
1274 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1275 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1276 else
1277 {
1278 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1279 {
1280 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1281
1282 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
1283 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
1284 */
1285 if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1286 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext))
1287 {
1288 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
1289 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
1290 &errorStatus);
1291 if (errorStatus)
1292 {
1293 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1294 errorStatus;
1295 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1296 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1297 }
1298 else
1299 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1300 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1301 }
1302 }
1303 }
1304 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1305 }
1306 }
1307 }
1308
1309 static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1310 {
1311 DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1312 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
1313 LPWSTR str = NULL;
1314
1315 if (len)
1316 {
1317 str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1318 if (str)
1319 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1320 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
1321 }
1322 return str;
1323 }
1324
1325 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
1326 {
1327 LPWSTR str;
1328
1329 switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
1330 {
1331 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
1332 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
1333 debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
1334 break;
1335 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
1336 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
1337 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
1338 break;
1339 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
1340 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
1341 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
1342 break;
1343 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
1344 str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
1345 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
1346 CryptMemFree(str);
1347 break;
1348 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
1349 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
1350 break;
1351 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
1352 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
1353 entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
1354 break;
1355 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
1356 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
1357 debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
1358 break;
1359 default:
1360 TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
1361 }
1362 }
1363
1364 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1365 {
1366 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
1367 DWORD size;
1368
1369 TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
1370 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
1371 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1372 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1373 {
1374 DWORD i;
1375
1376 TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
1377 for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
1378 dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
1379 LocalFree(name);
1380 }
1381 }
1382
1383 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1384 {
1385 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
1386 DWORD size = 0;
1387
1388 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
1389 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
1390 NULL, &info, &size))
1391 {
1392 TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
1393 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1394 info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1395 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
1396 LocalFree(info);
1397 }
1398 }
1399
1400 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1401 {
1402 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
1403 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
1404
1405 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1406 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1407 0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
1408 {
1409 TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
1410 TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
1411 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1412 constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1413 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
1414 }
1415 }
1416
1417 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1418 {
1419 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1420 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1421
1422 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1423 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1424 {
1425 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1426 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1427 if (usage.cbData)
1428 {
1429 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
1430 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
1431 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1432 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1433 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1434 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1435 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1436 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
1437 }
1438 #undef trace_usage_bit
1439 if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
1440 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1441 }
1442 }
1443
1444 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
1445 {
1446 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
1447 TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1448 subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
1449 }
1450
1451 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1452 {
1453 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1454 DWORD size;
1455
1456 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1457 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1458 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
1459 &size))
1460 {
1461 DWORD i;
1462
1463 TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1464 nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
1465 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1466 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
1467 TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1468 nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
1469 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1470 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
1471 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1472 }
1473 }
1474
1475 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1476 {
1477 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1478 DWORD size;
1479
1480 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1481 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1482 &policies, &size))
1483 {
1484 DWORD i, j;
1485
1486 TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
1487 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1488 {
1489 TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1490 debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
1491 TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1492 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
1493 for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
1494 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1495 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
1496 pszPolicyQualifierId));
1497 }
1498 LocalFree(policies);
1499 }
1500 }
1501
1502 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1503 {
1504 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
1505 DWORD size;
1506
1507 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
1508 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1509 &usage, &size))
1510 {
1511 DWORD i;
1512
1513 TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
1514 for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
1515 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
1516 LocalFree(usage);
1517 }
1518 }
1519
1520 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1521 {
1522 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1523 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1524
1525 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1526 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1527 {
1528 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1529 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1530 if (usage.cbData)
1531 {
1532 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1533 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1534 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1535 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1536 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
1537 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
1538 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1539 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1540 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1541 }
1542 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1543 }
1544 }
1545
1546 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1547 {
1548 TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
1549 ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
1550 if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1551 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
1552 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
1553 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
1554 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1555 dump_basic_constraints(ext);
1556 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1557 dump_key_usage(ext);
1558 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1559 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
1560 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
1561 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
1562 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1563 dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
1564 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1565 dump_name_constraints(ext);
1566 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1567 dump_cert_policies(ext);
1568 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1569 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
1570 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
1571 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
1572 }
1573
1574 static LPCWSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
1575 {
1576 static WCHAR date[80];
1577 WCHAR dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1578 SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
1579
1580 if (!time) return NULL;
1581
1582 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt,
1583 sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0]));
1584 FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
1585 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date,
1586 sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0]));
1587 return date;
1588 }
1589
1590 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1591 {
1592 LPWSTR name = NULL;
1593 DWORD len, i;
1594
1595 TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1596 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1597 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
1598 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1599 if (name)
1600 {
1601 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1602 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
1603 TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1604 CryptMemFree(name);
1605 }
1606 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1607 NULL, 0);
1608 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1609 if (name)
1610 {
1611 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1612 name, len);
1613 TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1614 CryptMemFree(name);
1615 }
1616 TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1617 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore)),
1618 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter)));
1619 TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
1620 for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1621 dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
1622 }
1623
1624 static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1625 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
1626 {
1627 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1628 BOOL ret;
1629 BYTE usageBits = 0;
1630
1631 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1632 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1633 if (ext)
1634 {
1635 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1636 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1637
1638 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
1639 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1640 &usage, &size);
1641 if (!ret)
1642 return FALSE;
1643 else if (usage.cbData > 2)
1644 {
1645 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1646 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1647 */
1648 return FALSE;
1649 }
1650 else
1651 {
1652 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1653 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1654 * key usage bits.
1655 */
1656 usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
1657 }
1658 }
1659 if (isCA)
1660 {
1661 if (!ext)
1662 {
1663 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1664 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1665 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1666 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1667 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1668 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1669 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1670 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1671 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1672 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1673 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1674 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1675 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1676 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1677 * certificate in the chain.
1678 */
1679 if (isRoot)
1680 ret = TRUE;
1681 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
1682 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
1683 {
1684 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1685 engine->hWorld, cert);
1686
1687 ret = localCert != NULL;
1688 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
1689 }
1690 else
1691 ret = FALSE;
1692 if (!ret)
1693 WARN_(chain)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1694 }
1695 else
1696 {
1697 if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1698 {
1699 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1700 ret = FALSE;
1701 }
1702 else
1703 ret = TRUE;
1704 }
1705 }
1706 else
1707 {
1708 if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1709 {
1710 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1711 ret = FALSE;
1712 }
1713 else
1714 ret = TRUE;
1715 }
1716 return ret;
1717 }
1718
1719 static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1720 {
1721 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1722 DWORD i;
1723
1724 for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1725 {
1726 if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
1727 {
1728 LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
1729
1730 if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1731 ret = TRUE;
1732 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1733 ret = TRUE;
1734 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1735 ret = TRUE;
1736 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1737 ret = TRUE;
1738 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1739 ret = TRUE;
1740 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1741 ret = TRUE;
1742 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1743 ret = TRUE;
1744 else
1745 {
1746 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1747 debugstr_a(oid));
1748 ret = FALSE;
1749 }
1750 }
1751 }
1752 return ret;
1753 }
1754
1755 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1756 {
1757 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1758
1759 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1760 switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
1761 {
1762 case CERT_V1:
1763 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1764 * section 4.1.2.8:
1765 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1766 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1767 */
1768 if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
1769 cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
1770 ret = FALSE;
1771 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1772 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1773 */
1774 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1775 ret = FALSE;
1776 break;
1777 case CERT_V2:
1778 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1779 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1780 */
1781 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1782 ret = FALSE;
1783 break;
1784 case CERT_V3:
1785 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1786 break;
1787 default:
1788 WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1789 ret = FALSE;
1790 }
1791 return ret;
1792 }
1793
1794 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1795 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
1796 {
1797 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
1798 int i;
1799 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
1800 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
1801
1802 TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1803 chain->cElement, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time)));
1804 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
1805 {
1806 BOOL isRoot;
1807
1808 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
1809 dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1810 if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
1811 isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1812 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1813 else
1814 isRoot = FALSE;
1815 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1816 {
1817 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1818 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1819 */
1820 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1821 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1822 }
1823 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
1824 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
1825 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1826 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
1827 if (i != 0)
1828 {
1829 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1830 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1831 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
1832 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
1833 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
1834 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
1835 chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1836 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
1837 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1838 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1839 */
1840 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
1841 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1842 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1843 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
1844 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
1845 &pathLengthConstraintViolated))
1846 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1847 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1848 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
1849 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
1850 {
1851 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1852 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
1853 }
1854 }
1855 else
1856 {
1857 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1858 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1859 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
1860 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1861 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1862 }
1863 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
1864 isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
1865 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1866 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
1867 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
1868 {
1869 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1870 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1871 */
1872 pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
1873 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1874 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
1875 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1876 }
1877 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1878 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1879 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1880 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1881 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1882 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1883 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1884 }
1885 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
1886 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext))
1887 {
1888 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1889 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
1890 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
1891 }
1892 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
1893 }
1894
1895 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject,
1896 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer, DWORD *infoStatus)
1897 {
1898 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
1899 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1900 DWORD size;
1901
1902 *infoStatus = 0;
1903 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
1904 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
1905 {
1906 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
1907 BOOL ret;
1908
1909 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
1910 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1911 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1912 &info, &size);
1913 if (ret)
1914 {
1915 CERT_ID id;
1916
1917 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
1918 {
1919 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
1920 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
1921 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
1922 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
1923 &info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
1924 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1925 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1926 prevIssuer);
1927 if (issuer)
1928 {
1929 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
1930 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
1931 }
1932 }
1933 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
1934 {
1935 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
1936 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
1937 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1938 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1939 prevIssuer);
1940 if (issuer)
1941 {
1942 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
1943 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
1944 }
1945 }
1946 LocalFree(info);
1947 }
1948 }
1949 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
1950 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
1951 {
1952 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
1953 BOOL ret;
1954
1955 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
1956 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1957 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1958 &info, &size);
1959 if (ret)
1960 {
1961 CERT_ID id;
1962
1963 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
1964 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
1965 {
1966 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
1967 DWORD i;
1968
1969 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
1970 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
1971 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
1972 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1973 directoryName =
1974 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
1975 if (directoryName)
1976 {
1977 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
1978 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
1979 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
1980 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
1981 &info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
1982 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
1983 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
1984 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
1985 prevIssuer);
1986 if (issuer)
1987 {
1988 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
1989 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
1990 }
1991 }
1992 else
1993 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
1994 }
1995 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
1996 {
1997 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
1998 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
1999 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2000 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2001 prevIssuer);
2002 if (issuer)
2003 {
2004 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2005 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2006 }
2007 }
2008 LocalFree(info);
2009 }
2010 }
2011 else
2012 {
2013 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2014 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
2015 &subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, prevIssuer);
2016 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
2017 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
2018 }
2019 return issuer;
2020 }
2021
2022 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
2023 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
2024 */
2025 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2026 HCERTSTORE world, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
2027 {
2028 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2029 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
2030
2031 while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
2032 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert))
2033 {
2034 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(world, cert, NULL,
2035 &chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2036
2037 if (issuer)
2038 {
2039 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
2040 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2041 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
2042 * close the enumeration that found it
2043 */
2044 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
2045 cert = issuer;
2046 }
2047 else
2048 {
2049 TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
2050 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
2051 break;
2052 }
2053 }
2054 return ret;
2055 }
2056
2057 static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
2058 HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime,
2059 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
2060 {
2061 BOOL ret = FALSE;
2062 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
2063
2064 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine, world, cert, pTime);
2065
2066 chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2067 if (chain)
2068 {
2069 memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2070 chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2071 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
2072 if (ret)
2073 {
2074 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, chain);
2075 if (ret)
2076 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
2077 }
2078 if (!ret)
2079 {
2080 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
2081 chain = NULL;
2082 }
2083 *ppChain = chain;
2084 }
2085 return ret;
2086 }
2087
2088 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2089 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2090 PCertificateChain *ppChain)
2091 {
2092 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2093 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
2094 HCERTSTORE world;
2095 BOOL ret;
2096
2097 world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
2098 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
2099 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
2100 if (hAdditionalStore)
2101 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
2102 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
2103 * supported yet.
2104 */
2105 if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime,
2106 &simpleChain)))
2107 {
2108 PCertificateChain chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2109
2110 if (chain)
2111 {
2112 chain->ref = 1;
2113 chain->world = world;
2114 chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2115 chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
2116 chain->context.cChain = 1;
2117 chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2118 chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
2119 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2120 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2121 chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2122 chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2123 }
2124 else
2125 ret = FALSE;
2126 *ppChain = chain;
2127 }
2128 return ret;
2129 }
2130
2131 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
2132 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
2133 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
2134 {
2135 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2136
2137 if (copy)
2138 {
2139 memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2140 copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2141 copy->rgpElement =
2142 CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2143 if (copy->rgpElement)
2144 {
2145 DWORD i;
2146 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2147
2148 memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
2149 (iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2150 for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
2151 {
2152 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2153 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2154
2155 if (element)
2156 {
2157 *element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
2158 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2159 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
2160 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
2161 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2162 */
2163 memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2164 copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
2165 }
2166 else
2167 ret = FALSE;
2168 }
2169 if (!ret)
2170 {
2171 for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
2172 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
2173 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
2174 CryptMemFree(copy);
2175 copy = NULL;
2176 }
2177 }
2178 else
2179 {
2180 CryptMemFree(copy);
2181 copy = NULL;
2182 }
2183 }
2184 return copy;
2185 }
2186
2187 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain)
2188 {
2189 DWORD i;
2190
2191 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2192 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
2193 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
2194 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2195 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2196 }
2197
2198 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain)
2199 {
2200 DWORD i;
2201
2202 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2203 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2204 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
2205 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
2206 CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
2207 CryptMemFree(chain);
2208 }
2209
2210 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
2211 * simple chain iChain.
2212 */
2213 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain,
2214 DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
2215 {
2216 PCertificateChain copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2217
2218 if (copy)
2219 {
2220 copy->ref = 1;
2221 copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
2222 copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2223 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
2224 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2225 */
2226 memset(&copy->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2227 copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2228 copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2229 copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2230 copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2231 copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
2232 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2233 if (copy->context.rgpChain)
2234 {
2235 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2236 DWORD i;
2237
2238 memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
2239 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2240 if (iChain)
2241 {
2242 for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
2243 {
2244 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2245 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2246 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
2247 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2248 ret = FALSE;
2249 }
2250 }
2251 else
2252 i = 0;
2253 if (ret)
2254 {
2255 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2256 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2257 iElement);
2258 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2259 ret = FALSE;
2260 }
2261 if (!ret)
2262 {
2263 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
2264 copy = NULL;
2265 }
2266 else
2267 copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
2268 }
2269 else
2270 {
2271 CryptMemFree(copy);
2272 copy = NULL;
2273 }
2274 }
2275 return copy;
2276 }
2277
2278 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
2279 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2280 PCertificateChain chain)
2281 {
2282 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2283 PCertificateChain alternate;
2284
2285 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2286
2287 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
2288 * order of alternate creation:
2289 */
2290 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2291 chain = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2292 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
2293 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
2294 if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
2295 alternate = NULL;
2296 else
2297 {
2298 DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
2299 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
2300
2301 alternate = NULL;
2302 for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2303 for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
2304 j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
2305 {
2306 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
2307 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2308 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2309 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
2310
2311 alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer->hCertStore,
2312 subject, prevIssuer, &infoStatus);
2313 }
2314 if (alternateIssuer)
2315 {
2316 i--;
2317 j--;
2318 alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
2319 if (alternate)
2320 {
2321 BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
2322 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
2323
2324 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2325 * to close the enumeration that found it
2326 */
2327 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
2328 if (ret)
2329 {
2330 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
2331 alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
2332 if (ret)
2333 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
2334 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
2335 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
2336 &alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
2337 }
2338 if (!ret)
2339 {
2340 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
2341 alternate = NULL;
2342 }
2343 }
2344 }
2345 }
2346 TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
2347 return alternate;
2348 }
2349
2350 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2351 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2352 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2353 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2354 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2355
2356 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2357 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2358 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2359 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2360
2361 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2362 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2363
2364 static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
2365 {
2366 DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
2367
2368 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2369 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
2370 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
2371 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2372 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
2373 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2374 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2375 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
2376 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
2377 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2378 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
2379 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
2380 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2381 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
2382 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
2383 return quality;
2384 }
2385
2386 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2387 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2388 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2389 */
2390 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2391 PCertificateChain chain)
2392 {
2393 DWORD i;
2394
2395 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2396 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2397 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2398 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2399 * lower quality contexts.
2400 */
2401 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2402 {
2403 PCertificateChain alternate =
2404 (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
2405
2406 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
2407 {
2408 alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
2409 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
2410 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2411 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
2412 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
2413 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2414 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2415 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2416 chain = alternate;
2417 }
2418 }
2419 return chain;
2420 }
2421
2422 static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain,
2423 const CertificateChain *alternate)
2424 {
2425 BOOL ret;
2426
2427 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2428 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2429 CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
2430 (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
2431 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2432 else
2433 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2434 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2435 if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
2436 {
2437 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2438 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
2439 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
2440 ret = TRUE;
2441 }
2442 else
2443 ret = FALSE;
2444 return ret;
2445 }
2446
2447 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2448 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
2449 {
2450 DWORD j, iElement;
2451 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
2452
2453 for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
2454 {
2455 if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
2456 iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
2457 else
2458 element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
2459 }
2460 return element;
2461 }
2462
2463 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
2464 DWORD cbSize;
2465 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
2466 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
2467
2468 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2469 LPFILETIME pTime, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
2470 {
2471 DWORD cContext;
2472
2473 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
2474 cContext = 1;
2475 else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
2476 (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
2477 {
2478 DWORD i;
2479
2480 for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2481 {
2482 if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
2483 chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
2484 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
2485 else
2486 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
2487 }
2488 }
2489 else
2490 cContext = 0;
2491 if (cContext)
2492 {
2493 PCCERT_CONTEXT *contexts =
2494 CryptMemAlloc(cContext * sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT));
2495
2496 if (contexts)
2497 {
2498 DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
2499 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
2500 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
2501 { sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
2502 BOOL ret;
2503
2504 for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain;
2505 i++)
2506 {
2507 for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
2508 j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2509 contexts[iContext++] =
2510 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2511 }
2512 revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
2513 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
2514 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
2515 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
2516 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
2517 revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
2518 if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2519 {
2520 revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
2521 pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
2522 revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
2523 pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
2524 revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
2525 pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
2526 }
2527 ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2528 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, cContext, (void **)contexts,
2529 revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
2530 if (!ret)
2531 {
2532 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2533 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain, revocationStatus.dwIndex);
2534 DWORD error;
2535
2536 switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
2537 {
2538 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
2539 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
2540 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
2541 /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed to be
2542 * offline too.
2543 */
2544 error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
2545 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2546 break;
2547 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
2548 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2549 break;
2550 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
2551 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
2552 break;
2553 default:
2554 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
2555 error = 0;
2556 }
2557 if (element)
2558 {
2559 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2560 element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2561 }
2562 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2563 }
2564 CryptMemFree(contexts);
2565 }
2566 }
2567 }
2568
2569 static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2570 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2571 {
2572 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) &&
2573 pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2574 {
2575 PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert;
2576 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
2577 BOOL validForUsage;
2578
2579 /* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
2580 endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
2581 /* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
2582 * public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
2583 * "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
2584 * certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
2585 * basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
2586 * If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
2587 * if that usage is included in the extension:
2588 * "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
2589 * for one of the purposes indicated."
2590 * There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
2591 * have to be respected:
2592 * "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
2593 * MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
2594 * but not the particular OID expected for the application."
2595 * For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
2596 * the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
2597 */
2598 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
2599 endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2600 {
2601 const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage =
2602 &pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage;
2603 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
2604 DWORD size;
2605
2606 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2607 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2608 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
2609 {
2610 if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND)
2611 {
2612 DWORD i, j;
2613
2614 /* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
2615 validForUsage = TRUE;
2616 for (i = 0; validForUsage &&
2617 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2618 {
2619 BOOL match = FALSE;
2620
2621 for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2622 match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2623 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2624 if (!match)
2625 validForUsage = FALSE;
2626 }
2627 }
2628 else
2629 {
2630 DWORD i, j;
2631
2632 /* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
2633 validForUsage = FALSE;
2634 for (i = 0; !validForUsage &&
2635 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2636 {
2637 for (j = 0; !validForUsage &&
2638 j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2639 validForUsage =
2640 !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2641 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2642 }
2643 }
2644 LocalFree(usage);
2645 }
2646 else
2647 validForUsage = FALSE;
2648 }
2649 else
2650 {
2651 /* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
2652 * "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
2653 * key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
2654 * be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
2655 * that application."
2656 * Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
2657 * accept chains without it.
2658 */
2659 TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
2660 validForUsage = TRUE;
2661 }
2662 if (!validForUsage)
2663 {
2664 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2665 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2666 chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2667 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2668 }
2669 }
2670 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) &&
2671 pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2672 FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
2673 }
2674
2675 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
2676 {
2677 if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2678 {
2679 DWORD i;
2680
2681 TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
2682 usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
2683 for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2684 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2685 }
2686 }
2687
2688 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2689 {
2690 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
2691 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
2692 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
2693 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2694 {
2695 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2696 &pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
2697 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
2698 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
2699 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
2700 }
2701 }
2702
2703 BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2704 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2705 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
2706 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
2707 {
2708 BOOL ret;
2709 PCertificateChain chain = NULL;
2710
2711 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
2712 pTime, hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags, pvReserved, ppChainContext);
2713
2714 if (ppChainContext)
2715 *ppChainContext = NULL;
2716 if (!pChainPara)
2717 {
2718 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
2719 return FALSE;
2720 }
2721 if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
2722 {
2723 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
2724 return FALSE;
2725 }
2726
2727 if (!hChainEngine)
2728 hChainEngine = CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2729 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
2730 dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
2731 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2732 ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime,
2733 hAdditionalStore, &chain);
2734 if (ret)
2735 {
2736 PCertificateChain alternate = NULL;
2737 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
2738
2739 do {
2740 alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine,
2741 pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2742
2743 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2744 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2745 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2746 */
2747 if (alternate)
2748 ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
2749 } while (ret && alternate);
2750 chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
2751 if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
2752 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2753 pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2754 if (!pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus)
2755 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, pChainPara, dwFlags);
2756 CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara);
2757 TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n",
2758 pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
2759 if (ppChainContext)
2760 *ppChainContext = pChain;
2761 else
2762 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
2763 }
2764 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
2765 return ret;
2766 }
2767
2768 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2769 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2770 {
2771 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2772
2773 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2774
2775 if (chain)
2776 InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
2777 return pChainContext;
2778 }
2779
2780 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2781 {
2782 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2783
2784 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2785
2786 if (chain)
2787 {
2788 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
2789 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
2790 }
2791 }
2792
2793 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
2794 LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
2795 {
2796 DWORD i, j;
2797
2798 for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2799 for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2800 if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2801 error)
2802 {
2803 *iChain = i;
2804 *iElement = j;
2805 return;
2806 }
2807 }
2808
2809 static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2810 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2811 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2812 {
2813 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2814 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2815 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
2816 {
2817 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
2818 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2819 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2820 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2821 }
2822 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2823 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
2824 {
2825 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
2826 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2827 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2828 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2829 }
2830 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
2831 {
2832 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
2833 find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
2834 &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2835 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2836 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2837 }
2838 else
2839 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2840 return TRUE;
2841 }
2842
2843 static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
2844 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2845 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2846 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2847 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2848 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2849 static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
2850 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2851 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2852 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2853 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2854 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2855
2856 static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2857 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2858 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2859 {
2860 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
2861 pPolicyStatus);
2862
2863 if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
2864 {
2865 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
2866 BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
2867 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
2868 pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
2869 rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
2870 DWORD i;
2871 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
2872 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
2873 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
2874 };
2875
2876 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2877 for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
2878 i++)
2879 {
2880 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
2881 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
2882 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2883 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
2884 &failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
2885 isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
2886 }
2887 if (isMSTestRoot)
2888 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
2889 }
2890 return ret;
2891 }
2892
2893 static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2894 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2895 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2896 {
2897 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2898 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2899 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
2900 {
2901 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2902 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2903 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2904 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2905 }
2906 else
2907 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2908 return TRUE;
2909 }
2910
2911 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext,
2912 LPCWSTR server_name)
2913 {
2914 BOOL matches = FALSE;
2915 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
2916 DWORD size;
2917
2918 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
2919 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
2920 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
2921 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
2922 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
2923 */
2924 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
2925 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2926 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2927 &subjectName, &size))
2928 {
2929 DWORD i;
2930
2931 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
2932 * in section 4.2.1.6:
2933 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
2934 * MAY be included."
2935 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
2936 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
2937 */
2938 for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
2939 {
2940 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
2941 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
2942 {
2943 TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
2944 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
2945 if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
2946 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
2947 matches = TRUE;
2948 }
2949 }
2950 LocalFree(subjectName);
2951 }
2952 return matches;
2953 }
2954
2955 static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
2956 LPCWSTR component)
2957 {
2958 BOOL matches = FALSE;
2959 DWORD i, j;
2960
2961 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
2962 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
2963 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
2964 name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
2965 {
2966 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr;
2967
2968 attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
2969 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
2970 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
2971 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
2972 * value with a case-insensitive match.
2973 */
2974 matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
2975 attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
2976 }
2977 return matches;
2978 }
2979
2980 static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
2981 LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
2982 BOOL *see_wildcard)
2983 {
2984 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
2985 BOOL matches = TRUE;
2986
2987 *see_wildcard = FALSE;
2988 if (server_len < allowed_len)
2989 {
2990 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
2991 debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
2992 debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
2993 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
2994 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
2995 */
2996 return FALSE;
2997 }
2998 for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
2999 matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
3000 allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
3001 {
3002 if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
3003 {
3004 if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
3005 {
3006 WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
3007 matches = FALSE;
3008 }
3009 else if (!allow_wildcards)
3010 {
3011 WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
3012 matches = FALSE;
3013 }
3014 else
3015 {
3016 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
3017 * the component also matches.
3018 */
3019 *see_wildcard = TRUE;
3020 break;
3021 }
3022 }
3023 matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
3024 }
3025 if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
3026 {
3027 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
3028 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
3029 */
3030 matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
3031 }
3032 return matches;
3033 }
3034
3035 static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr)
3036 {
3037 LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
3038 LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
3039 DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
3040 LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
3041 DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
3042 BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
3043
3044 TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3045
3046 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
3047 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
3048 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
3049 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
3050 * but not bar.com."
3051 *
3052 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
3053 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
3054 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
3055 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
3056 *
3057 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
3058 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
3059 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
3060 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
3061 */
3062 do {
3063 LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
3064
3065 allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
3066 allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
3067 server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
3068 server_len - (server_component - server_name));
3069 /* The number of components must match */
3070 if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
3071 {
3072 if (!allowed_dot)
3073 WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
3074 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3075 else
3076 WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
3077 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3078 matches = FALSE;
3079 }
3080 else
3081 {
3082 LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
3083 BOOL has_wildcard;
3084
3085 allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
3086 server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
3087 matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
3088 allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
3089 server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
3090 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
3091 * may follow
3092 */
3093 if (!has_wildcard)
3094 allow_wildcards = FALSE;
3095 if (matches)
3096 {
3097 allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
3098 server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
3099 }
3100 }
3101 } while (matches && allowed_component &&
3102 allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
3103 server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
3104 TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
3105 return matches;
3106 }
3107
3108 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
3109 {
3110 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3111 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
3112 DWORD size;
3113
3114 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3115 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
3116 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
3117 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3118 &name, &size))
3119 {
3120 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
3121 * make sure all of them are present.
3122 */
3123 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
3124 {
3125 LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
3126
3127 matches = TRUE;
3128 do {
3129 LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
3130 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
3131 WCHAR component[255];
3132 DWORD len;
3133
3134 end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
3135 len = end - ptr;
3136 if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0]))
3137 {
3138 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
3139 debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
3140 matches = FALSE;
3141 }
3142 else
3143 {
3144 memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
3145 component[len] = 0;
3146 matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
3147 }
3148 ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
3149 } while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
3150 }
3151 else
3152 {
3153 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr;
3154
3155 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
3156 * make sure the common name matches.
3157 */
3158 if ((attr = CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME, name)))
3159 matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
3160 }
3161 LocalFree(name);
3162 }
3163 return matches;
3164 }
3165
3166 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3167 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3168 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3169 {
3170 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3171 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3172 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
3173 {
3174 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
3175 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3176 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3177 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3178 }
3179 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3180 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
3181 {
3182 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3183 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3184 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3185 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3186 }
3187 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
3188 {
3189 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3190 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3191 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3192 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3193 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
3194 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3195 }
3196 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3197 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
3198 {
3199 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
3200 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3201 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3202 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3203 }
3204 else
3205 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3206 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
3207 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
3208 */
3209 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
3210 pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
3211 {
3212 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
3213
3214 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
3215 {
3216 if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
3217 sslPara->pwszServerName)
3218 {
3219 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
3220 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
3221 BOOL matches;
3222
3223 cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
3224 altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
3225 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
3226 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
3227 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
3228 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
3229 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
3230 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
3231 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
3232 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
3233 * domainComponent attribute."
3234 */
3235 if (altNameExt)
3236 matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
3237 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3238 else
3239 matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
3240 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3241 if (!matches)
3242 {
3243 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
3244 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
3245 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3246 }
3247 }
3248 }
3249 }
3250 return TRUE;
3251 }
3252
3253 static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
3254 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
3255 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
3256 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
3257 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
3258 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
3259 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
3260 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
3261 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
3262 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
3263 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
3264 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
3265 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
3266 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
3267 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
3268 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
3269 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
3270 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
3271 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3272 static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
3273 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
3274 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
3275 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
3276 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
3277 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
3278 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
3279 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
3280 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
3281 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
3282 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
3283 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
3284 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
3285 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
3286 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
3287 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
3288 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
3289 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
3290 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3291 static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
3292 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
3293 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
3294 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
3295 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
3296 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
3297 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
3298 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
3299 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
3300 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
3301 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
3302 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
3303 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
3304 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
3305 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
3306 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
3307 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
3308 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
3309 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
3310 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
3311 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
3312 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
3313 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
3314 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
3315 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
3316 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
3317 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
3318 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
3319 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
3320 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
3321 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
3322 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
3323 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
3324 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
3325 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
3326 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
3327 0x01 };
3328
3329 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3330 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3331 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3332 {
3333 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3334 pPolicyStatus);
3335
3336 if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
3337 {
3338 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3339 BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
3340 DWORD i;
3341 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3342 { sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
3343 { sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
3344 { sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
3345 };
3346 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
3347 pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
3348 PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
3349 rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
3350
3351 for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3352 i++)
3353 {
3354 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3355 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3356 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3357 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3358 &root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3359 isMSRoot = TRUE;
3360 }
3361 if (isMSRoot)
3362 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3363 }
3364 return ret;
3365 }
3366
3367 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3368 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3369 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
3370
3371 BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3372 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3373 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3374 {
3375 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
3376 BOOL ret = FALSE;
3377 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
3378 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
3379
3380 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
3381 pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
3382
3383 if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID))
3384 {
3385 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
3386 {
3387 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
3388 verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
3389 break;
3390 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
3391 verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
3392 break;
3393 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
3394 verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
3395 break;
3396 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
3397 verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
3398 break;
3399 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
3400 verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
3401 break;
3402 default:
3403 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
3404 }
3405 }
3406 if (!verifyPolicy)
3407 {
3408 if (!set)
3409 set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
3410 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
3411 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
3412 (void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
3413 }
3414 if (verifyPolicy)
3415 ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3416 pPolicyStatus);
3417 if (hFunc)
3418 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
3419 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
3420 return ret;
3421 }
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