MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |
MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ),
/* Only ECDSA */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ),
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) |
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ),
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
/* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */
MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) |
static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
+ if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
+ return( -1 );
+
if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg )
{
+ if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
+ return( -1 );
+
if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
{
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;
+ if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
+ return( -1 );
+
if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
- if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) != MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC )
+ if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) !=
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC )
+ {
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG );
+ }
/* Skip everything but DNS name */
if( tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2 ) )
end_ext_data = *p + len;
/* Get extension ID */
- extn_oid.tag = **p;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &extn_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
+ extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
extn_oid.p = *p;
*p += extn_oid.len;
- if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA );
-
/* Get optional critical */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 &&
( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) )
memcpy( p, buf, crt->raw.len );
- // Direct pointers to the new buffer
+ // Direct pointers to the new buffer
p += crt->raw.len - len;
end = crt_end = p + len;
/*
* Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL.
- * Skip validation is no CRL for the given CA is present.
+ * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present.
*/
static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list,
flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md );
- if( md_info == NULL )
+ if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
{
- /*
- * Cannot check 'unknown' hash
- */
+ /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break;
}
- mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash );
-
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, crl_list->sig_pk, &ca->pk ) != 0 )
flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
return( 0 );
}
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate with no parent inside the chain
+ * (either the parent is a trusted root, or there is no parent)
+ *
+ * See comments for mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile()
+ * (also for notation used below)
+ *
+ * This function is called in two cases:
+ * - child was found to have a parent in trusted roots, in which case we're
+ * called with trust_ca pointing directly to that parent (not the full list)
+ * - this is cases 1, 2 and 3 of the comment on verify_with_profile()
+ * - case 1 is special as child and trust_ca point to copies of the same
+ * certificate then
+ * - child was found to have no parent either in the chain or in trusted CAs
+ * - this is cases 4 and 5 of the comment on verify_with_profile()
+ *
+ * For historical reasons, the function currently does not assume that
+ * trust_ca points directly to the right root in the first case, and it
+ * doesn't know in which case it starts, so it always starts by searching for
+ * a parent in trust_ca.
+ */
static int x509_crt_verify_top(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
- if( md_info == NULL )
+ if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
{
- /*
- * Cannot check 'unknown', no need to try any CA
- */
+ /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
+ /* Cannot check signature, no need to try any CA */
trust_ca = NULL;
}
- else
- mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
for( /* trust_ca */ ; trust_ca != NULL; trust_ca = trust_ca->next )
{
*/
if( child->subject_raw.len == trust_ca->subject_raw.len &&
memcmp( child->subject_raw.p, trust_ca->subject_raw.p,
- child->issuer_raw.len ) == 0 )
+ child->subject_raw.len ) == 0 )
{
check_path_cnt--;
}
if( trust_ca != NULL &&
( child->subject_raw.len != trust_ca->subject_raw.len ||
memcmp( child->subject_raw.p, trust_ca->subject_raw.p,
- child->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 ) )
+ child->subject_raw.len ) != 0 ) )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the chain's top crt */
return( 0 );
}
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate with a parent inside the chain
+ *
+ * See comments for mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile()
+ */
static int x509_crt_verify_child(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
- if( md_info == NULL )
+ if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
{
- /*
- * Cannot check 'unknown' hash
- */
+ /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
else
{
- mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
-
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/*
* Verify the certificate validity, with profile
+ *
+ * The chain building/verification is spread accross 4 functions:
+ * - this one
+ * - x509_crt_verify_child()
+ * - x509_crt_verify_top()
+ * - x509_crt_check_parent()
+ *
+ * There are five main cases to consider. Let's introduce some notation:
+ * - E means the end-entity certificate
+ * - I an intermediate CA
+ * - R the trusted root CA this chain anchors to
+ * - T the list of trusted roots (R and possible some others)
+ *
+ * The main cases with the calling sequence of the crt_verify_xxx() are:
+ * 1. E = R (explicitly trusted EE cert)
+ * verify(E, T) -> verify_top(E, R)
+ * 2. E -> R (EE signed by trusted root)
+ * verify(E, T) -> verify_top(E, R)
+ * 3. E -> I -> R (EE signed by intermediate signed by trusted root)
+ * verify(E, T) -> verify_child(E, I, T) -> verify_top(I, R)
+ * (plus variant with multiple intermediates)
+ * 4. E -> I (EE signed by intermediate that's not trusted)
+ * verify(E, T) -> verify_child(E, I, T) -> verify_top(I, T)
+ * (plus variant with multiple intermediates)
+ * 5. E (EE not trusted)
+ * verify(E, T) -> verify_top(E, T)
+ *
+ * Note: this notation and case numbering is also used in x509_crt_verify_top()
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
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